State v. Inglis

• Decision Date: 01 July 2014
• Docket Number: No. 35750.,35750.
• Citation: 151 Conn.App. 283,94 A.3d 1204
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Antonio J. INGLIS.

151 Conn.App. 283

94 A.3d 1204

STATE of Connecticut

v.Antonio J. INGLIS.

No. 35750.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 20, 2014.

Decided July 1, 2014.

Conrad Ost Seifert, assigned counsel, Old Lyme, for the appellant (defendant).

Melissa L. Streeto, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Peter A. McShane, state's attorney, and Timothy J. Liston, former state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

DiPENTIMA, C.J., and GRUENDEL and ALVORD, Js.

GRUENDEL, J.

The defendant, Antonio J. Inglis, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of two counts of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a–54a (a),¹ and one count each of capital felony in violation of General Statutes § 53a–54b (7),² assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–59 (a)(5),³ and carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of General Statutes § 29–35(a).⁴ The defendant claims that the court improperly declined (1) to instruct the jury in accordance with two of his proposed eyewitness identification instructions, and (2) to provide a third party culpability instruction to the jury.⁵ We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found that, in the early hours of February 10, 2008, an altercation ensued at the Cocktails on the Green nightclub (club) in Cromwell that left two men dead and another wounded. The altercation began when the defendant repeatedly antagonized one of the victims, Tyrese Lockhart, a patron seated at the bar with friends. Lockhart and his friends eventually confronted the defendant and asked him to leave Lockhart alone. A group of the defendant's friends that included his brother, Daren Walls, likewise encouraged the defendant to leave Lockhart alone. When Israel Dandrade, a disc jockey who was performing at the club that evening, announced “last call” soon thereafter, Lockhart headed toward an exit with friends. At that moment, the defendant brandished a chrome revolver and fired several shots in Lockhart's direction. One shot struck Lockhart in the head, another struck Dandrade in the eye, and a third grazed the cheek of Kenneth Lewis, a cook at the club. Lockhart and Dandrade died as a result of their respective gunshot wounds.

The defendant subsequently was arrested and charged with the aforementioned offenses. A jury trial followed, at which the state presented eyewitness testimony from multiple individuals identifying the defendant as the shooter. ⁶ The theory advanced by the defense was that, due to the facial similarity between Walls and the defendant, those witnesses could not distinguish between the two brothers to properly identify the shooter. ⁷ At the conclusionof trial, the jury found the defendant guilty on all counts. The court rendered judgment in accordance with that verdict and sentenced the defendant to a total effective term of life imprisonment without the possibility of release, plus twenty five years. ⁸ From that judgment, the defendant now appeals.

I

The defendant alleges instructional error on the issue of eyewitness identification. Specifically, he claims that the court improperly declined to instruct the jury in accordance with two of his proposed instructions regarding “identification based on own recollection” and “honest mistake.” ⁹

Practice Book § 42–18, which specifies the form and content requirements of requests to charge, provides in relevant part that “[w]hen there are several requests, they shall be in separate and numbered paragraphs, each containing a single proposition of law clearly and concisely stated with the citation of authority upon which it is based, and the evidence to which the proposition would apply ....” (Emphasis added.) As our Supreme Court repeatedly has explained, “[w]hile this court does not favor unyielding adherence to rules of procedure where the interests of justice are thereby disserved ... the ever increasing refinement of our law justifies cooperation of counsel in stating requests for jury instruction. The minor burden of cooperation imposed by [Practice Book § 42–18] is neither unreasonable nor novel.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Corbin, 260 Conn. 730, 747, 799 A.2d 1056 (2002).

It is undisputed that the defendant did not comply with the prerequisites of Practice Book § 42–18. His request to charge on eyewitness identification did not cite to any legal authority, nor did it specify any evidence to which the propositions allegedly applied. Significantly, this is not a case in which the record contains “substantial additional support ... such as detailed colloquies with the court and opposing counsel and a postcharge exception [indicating that] ... the trial court is informed adequately of the factual and legal bases for the instructional request.” State v. Smith, 262 Conn. 453, 466, 815 A.2d 1216 (2003). Rather, the record before us is bereft of any discussion of this specific issue; the defendant did not raise it during the charging conference or take a postcharge exception. The court, therefore, properly could have denied those requests to charge on the basis of the defendant's noncompliance with § 42–18. See State v. Bettini, 11 Conn.App. 684, 690, 528 A.2d 1180 (“[i]n the absence of compliance with the rules of practice, the trial court is entitled to deny a request to charge”), cert. denied, 205 Conn. 804, 531 A.2d 937 (1987); accord State v. Tomasko, 238 Conn. 253, 262–63, 681 A.2d 922 (1996) (trial court properly denied request to charge that did not comply with rules of practice).

