State v. Ingalls

• Decision Date: 08 October 1896
• Citation: 68 N.W. 445,98 Iowa 728
• Parties: STATE v. INGALLS ET AL.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

98 Iowa 728

68 N.W. 445

STATE

v.INGALLS ET AL.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 8, 1896.

Appeal from district court, Winneshiek county; L. E. Fellows, Judge.

At the October, 1895, term of the Winneshiek county district court, the grand jury returned two indictments against the defendants,--one for larceny, and the other for breaking and entering. They were tried on the first indictment, and acquitted. Thereafter they were called to answer to the second, and to this they pleaded a former acquittal by the verdict of the jury in the larceny case. At the trial upon the second indictment they were acquitted, by the direction of the court. From the ruling upon this plea of autrefois acquit the state appeals. Reversed.E. P. Johnson, Co. Atty., for the State.

DEEMER, J.

The record shows that the grand jury acted upon the same evidence in finding each indictment; that the defendants were acquitted upon the charge of larceny; and the lower court held, as a matter of law, that the acquittal of the charge of larceny was such an adjudication as to bar the prosecution of the second charge. The exact holding of the court was: “The indictment in this case being based upon the same testimony as in No. 6,260, and there having been an acquittal in that case upon a question absolutely essential to be proven to authorize a conviction in this case, and the adjudication in that case having been pled in this case, and the court holding such plea to be a bar to the prosecution of this case, the case is dismissed, and the defendants discharged.” This ruling was evidently based upon the opinion of this court in the case of State v. Waterman, 87 Iowa, 255, 54 N. W. 359. We do not think the case is in point, nor is it an authority for the position taken by the learned district judge. While the defendant in that case was twice indicted, yet each presentment was for the same offense, to wit, that of obstructing a highway; and the evidence adduced conclusively established the fact that it was the same highway, and the same obstacle which it was claimed constituted the obstruction to the highway in each case. It was also shown that the indictments covered, in part at least, the same periods of time. On such a state of facts, we held that an acquittal in the one case was a bar to the prosecution of the other. How different are the facts in this case! Here the two indictments do not charge the same offense, but entirely distinct and independent crimes. True, the state might have shown in the second trial that a larceny was in fact committed by the defendants for the purpose of showing their intent in breaking and entering the building, but it was not required to do this. It could secure a conviction without proving a larceny. All that it needed to prove in this connection was that the defendants broke and entered the building with...