State v. Iddings
| Decision Date | 03 January 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. S-19-304.,S-19-304. |
| Citation | 936 N.W.2d 747,304 Neb. 759 |
| Parties | STATE of Nebraska, appellee, v. Matthew P. IDDINGS, appellant. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
Jonathan M. Hendricks, of Dowding, Dowding, Dowding & Urbom Law Offices, for appellant.
Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Erin E. Tangeman, Lincoln, for appellee.
This case presents an appeal from a sentence imposed after the defendant pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. The State and the defendant had jointly agreed to recommend an 18-month period of incarceration. The district court ultimately sentenced the defendant to an indeterminate term of 18 months’ to 5 years’ incarceration, and the defendant appeals. The defendant asserts that the State breached its agreement to recommend a sentence of 18 months’ incarceration by remarking that it "struggled" concerning the sentencing recommendation. Further, the defendant argues that the court erred by failing to order a presentence investigation when, although defense counsel below stated that the defendant was waiving the presentence investigation, the court only articulated that it had found such an investigation to be impractical. The defendant argues that the court abused its discretion in finding a presentence investigation impractical. The defendant generally asserts that the sentence was excessive and was a result of the court’s abuse of discretion in failing to consider all of the sentencing factors, such as mentality, education and experience, or social and cultural background, in part as a result of failing to conduct a presentence investigation. Finally, the defendant argues that defense counsel below was ineffective for failing to request the proper amount of jail time credit pertaining to alleged time spent in jail in another county under arrest warrants for both the present case and the charges filed in that other county.
In relation to a traffic stop that occurred in July 2015, the defendant, Matthew P. Iddings, was originally charged under "60-6,196.15" with driving under the influence (DUI), fourth offense aggravated, a Class III felony. Defense counsel and the State reached a plea agreement pursuant to which the State filed an amended information charging Iddings with a nonaggravated DUI, fourth offense, under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,196 (Reissue 2010), a Class IIIA felony.
The amended information described that on July 2, 2015, Iddings operated a motor vehicle and had a concentration of .08 of 1 gram or more by weight of alcohol per 100 milliliters of his blood or .08 of 1 gram or more by weight of alcohol per 210 liters of his breath. The amended complaint further alleged that this was the fourth DUI offense committed by Iddings, who had been previously convicted of DUI in Nebraska on or about May 26, 2005, and March 15 and December 12, 2007.
At the plea and sentencing hearing held on March 6, 2019, defense counsel and the State explained to the court that they had reached a plea agreement under which the State amended the information from aggravated DUI, fourth offense, to nonaggravated DUI, fourth offense, and agreed to recommend jointly with defense counsel that Iddings be sentenced to 18 months’ incarceration.
As the factual basis for the crime, the State recited that on July 2, 2015, the "Nebraska State Patrol Help Line" received multiple telephone calls about a potential drunk driver on Interstate 80. An officer was able to locate the vehicle and observed both passenger-side tires drive off the shoulder of the roadway two different times. The officer conducted a traffic stop and, upon contact with the driver, Iddings, noticed a smell of alcoholic beverage. A blood draw was eventually conducted on Iddings, which demonstrated .307 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood.
Defense counsel agreed with the factual basis. Defense counsel also stated the defense was willing to stipulate to the prior DUI offenses alleged in the information and that Iddings had been represented by an attorney in each of the three prior offenses.
The court found the factual basis adequate to support the plea. After a standard plea colloquy, the court accepted Iddings’ no contest plea. The court found that the plea was not a result of any promise or threat; that the plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently; and that Iddings knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his constitutional rights.
Defense counsel advised the court that Iddings’ preference was to proceed immediately to sentencing, noting that he had calculated the jail time credit. The court did so.
When the court asked about a presentence investigation, defense counsel stated, "Your honor, ... Iddings will waive his right to a presentence investigation." When asked by the court for its comments, the State expressed that it had no objection to Iddings’ waiver of the presentence investigation. However, Iddings was not personally addressed by the court regarding such waiver.
The State noted with regard to Iddings’ criminal history that other than the three prior convictions listed on the information, Iddings also had a prior DUI in 1997. Further, he had committed a more recent DUI in Sarpy County around the same time as the charge he had just pled to and for which in October 2018 he had been sentenced to 18 months’ incarceration. Lastly, Iddings had a pending DUI charge in Grant County.
