State v. J. J. Newman Lumber Company

• Decision Date: 06 January 1913
• Citation: 60 So. 215,103 Miss. 263
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. J. J. NEWMAN LUMBER COMPANY

60 So. 215

103 Miss. 263

STATE v. J. J. NEWMAN LUMBER COMPANY

Supreme Court of Mississippi

January 6, 1913

October 1912

The opinion in this case was rendered on suggestion of error. For former opinion see 59 So. 923.

Reversed and remanded. Suggestion of error overruled.

Frank Johnston, assistant attorney-general, for state.

S. E Travis, T. Brady, Jones & Tyler, Green & Green and Whitfield McNeial & Whitfield, attorneys for appellees.

Counsel on both sides filed elaborate briefs but too lengthy for publication.

OPINION

COOK, J.

At a former day of this term this case was affirmed; the court being of opinion that chapter 157 of the Laws of 1912, entitled "An act to prohibit persons, firms or corporations engaged in manufacturing or repairing, from working their employees more than ten hours per day, except in cases of emergency or where the public necessity requires, and fixing the penalty for such violation," is not invalid, so far as the same may apply to appellant's appeal. The question is again before us upon the suggestion that the court erred in its former opinion, and it is earnestly contended that the statute under review is unconstitutional and void.

The original briefs in the case were complete, both in citation of authorities and in dextrous and adroit argument of the principles of law then and now insisted upon as determinative of the case in favor of appellant's view of the law. It follows, necessarily, that the oral argument was, in a large measure, but a repetition of what had already been forcibly presented to the court. Many illustrations of the far-reaching effects of the law and the calamitous consequences which will inevitably follow its enforcement have been suggested; but the law, we think, was not intended to reach the numerous forms of manufactures which may be included in the literal definition of the language employed by the legislature.

We are not unmindful of the rules laid down for the guidance of courts in the construction of statutes; but we do not believe the general rules for the construction of the statutes, invoked by counsel, should be used to defeat the purpose of the lawmakers by attributing to them a design to ignore and override the constitutional limitations upon their power to legislate.

The English language is elastic, and new meanings are frequently given to words not authorized by the literal definition of the words from which they are compounded. Indeed, the common understanding of the signification of words in general use will not bear the test of the scholar's scientific analysis. In Kennington v. Hemingway, 101 Miss. 259, 57 So. 809, this court said: "Legislators must be presumed to be reasonable and sane men, 'and to intend the natural, direct, and probable consequences of their acts, that these shall not be absurdly or unreasonably construed, and therefore that they intend to avoid absurdities and nonsense.' . . . Human language is not a perfect vehicle for conveying thoughts, and it frequently happens that words used have a broader or narrower meaning than that intended by the person using them. One of the maxims of the common law, therefore, is 'verba intentioni debent inservire.' (Words are to be governed by the intention.) As was said by this court in Board of Education v. Railroad Co., (72 Miss. 236, 16 So. 489): 'It is familiar learning that, in the construction of statutes, courts chiefly desire to reach and know the real intention of the framers of the law, and, reaching and knowing it, then to adopt that interpretation which will meet the real meaning of the legislature, though such interpretation may be beyond or within, wider or narrower than, the mere letter of the enactment.'"

The constant changes in and additions to the definition of words is aptly illustrated by the word "manufacture." Dictionaries of latest publication have added new definitions, created by the growth of the language. Referring to Webster's New International Dictionary, 1910 "manufacture" is thus defined: "To produce by labor, esp., now, according to an organized plan and and with division of labor, and usually with the use of machinery." We must conclude that the legislature employed the words of this statute in their usual and most common sense, and when we now speak of manufacturing we usually have in mind an organized force of laborers, working with machinery, to produce from the raw materials the finished product. The broader language of our former...