The defendant also argues that his claim is reviewable pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989). He is mistaken. As this court has observed, “[n]ot every claim of instructional error is constitutional in nature. State v. LaBrec, 270 Conn. 548, 557, 854 A.2d 1 (2004). Our Supreme Court repeatedly has noted that it has recognized instructional claims as raising constitutional issues only in matters relating to the elements of an offense, burden of proof and the presumption of innocence. Id.; see also State v. Schiappa, 248 Conn. 132, 165, 728 A.2d 466, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 862, 120 S.Ct. 152, 145 L.Ed.2d 129 (1999); State v. Dash, 242 Conn. 143, 151–52, 698 A.2d 297 (1997); State v. Walton, 227 Conn. 32, 64–65, 630 A.2d 990 (1993). The defendant's claim does not pertain to the elements of the offenses in question, the state's burden of proof or the presumption of innocence, nor does the defendant make such an argument. Accordingly, it does not merit Golding review.” State v. Antwon W., 118 Conn.App. 180, 201, 982 A.2d 1112 (2009), cert. denied, 295 Conn. 922, 991 A.2d 568 (2010). That logic applies equally in the present case.

Claims pertaining to the adequacy of a court's instructions on misidentification are not constitutional in nature. See State v. Cerilli, 222 Conn. 556, 567, 610 A.2d 1130 (1992) (identification instruction not constitutionally required); State v. Tillman, 220 Conn. 487, 501, 600 A.2d 738 (1991) (“[e]ven if the court's instructions were less informative on the risks of misidentification than they might have been, the issue is at most one of instructional error rather than of constitutional error”), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1207, 112 S.Ct. 3000, 120 L.Ed.2d 876 (1992); State v. Anderson, 20 Conn.App. 271, 281, 566 A.2d 436 (1989) (“there is no constitutional right to an instruction on the fallibility of eyewitness identifications”), cert. denied, 213 Conn. 813, 569 A.2d 549 (1990). As such, the defendant cannot satisfy the second prong of Golding.

II

The defendant also claims that the court committed reversible error when it declined to provide a third party culpability instruction to the jury. We disagree.

The following additional facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, are relevant to this claim. Walls was the defendant's brother and bore a strong facial resemblance to him. He did not physically resemble the defendant. Unlike the defendant, who stood five feet, seven inches tall with a “husky” and “more muscular” build, Walls was five feet, ten inches tall and had a “slim” physique. At the time of the shooting, Walls' hair was braided in cornrows, whereas the defendant's hair was short and curly.¹⁰ The two also were dressed differently at that time. The defendant wore a black knit cap, a baggy grey jacket with yellow trim, jeans, and tan boots. By contrast, Walls had on a fitted and light-colored jacket with a large emblem on the upper left chest, jeans, and no cap.

Lockhart was seated at the bar when the defendant began antagonizing him. After several minutes, Lockhart turned around and said, “I don't even know who you are, who are you, leave me alone ... what is the problem?” As Lockhart turned back to the bar to finish his drink, Walls intervened and attempted to calm the defendant. Walls told the defendant to “let it go” and made a “calm down” gesture with his hands. The defendant nevertheless refused to “let it go” and remained agitated. Walls continued his efforts to calm the defendant, telling him to “chill, just let it go, back up....” ¹¹ Lockhart was fatally shot soon thereafter.

At trial, the defendant submitted a request to charge that sought, inter alia, an instruction on third party liability.¹² During the charging conference, defense counsel explained why he thought that instruction was appropriate, stating: “There's a lot of controversy as to—with respect to where the shooter was and who was shooting.... Certainly, based on the testimony that's brought out [Walls] as being—looking similar to [the defendant with] one witness saying he looks exactly alike, we believe it's more than appropriate for the court to give such an instruction....” The court responded: “The only reason I disagree with that [is] your classic third party culpability is usually the defense ... after some kind of evidentiary hearing or motion, is attempting to put in evidence of...