State v. J. H., T--281
| Decision Date | 11 June 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. T--281,T--281 |
| Citation | 295 So.2d 698 |
| Parties | STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. In the Interest of J. H., a child, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Donald Nichols and Roger Merriam, Jacksonville, for appellant.
Donald W. Matthews, Jacksonville, for appellee.
The State appeals an order of the Circuit Court, Juvenile Division, dismissing a petition to have the Appellee, a juvenile, adjudged delinquent because of the alleged offense of breaking and entering, grand larceny and larceny of firearms; the basis of the dismissal being violation of the speedy trial rule.
Rule 3.191(a)(1) R.Cr.P., 33 F.S.A., requires that one charged with a crime be forever discharged from that crime unless he shall, without demand, be brought to trial within 90 days if the crime charged is a misdemeanor, or within 180 days if the crime be a felony.
Subsection (d)(2) of the rule provides for extensions of time upon the grounds there set forth, and subsection (f) provides for extensions or continuances where exceptional circumstances are shown to exist.
Rule 8.120, R.J.P. provides as follows:
The parties stipulated before the lower court that the 90 days period, as provided in the rule, had expired. However, the State contended below, and now here, that the Appellee waived speedy trial or in the alternative that such exceptional circumstances existed as to bring the case within the provisions of Rule 3.191(f) R.Cr.P.
We find Appellant's contentions to be without merit and affirm.
The material facts are: The petition which was ultimately dismissed was filed March 6, 1973, and on the same day an order was entered appointing the Public Defender to represent the juvenile. On March 23, 1973 the Public Defender filed a motion for permission to withdraw on the basis of a conflict of interest, which motion was granted. On March 26, 1973 an order was entered appointing an attorney to represent the juvenile, which attorney filed a motion to dismiss on April 24, 1973. As above recited, at the hearing on that motion to dismiss the State stipulated that the 90 day period provided by Rule 8.120 R.J.P. had expired.
The State contends that the filing of the motion to withdraw by the Public Defender constituted a waiver of speedy trial. While we...
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Stuart v. State
...more time for the negotiation of a plea. The case says nothing about plea bargaining itself constituting a waiver. In State v. J. H., 295 So.2d 698 (Fla.1st DCA 1974), the state appealed a dismissal of a petition to have a juvenile adjudged delinquent, the dismissal having been granted on t......
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Ehn v. Smith, 82-1422
...So.2d 522 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 341 So.2d 1085 (Fla.1976); Riggins v. State, 301 So.2d 124 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); State v. J.H., 295 So.2d 698 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). None of the other grounds for an extension, as enumerated in subsection (d)(2) of the rule, is present in this case. Thus......
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...he was not available for trial during the crucial period of 180 days. We find no merit in the first two points. State v. J. H., 295 So.2d 698 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); Stuart v. State, 360 So.2d 406 (Fla.1978); Christopher v. State, 369 So.2d 97 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); State v. Thurston, 372 So.2d 9......
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Hill v. State
...of counsel, without more, does not necessarily cause a delay, nor does it constitute a waiver of speedy trial. State v. J.H., 295 So.2d 698 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). There has been no showing below that the motion for withdrawal was frivolous, filed for delay, or that it was caused by the conduc......