State v. Huynh
| Decision Date | 11 June 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 46826-0-I.,46826-0-I. |
| Citation | 107 Wash.App. 68,26 P.3d 290 |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Ngo Tho HUYNH, Appellant. |
Oliver Davis, Washington Appellate Project, Seattle, Wa., for appellant.
David Seaver, Deputy King Co. Pros., Seattle, Wa., for respondent.
After police observed Ngo Tho Huynh receive cocaine in an apparent narcotics transaction, they arrested him and the State charged him with possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. Huynh sought to admit at trial a medical record containing statements he made to a treating physician blaming police for injuring his wrist and shoulder during his arrest. The trial court excluded the medical record and a jury found him guilty of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. Huynh moved for an arrest of judgment, contending that the State failed to prove his intent to deliver the cocaine. The trial court granted this motion and entered judgment instead on the lesser included offense of possession of cocaine. Huynh appeals.
Hearsay statements attributing fault that are not reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment are not admissible under ER 803(a)(4). We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Huynh's medical record. We also conclude that the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the State is insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt Huynh's intent to deliver the cocaine. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's arrest of judgment.
On January 6, 2000, Seattle Police Sergeant Roger Rusness and Seattle Police Detective Maria Vijarro watched Ngo Tho Huynh take a "white object wrapped up" from another man. According to Sergeant Rusness, Huynh attempted to hand the other man something. When Huynh saw the police, he ran. Sergeant Rusness watched Huynh toss the package over a railing onto an awning. After Sergeant Rusness told Detective Vijarro that Huynh had thrown the package, she retrieved it and discovered that it contained approximately 22 grams of warm, soft cocaine wrapped in a paper towel. Sergeant Rusness and Detective Vijarro arrested Huynh, and Detective Vijarro discovered $900 in $100 bills in his jacket outside of his wallet. The State charged Huynh with a Violation of the Uniform Controlled Substance Act (VUCSA) by unlawfully possessing cocaine with intent to deliver within 1,000 feet of a school bus stop.
Before trial in this case, Huynh sought to admit a medical record dated January 9, 2000, containing the following statements written by a physician at Harborview Medical Center:
The record reflects that this medical treatment occurred three days after he was arrested, which was three days before he was released on bail pending trial. After lengthy argument from Huynh's attorney and the prosecutor on the admissibility of the medical record, the trial judge stated: "I will reserve ruling on the admissibility of the substance of this document until I've heard cross-examination of the police officers, and possibly until I've heard the defendant's testimony, if he does testify." But during trial, Huynh's attorney did not ask Sergeant Rusness or Detective Vijarro about any injuries to Huynh. And Huynh did not testify. Nonetheless, Huynh's attorney again moved the trial court to admit the medical record containing allegations that the police injured Huynh during his arrest. After hearing arguments again, the trial court denied this motion because the officers were not given the opportunity to admit or deny the allegations during cross-examination. As a result, the medical record was excluded from trial.
At trial, the State presented evidence that the street value of the cocaine was approximately $2,700 to $2,800, the warm temperature and soft consistency of the cocaine indicated that it was freshly cooked, and the police discovered no drug paraphernalia on Huynh when he was arrested, indicative of personal use. Further, Sergeant Rusness and Detective Vijarro opined that they believed Huynh's intent was to sell the cocaine. A jury found Huynh guilty of unlawfully possessing cocaine with intent to deliver within 1,000 feet of a school bus stop. Huynh moved for an arrest of judgment, contending that the State failed to establish his intent to deliver the cocaine. He also moved for a new trial on the possession of cocaine charge on the basis that the trial court committed reversible error when it excluded his medical report. The trial court granted Huynh's motion for arrest of judgment, but denied his motion for a new trial. It then entered judgment on the lesser included offense of possession of cocaine.
Huynh appeals, contending that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a new trial based on the trial court's exclusion of his medical record. And the State cross-appeals, contending that the trial court erred by granting Huynh's motion for arrest of judgment because the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's verdict that Huynh is guilty of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver.
