State v. Iglesias
| Decision Date | 22 June 1994 |
| Docket Number | 92-2679-CR,Nos. 92-2437-C,s. 92-2437-C |
| Citation | 185 Wis.2d 117,517 N.W.2d 175 |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
| Parties | , 42 A.L.R.5th 909 STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Lori IGLESIAS, Defendant-Appellant. In the Matter of State of Wisconsin v. Lori Iglesias: Leroy BOCHLER, and Frank Miller, Appellants, v. STATE of Wisconsin, Respondent. |
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Thomas J. Balistreri, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, Atty. Gen.
For the appellants in No. 92-2679-CR there were briefs by Bill Ginsberg, Rick B. Meier and Mandell & Ginsberg, Madison and oral argument by William M. Ginsberg.
For the respondent the cause was argued by Thomas J. Balistreri, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, Atty. Gen.
These consolidated cases are before us on certification by the court of appeals pursuant to sec. (Rule) 809.61, Stats. Appellants present two issues for review. The first is whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it imposed a fine against the defendant-appellant Lori Iglesias (Iglesias). The second is whether sec. 969.03(4), Stats., 1 violates the United States and/or Wisconsin constitutions by providing that bail money can be used to satisfy fines and costs imposed against a defendant. We conclude that the answer to both these questions is "no," and therefore affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
In the spring of 1991, Iglesias was arrested and charged with multiple criminal offenses stemming from her role in engaging two fourteen-year-old girls to work as prostitutes. The circuit court eventually set bail at $11,750. This amount was posted on Iglesias's behalf by Leroy Bochler and Frank Miller. Bochler was a business partner of Iglesias's brother. He posted $5,750. Frank Miller, a friend of Iglesias's, posted the remaining $6,000. Upon posting these amounts, both Bochler and Miller were given a receipt which contained the following language:
In the event the court orders a judgment for a fine or costs or both, the amount of cash deposited with this bond, if any, shall be applied to the payment of the judgment. This means that before any money is returned to the person or persons making the cash deposit, the cash deposit will first be used for payment of the judgment. Any excess will be returned to the person or persons making the cash deposit. (See ss. 969.02 and 969.03 Wis.Stats
On October 21, 1991, Iglesias was convicted of one count of soliciting a child for prostitution, sec. 948.08, Stats., one count of child enticement, party to a crime, secs. 948.07(2) and 939.05, and four counts of second degree sexual assault of a child, party to a crime, secs. 948.02(2) and 939.05.
At sentencing, the circuit court discussed the factors it considered in arriving at what it believed was an appropriate sentence. On one hand, the court expressed sensitivity to the fact that in June of 1991, Iglesias was diagnosed as HIV positive. The court believed Iglesias's medical condition was counterbalanced, though, by the seriousness of her crimes, and the need to send a strong message to the community for deterrence purposes. In the end, the court sentenced Iglesias to twelve years in prison. Additionally, the court imposed a fine against Iglesias in the amount of $1,500 for each of the six counts. Those fines, along with costs, totalled $11,210. Pursuant to sec. 969.03(4), Stats., the court ordered that the bail money be used to satisfy this judgment, with any remaining funds returned to Bochler and Miller.
Iglesias, Bochler and Miller all filed postconviction motions with the circuit court. The thrust of Iglesias's motion was that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it imposed a fine without first assessing her ability to pay. Iglesias asked that the fine be vacated, or in the alternative, that the funds be returned to Bochler and Miller and that she be held personally liable for the fine. Bochler and Miller moved that the money they posted for bail be returned to them on the grounds that sec. 969.03(4), Stats., violated various provisions of the United States and/or Wisconsin constitutions. The circuit court denied their motions. Appellants then appealed to the court of appeals, which consolidated and certified their cases to this court.
