State v. Hutton
| Decision Date | 10 February 1960 |
| Docket Number | No. 1115,1115 |
| Citation | 87 Ariz. 176,349 P.2d 187 |
| Parties | STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Earl HUTTON, Appellant. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Richard F. Harles and Henry R. Paytas, Phoenix, for appellant.
Wade Church, Atty. Gen., and Leslie C. Hardy, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
The County Attorney of Maricopa County filed an information consisting of three counts, charging Earl Hutton with the following crimes: Count 1--First Degree Burglary. Counts 2 and 3--Grand Theft. He pleaded guilty to counts 1 and 2. Count 3 was dismissed. The trial court sentenced him to not less than 14 years nor more than 15 years for the crime of burglary, and not less than nine nor more than ten years for grand theft, the sentences to run consecutively.
The grand theft for which the defendant was sentenced was for stealing a saddle from the building which he burglarized. It is claimed the court erred in subjecting defendant to cumulative punishment because the burglary and grand theft were one and the same act or transaction. It is also contended that to subject defendant to an aggregate of not less than 23 years nor more than 25 years constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. The first question presented is whether the defendant, having pleaded guilty to both crimes (burglary and grand theft), may be legally sentenced for both when the grand theft was committed in carrying out the original motive for committing the burglary. He was charged with breaking and entering with the intent to commit larceny. He committed the burglary and consummated his original intent by stealing the saddle. The validity of the sentences for both offenses is dependent upon whether, under the circumstances, he actually committed both crimes.
A.R.S. § 13-1641 reads:
'Different punishments for same offense; limitation and bar
Defendant says that this section protects him from double punishment because the burglary and theft were committed in one transaction. We cannot agree. The above statute covers a situation where the same act is punishable in different ways under different sections of the law. Under such a situation, he can be punished for only one offense. Burglary and theft are two separate and distinct acts. To constitute burglary it is not necessary that theft be committed. In this case, it was only necessary that the breaking and entering be made with the intent to commit grand theft. To consummate theft, it is essential that after the burglary is completed, the additional act of actually stealing be committed. We have had occasion to construe the aforementioned section of the statute and held in effect that for the section to operate to prevent double punishment, the two alleged crimes must have identical components. State v. Westbrook, 79 Ariz. 116, 285 P.2d 161, 53 A.L.R.2d 619. The elements constituting burglary and theft are entirely different. One may be committed without the other.
A.R.S. § 13-1641, supra, was taken from California, and the courts of that state have construed the statute to the effect that one committing burglary and larceny in one transaction was guilty of two crimes and could be sentenced for both. People v. Goodman, ...
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People v. McFarland
...subject rule is also followed in those states which do have statutes similar to our section 654. 16 Thus, in State v. Hutton (1960, Ariz.), 87 Ariz. 176, 349 P.2d 187, 188-189 (1-5), the defendant was given consecutive sentences for burglary and for grand theft committed after entering the ......
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People v. Wise
...(1981).9 E.g., Morgan v. Devine, 237 U.S. 632, 35 S.Ct. 712, 59 L.Ed. 1153 (1915); Mead v. State, 489 P.2d 738 (1971); State v. Hutton, 87 Ariz. 176, 349 P.2d 187 (1960); Whitted v. State, 187 Ark. 285, 59 S.W.2d 597 (1933); Wilson v. State, 24 Conn. 57 (1855); Estevez v. State, 313 So.2d 6......
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Edmond v. State
...1969, 169 Colo. 186, 45 P.2d 797; Newburn v. State, Miss.1967, 205 So.2d 260.10 Mead v. State, Alas.1971, 489 P.2d 738; State v. Hutton, 1960, 87 Ariz. 176, 349 P.2d 187; Williams v. State, 1954, 205 Md. 470, 109 A.2d 89; Rogerson v. Harris, 1947, 111 Utah 330, 178 P.2d 397.11 C.C.W.D.Mo. 1......
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State v. Boag
...was 'an act' as contemplated by this statute, and therefore he could only be convicted under one of the criminal statutes. State v. Hutton, 87 Ariz. 176, 349 P.2d 187, is directly in point, and refutes defendant's contention. In that case the defendant broke into a building and stole a sadd......