State v. Ireland

Citation111 N.E.3d 468,2017 Ohio 263
Decision Date24 January 2017
Docket NumberNo. 15AP–1134.,15AP–1134.
Parties STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Darin K. IRELAND, Defendant–Appellant.
CourtUnited States Court of Appeals (Ohio)

On brief: Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael P. Walton, for appellee. Argued: Michael P. Walton.

On brief: Giorgianni Law LLC, and Paul Giorgianni, for appellant. Argued: Paul Giorgianni.

DORRIAN, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Darin K. Ireland, appeals the December 8, 2015 judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas convicting him, pursuant to a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

I. History
A. Factual History

{¶ 2} On October 19, 2013, appellant, his wife, Pam Ireland, his friend, Tyler Thrash, and Tyler Thrash's girlfriend, were at Cappy's Bar in Blacklick, Ohio for a fundraiser for a military combat veteran's organization. Between 7 and 8 p.m. on the same night, Drew Coen and his brother, Cris Coen, also arrived at Cappy's Bar.

{¶ 3} According to Thrash, around midnight, a very intoxicated man grabbed Pam's buttocks as he exited the bar. Thrash followed the man, later identified as Drew, out of the bar, placed him in a headlock, and forced him to the ground. Thrash told Drew: "Don't touch my brother's girl's ass ever again." (Thrash Depo. at 2:12:30.)1 After he forced Drew to the ground, Thrash was pulled away by appellant and others. Thrash returned to the bar and resumed drinking. Shortly afterward, he heard a commotion outside. When he exited the bar, he saw appellant hitting someone in the parking lot. Seconds after observing appellant hitting the person "one to two times," Thrash and his girlfriend left the bar. (Thrash Depo. at 2:17:30.) Thrash testified that he and appellant had been drinking prior to this incident.

{¶ 4} Louis Capodanno, the owner of Cappy's Bar at the time of the incident, testified that he observed appellant's actions before Thrash attacked Drew. According to Capodanno, immediately before the incident, appellant was "his normal self" and was not intoxicated. (Tr. Vol. III at 261.) When Capodanno witnessed Thrash assaulting Drew, he and appellant tried to pull Thrash away from Drew. Capodanno then heard Thrash say to Drew, "You wanna touch one of our women?" Appellant then asked Drew, "Whose woman did you touch? You touched my woman?" (Tr. Vol. III at 262.) Capodanno then moved to assist Drew. While Capodanno was moving Drew away from the building into the parting lot, appellant said, "You wanna touch one of our women?" and began hitting Drew. (Tr. Vol. III at 266.) Capodanno tried to shield Drew with his own body and received kicks and punches from appellant.

{¶ 5} Theresa Luginbuhl, a manager at Cappy's Bar, testified that she observed appellant assault Drew in the parking lot outside the bar. Luginbuhl ran back inside the bar to call 911. When she came back outside after calling 911, she witnessed appellant striking Drew:

[Luginbuhl]: I came out and I had called the cops and I came out and I saw [Capodanno] was on top of Drew Coen, and [appellant] was punching [Capodanno].
* * *
I saw [Capodanno] on top of [Drew], and I saw someone try to pull [appellant] off, but [appellant] wouldn't—[appellant] wouldn't stop.
* * *
[Appellant] was still punching and probably still would have been stomping.
* * *
[Assistant Prosecutor]: So Drew—Drew is on the ground; [Capodanno] is on top of him protecting him. What was [appellant] doing?
[Luginbuhl]: Punching, punching, trying to get to Drew but punching [Capodanno].
I mean, he didn't care. He was just punching. He didn't care what was in his way, who it was. He didn't care. He would have punched anyone.

(Tr. Vol. III at 237–38, 241.)

{¶ 6} Adam Joseph McMillen testified that he witnessed Thrash assault Drew. According to McMillen, he, Capodanno, and appellant pulled Thrash away from Drew. After they pulled Thrash away from Drew, Thrash ran across the parking lot, and punched Drew in the face. McMillen then heard Pam screaming and saw appellant standing over Drew punching and kicking him. McMillen testified that appellant appeared very angry and "had this tunnel vision, like when you get in a fight." (Tr. Vol. II at 188.) McMillen witnessed appellant fall and then he stopped assaulting Drew. According to McMillen, "it was just like he was just kind of stumbling around, out of it." (Tr. Vol. II at 167.) McMillen then helped place appellant in Pam's car.

{¶ 7} According to Cris Coen, around 1 a.m., he and his brother exited the bar together when he was summoned back inside to sign a receipt by Luginbuhl. He signed the receipt and then went to the restroom. Shortly afterward, he was informed that his brother had been injured. Cris testified that, at first, he did not recognize Drew because of the severity of his injuries and the amount of blood covering his face and clothing. After recognizing his brother, Cris ran into the bar to grab towels which he then used to apply pressure to the injuries to Drew's face.

