State v. Inman, KCD
| Decision Date | 26 February 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. KCD,KCD |
| Citation | 578 S.W.2d 336 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Charles INMAN, Appellant. 29777. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
E. Richard Webber, Memphis, for appellant.
John D. Ashcroft, Atty. Gen., Bruce E. Anderson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.
Before SOMERVILLE, P. J., and DIXON and TURNAGE, JJ.
Defendant was charged with receiving stolen property (Section 560.270, RSMo 1969). A Putnam County jury before whom he cast his lot found him guilty as charged and fixed his punishment at thirty days confinement in the county jail and payment of a fine in the amount of $350.00 (Section 560.161.1(2) and .2(2), RSMo 1969). Judgment and sentence were rendered and pronounced accordingly.
None of the three rulings of the trial court with which defendant takes issue on appeal need be set forth as the evidence was insufficient to make a submissible case. Defendant's incarceration and subjection to a fine for commission of a crime wholly unsustained by the evidence is legally intolerable, and as its inseparable companions are "manifest injustice" and "miscarriage of justice" a prime situation for sua sponte application of the "plain error" rule within the intendment of Rule 27.20(c) is presented. State v. Goodwin, 352 S.W.2d 614, 619 (Mo. banc 1962). See also State v. Sockel, 490 S.W.2d 336, 339 (Mo.App.1973).
State v. Armstrong, 555 S.W.2d 640, 642 (Mo.App.1977), citing State v. Kelly, 365 S.W.2d 602 (Mo.1963), spells out the essential elements, four in number, of the offense of receiving stolen property: "(1) The property must be 'received in some way' from another person ; (2) the property at the time of reception must be stolen property; (3) the receiver, at the time of reception, must have guilty knowledge that it is stolen property; and (4) the accused must have received the property with a fraudulent or criminal intent". (Emphasis added.) The first element makes eminent good sense. The general rule underlying it, "that one cannot at the same time be a principal in the larceny and in the legal sense a receiver of stolen property", was acknowledged in State v. Honig, 78 Mo. 249, 252-53 (1883), wherein the court observed by way of explanation that if one "is a principal actor in the theft the Actual captor of the property, it is illogical and contradictory to say he has received it from another." (Emphasis added.) Obversely stated, a thief cannot receive stolen property from himself.
Insofar as the first element of the charged offense is concerned, a recitation of the germane facts is most noteworthy for what they fail to prove rather than for what they do prove. On or about August 7, 1975, a 1975 green Chevrolet pickup truck was stolen from the lot of Smith Chevrolet, Inc., in Bloomfield, Iowa. Shortly thereafter defendant purchased a wrecked 1974 Chevrolet pickup truck from a salvage yard in Fort Dodge, Iowa. Various parts of the wrecked vehicle were cannibalized, including a plate bearing its "vehicle identification number" (VIN), and utilized on the stolen 1975 green Chevrolet pickup for the obvious purpose of concealing its true identity. The end product was thereafter observed in defendant's possession in Putnam County, Missouri. Be that as it may, there is not one iota of evidence as to who stole the 1975 green Chevrolet pickup truck from the Smith Chevrolet, Inc., lot or how it ever came into defendant's possession. With the record in this posture there is no escape from the conclusion that evidence to support the first essential element of the offense of receiving stolen property was totally lacking.
No solace for the state is to be found in the general principle that in ruling upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a judgment of conviction the facts in evidence and all favorable inferences to be drawn therefrom must be considered...
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...is wholly unsupported by the evidence, review for plain error within the intendment of Rule 29.12(b) is appropriate. State v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 336, 337 (Mo.App.1979); State v. Maddox, 549 S.W.2d 931, 932 Under § 570.030 of the new Criminal Code (effective 1/1/79), an individual is guilty o......
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State v. Hayes
...that it is stolen property; and, (d) the accused must have received the property with a fraudulent or criminal intent. State v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 336 (Mo.App.1979). The rule is clear in this state that, while an unexplained possession of recently stolen property can give rise to an inferenc......
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State v. Reyes
...held that to merely reverse the conviction and grant defendant a new trial would improperly place her in double jeopardy. State v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 336 (Mo.App.1979) is cited. For this reason, defendant was ordered The State contends Instruction No. 6 followed MAI-CR 3d 304.06 and was a pr......
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State v. Montgomery, 10981
...must receive the property with a fraudulent or criminal intent. State v. Norman, 586 S.W.2d 45, 47(1) (Mo.App.1979); State v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 336, 337 (Mo.App.1979). It is defendant's position that the evidence fails to show element (1). "( W)hile an unexplained possession of recently sto......