The first issue we address is whether the circuit court abused its discretion when it imposed a fine against Iglesias. Iglesias advances two arguments in this regard. First, she maintains that the circuit court's decision to impose a fine was premised upon that court's mistaken view of the law governing sentencing. Specifically, she argues that the circuit court mistakenly believed that a defendant's health cannot be a factor at sentencing. Thus, when the court gave Iglesias a shorter prison term than it otherwise would have, it felt compelled to compensate by imposing a substantial fine. In other words, Iglesias's argument is that the court would never have imposed a fine had it properly realized that a defendant's health can be considered at sentencing.
Sentencing is a discretionary judicial act reviewable by this court in the same manner as all other discretionary acts. McCleary v. State, 49 Wis.2d 263, 277, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971). As we explained in McCleary, the term "discretion" contemplates a process of reasoning dependent on facts in the record or fairly inferable from the record and a conclusion based upon the logical application of proper legal standards. Id. If the trial court states its reasoning on the record, and that reasoning indicates that discretion was properly exercised, the sentence should ordinarily be affirmed. Id. at 281, 182 N.W.2d 512.
In the past, we have outlined the factors appropriate for consideration in sentencing:
The primary factors that a sentencing court considers are (1) the gravity of the offense, (2) the character of the offender, and (3) the need to protect the public. As part of these primary factors, the sentencing court may consider: the vicious or aggravated nature of the crime; the past record of criminal offenses; any history of undesirable behavior patterns; the defendant's personality, character and social traits; the results of a presentence investigation; the degree of the defendant's culpability; the defendant's demeanor at trial; the defendant's age, educational background and employment record; the defendant's remorse, repentance and cooperativeness; the defendant's need for rehabilitative control; the right of the public; and the length of pretrial detention.
State v. Borrell, 167 Wis.2d 749, 773-74, 482 N.W.2d 883 (1992). This list is not exhaustive. The defendant's health can be considered at sentencing. See, State v. Michels, 150 Wis.2d 94, 99-100, 441 N.W.2d 278 (Ct.App.1989) (Defendant's health was a factor for trial court to consider at initial sentencing, but a change in health is not a "new factor" so as to warrant modification of original sentence The weight given to each factor is left to the trial court's broad discretion. State v. Thompson, 172 Wis.2d 257, 264, 493 N.W.2d 729 (Ct.App.1992).
In this case, the record indicates that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion. The transcripts from the sentencing hearing and the hearing on postconviction motions reveal that the circuit court considered a wide range of appropriate factors when it sentenced Iglesias. Those included not only her health, but the gravity of her crimes, her past criminal behavior, her character, and the need to send a "strong message" to deter would-be offenders from similarly exploiting minors. Moreover, there is no indication that the circuit court imposed a fine simply to "atone" for giving Iglesias a shorter prison sentence than it otherwise would have but for her poor health. The record indicates that the court weighed all the relevant factors, and arrived at a sentence which it felt was appropriate: twelve years in prison coupled with a substantial fine. We do not believe the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it imposed that sentence.
Iglesias's second challenge to the fine is her contention that the circuit court imposed the fine without first ascertaining her ability to pay. Because Iglesias timely raised the issue of ability to pay in her postconviction motion, we agree that the circuit court had a duty to make a determination on that issue. West Allis v. State ex rel. Tochalauski, 67 Wis.2d 26, 32, 226 N.W.2d 424 (1975); Will v. State, 84 Wis.2d 397, 404, 267 N.W.2d 357 (1978).
(1972), this court cited with approval section 2.7 of the American Bar Association's Standards on Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures. Subsection (c) of those guidelines provides the following:
(c) In determining whether to impose a fine and its amount, the court should consider:
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of a fine will impose, with due regard to his other obligations;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay a fine on an installment basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court;
(iii) the extent to which payment of a fine will interfere with the ability of the defendant to make any ordered restitution or reparation to the victim of the crime; and
(iv) whether there are particular reasons which make a fine appropriate as a deterrent to the offense involved or appropriate as a corrective measure for the defendant.
Citing in particular those factors listed in subsection (i), Iglesias argues that in this case, the circuit court failed to adequately consider her limited financial resources and failed to consider the effect imposition of the fine would have on her other obligations. These other obligations, according to Iglesias, included outstanding medical bills, the support of her children, and the need...
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