{¶ 8} Drew testified that he drank "quite a bit" of alcohol at the bar and was "pretty intoxicated that night." (Tr. Vol. II at 101; 80.) He recalled leaving the bar with Cris who was then summoned back inside the bar to sign a receipt. Drew testified that his next memory was waking up in Ohio Health Grant Medical Center in Columbus, Ohio. For some days following his arrival at the hospital, Drew suffered from memory loss and was unable to recall anything between his exiting the bar and waking up at the hospital. However, after some time, Drew testified that some of his memory of the night returned and he now recalls someone approaching him from behind and choking him.

{¶ 9} Drew received treatment for severe injuries to his face and head in addition to pain in his knee. Dr. Mark Douglas Wells, a physician at Ohio Health Grant Medical Center, testified that when Drew arrived at the hospital, he was alert and suffering from a variety of injuries including swelling around his eyes, a broken nose

, and a broken upper jaw. At the hospital, it was determined that Drew had a blood alcohol content of .3. Drew underwent three surgeries to repair the damage to his face and head. As a result of the incident, Drew suffered from chronic pain, scarring, permanent physical injuries, and psychological injuries.

{¶ 10} At trial, the defense called James P. Reardon, Ph.D., a psychologist, as its sole witness. Following the incident, Dr. Reardon performed a psychological examination of appellant. Dr. Reardon testified that it was his opinion within a reasonable degree of psychological certainty that appellant was experiencing a dissociative episode when he attacked Drew. According to Dr. Reardon, appellant's dissociative episode was a manifestation of post-traumatic stress disorder

("PTSD"), from which appellant suffered as a result of his experience in the Persian Gulf War in 1991. Dr. Reardon testified that as a result of appellant's combat experience, he had "a significant capacity for dissociation." (Tr. Vol. III at 346.) Dr. Reardon offered the following explanation for dissociative episodes:

[Appellant's Counsel]: And when a person experiences what you call a "dissociative episode," if that happens, do they have a conscious awareness of what's going on around them?
[Dr. Reardon]: No. I mean, a dissociative episode, by definition, is an alteration in consciousness, memory, and the ability to make kind of rational decisions. I mean, the whole point of dissociating is if you can't escape—it's been described as dissociation is an escape when there's no escape * * * when you can't physically remove yourself.
* * *
[Appellant's Counsel]: Are you saying then that's a conscious decision to escape to this dissociative place?
[Dr. Reardon]: No. I mean, by definition, it is not a volitional experience. It's not something you do; it's something you experience.
[W]hen they disassociate [sic], when they are in a flashback, it's a disorientation for right here, right now because they feel like they're right there, right then. * * * And their reactions are automatic reactions that kind of kept them alive.

(Tr. Vol. III at 357–58; 360.) Under cross-examination, Dr. Reardon explained whether someone who is experiencing a dissociative episode is acting voluntarily or involuntarily:

[Assistant Prosecutor]: [I]n this incident, [appellant] reported having no memory of the contact?
[Dr. Reardon]: It's an alteration of consciousness. And then when a dissociative episode occurs, people don't consciously—they're not consciously present at that moment.
* * *
[Assistant Prosecutor]: [I]f someone's disassociated [sic], you're saying this action is involuntary; right? They have no control over it?
[Dr. Reardon]: It's not a manifestation of conscious thought or awareness.
[Assistant Prosecutor]: Okay. Meaning they can't control it?
[Dr. Reardon]: They don't control it.
* * *
[A]nd they can't because it's not a product of their consciousness and decision making.

(Tr. Vol. III at 381, 387.)

{¶ 11} For purposes of rebuttal, plaintiff-appellee, State of Ohio, offered the testimony of Dennis Eshbaugh, Ph.D., a clinical and forensic psychologist. Dr. Eshbaugh stated that, based on his review of appellant's records, including Dr. Reardon's report, it was his opinion within a reasonable degree of psychological and scientific certainty that "the evidence argued against PTSD and argued in favor of substance abuse having anything related to the instant charge." (Tr. Vol. IV at 515.) Dr. Eshbaugh stated that he did not interview appellant and therefore could not diagnose him.

B. Procedural History

{¶ 12} On January 22, 2014, a Franklin County Grand Jury filed an indictment charging appellant with a single count of felonious assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.11, a felony of the second degree. On October 26, 2015, the matter proceeded to trial. At trial, appellant requested an instruction on the defense of "blackout" as contained in The Ohio Jury...

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2 cases
  • State v. Nicholas
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Ohio)
    • June 26, 2020
    ...actions were voluntary. Id. at p. 352-398. In this regard, the court primarily relied on R.C. 2901.21(F)(2) and State v. Ireland , 2017-Ohio-263, 111 N.E.3d 468 (10th Dist.).14 {¶ 108} Based on the discussion with the court, both the State and defense asked the court to provide pertinent in......
  • State v. Ireland
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Ohio
    • November 8, 2018
    ...not "agree that the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his or her actions were involuntary." 2017-Ohio-263, 111 N.E.3d 468, ¶ 39. The appellate court further determined that Ireland's blackout defense was not an affirmative defense because the "issue of voluntarine......

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