Defense counsel did not contest this history other than clarifying that Iddings had just finished serving his sentence on the Sarpy County conviction in October 2018, as opposed to being sentenced in October 2018. Further, defense counsel described that Iddings had already pled guilty to the charge of nonaggravated DUI, fourth offense, in Grant County and was awaiting sentencing.
After being so informed of the pending charges in Grant County, the district court for Hall County confirmed that Iddings was "likely to be transported to another county when [Hall County authorities were] done with him." The court found "under those circumstances that a presentence investigation is impractical." Defense counsel did not object to this conclusion. The court did not make an express finding that the presentence investigation had been waived.
Defense counsel asked the court to adopt the plea agreement and sentence Iddings to 18 months’ incarceration with 136 days’ credit. Defense counsel informed the court that Iddings had been in jail from October 23, 2017, to the date of the hearing, March 6, 2019, and that he had been in jail for 2 additional days in 2015.
Defense counsel asked the court to consider in sentencing that Iddings had not been out of jail since 2017 and had thus experienced a long period of sobriety. According to defense counsel, Iddings fully intended to "walk out of the Department of Corrections a better man than when he went in, and he does believe that he can maintain long-term sobriety."
When asked by the court for its thoughts on sentencing, the State said:
The record reflects that a bench warrant had been issued by the district court for Hall County on June 8, 2016, for Iddings’ failure to appear at a scheduled hearing. The appellate record does not reflect an arrest in Sarpy County in 2017. Instead, a document filed on October 24, 2018, reflects that Iddings was arrested in Hall County on October 23, 2018, on the June 8, 2016, warrant.
Having been present for the foregoing, Iddings was asked by the court whether he had any legal reason why the court should not pronounce its sentence and whether he had anything else to bring to the court’s attention before the court sentenced him. Iddings responded that he did not have any reason why the court should not proceed to sentencing. Iddings apologized for not appearing in court on June 8, 2016, explaining, "It was a health issue, I was in the hospital."
The court sentenced Iddings to a term of incarceration of 18 months to 5 years, with "credit for 136 days." Iddings’ driver’s license was revoked for 15 years. Defense counsel raised no objection to the sentence. In its final order, the court noted that the parties had agreed to 18 months’ incarceration and informed Iddings that it was not bound by the plea negotiations. The court reiterated its conclusion that a presentence investigation would be impractical and did not articulate anything pertaining to a waiver of the same.
Iddings appeals his sentence. He has obtained new counsel to represent him on appeal.
Iddings assigns that (1) the district court abused its discretion by sentencing him to a term of incarceration of 18 months to 5 years without due consideration of established sentencing factors, (2) the State violated the plea agreement, (3) he was entitled to additional credit for time served, (4) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the State’s violation of the plea agreement, and (5) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request at the sentencing hearing additional credit for time served.
When issues on appeal present questions of law, an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent conclusion irrespective of the decision of the court below.1
In determining whether a defendant’s waiver of a statutory or constitutional right was...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Malone
...v. Millard Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 17 , 302 Neb. 70, 921 N.W.2d 589 (2019).60 Cotton , supra note 48.61 Id.62 Id.63 State v. Iddings , 304 Neb. 759, 936 N.W.2d 747 (2020).64 Cotton , supra note 48.65 Brief for appellant at 33.66 Id. at 34.67 State v. Brown , 258 Neb. 330, 340, 603 N.W.2d 419, 4......
-
State v. Cody
...counsel's performance was deficient and that this deficient performance actually prejudiced the defendant's defense. State v. Iddings, 304 Neb. 759, 936 N.W.2d 747 (2020). To show that counsel's performance was deficient, a defendant must show that counsel's performance did not equal that o......
-
State v. Clausen
...Id.5 State v. Nadeem , 284 Neb. 513, 822 N.W.2d 372 (2012).6 State v. Paez , 302 Neb. 676, 925 N.W.2d 75 (2019).7 State v. Iddings , 304 Neb. 759, 936 N.W.2d 747 (2020).8 See id.9 State v. Vanness , 300 Neb. 159, 912 N.W.2d 736 (2018).10 See State v. Draper , 289 Neb. 777, 857 N.W.2d 334 (2......
-
State v. Simpson
...counsel's performance was deficient and that this deficient performance actually prejudiced the defendant's defense. State v. Iddings, 304 Neb. 759, 936 N.W.2d 747 (2020). To show that counsel's performance was deficient, a defendant must show that counsel's performance did not equal that o......