Huynh contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a new trial based on the trial court's exclusion of his medical record, which would have demonstrated Sergeant Rusness's bias.1
"The grant or denial of a motion for a new trial is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only for abuse of that discretion." State v. Copeland, 130 Wash.2d 244, 294, 922 P.2d 1304 (1996); see CrR 7.6. "Admissibility of evidence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and the court's decision will not be reversed absent abuse of that discretion." State v. Hamlet, 133 Wash.2d 314, 324, 944 P.2d 1026 (1997). If a party seeking admission of documentary evidence makes an offer of proof that "includes both inadmissible and admissible evidence, a ruling excluding the evidence is not erroneous." 5 Karl B. Tegland, Washington Practice: Evidence § 103.19, at 73 (4th ed.1999) (footnote omitted) (citing Kennard v. Mountain View Dev. Co., 69 Wash.2d 492, 496, 419 P.2d 154 (1966)).
Under ER 607, the "credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party[.]" Although the court may require that a witness be shown his or her prior inconsistent statement before he or she is asked about it at trial, extrinsic evidence of acts or conduct may be introduced to prove a witness's bias without first calling such acts or conduct to the witness's attention. State v. Wilder, 4 Wash.App. 850, 855, 486 P.2d 319 (1971); ER 613(a).
In this case, the trial court denied Huynh's motion to introduce the medical record because Huynh's attorney did not first question the officers about these allegations. But Huynh's attorney was not required to call to Sergeant Rusness's attention extrinsic evidence of acts or conduct contained in the medical record before that evidence was admissible to prove his bias. See Wilder, 4 Wash.App. at 855,
486 P.2d 319. Indeed, the State correctly concedes on appeal that the trial court excluded the medical report on incorrect grounds but urges this court to uphold the trial court's exclusion of the medical record under ER 803(a)(4). We can affirm on any grounds supported by the record. State v. Bryant, 97 Wash.App. 479, 490-91, 983 P.2d 1181 (1999) (footnote omitted), review denied, 140 Wash.2d 1026, 10 P.3d 406, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1016, 121 S.Ct. 576, 148 L.Ed.2d 493 (2000).
"`Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." ER 801(c). Unless a rule or statute provides otherwise, hearsay is not admissible at trial. ER 802. ER 803(a)(4) provides that "[s]tatements made for the purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment" are not excluded by the hearsay rule. Under ER 803(a)(4), "neutral statements of causation (`I was hit in the face') would normally be admissible, but a statement attributing fault (`Uncle Joe was beating me') may not be." 5B Tegland, Wash.Prac. § 803.23 at 469 (4th ed.1999) (footnote omitted), For example, in cases involving abuse, statements attributing fault to a person living in a victim's household are reasonably pertinent to treatment and therefore admissible. See, e.g. State v. Ashcraft, 71 Wash.App. 444, 456-57, 859 P.2d 60 (1993)
. The rationale behind this rule is that such statements are "`relevant to the prevention of recurrence of injury.'" State v. Sims, 77 Wash.App. 236, 239, 890 P.2d 521 (1995) (quoting State v. Butler, 53 Wash.App. 214, 221, 766 P.2d 505, (1989)).
In the present case, Huynh's medical record contains allegations that police assaulted him by bending his arm and hitting him in the face three days before he sought treatment. Huynh asserts that these statements are "relevant to medical treatment because [he] had been and was in the care and custody of the police—the source of the injuries—at the time of treatment." Reply Brief of Appellant, at 4. But Huynh points to no evidence to indicate that he remained in Sergeant Rusness's custody after Sergeant Rusness and Detective Vijarro brought him back to the precinct the day he was arrested. Indeed, the record indicates...
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In re Detention of Law
...subjects that would otherwise be irrelevant, if the extrinsic evidence sought for impeachment constitutes hearsay, it is inadmissible.6 In Huynh, the defendant sought to attack a police officer's credibility and show his bias with a medical record containing that the police injured him duri......
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State v. Hicks, No. 53606-1-I (WA 7/18/2005)
...26. Apparently, the court based its erroneous assessment on the fact that both offenses were Class B felonies. 27. State v. Huynh, 107 Wn. App. 68, 74, 26 P.3d 290 (2001). 28. RCW 29. RCW 9A.56.020. 30. RCW 9A.56.030(1)(b). 31. Fernandez-Medina, 141 Wn.2d at 456 (quoting State v. Warden, 13......
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In re Detention of Law
...subjects that would otherwise be irrelevant, if the extrinsic evidence sought for impeachment constitutes hearsay, it is inadmissible.[6] In Huynh, the sought to attack a police officer's credibility and show his bias with a medical record containing allegations that the police injured him ......
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State v. Rager, No. 50796-6-I (Wash. App. 12/22/2003)
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