State v. Jack

• Decision Date: 12 December 2005
• Docket Number: No. S-11051.,S-11051.
• Citation: 125 P.3d 311
• Parties: STATE of Alaska, Petitioner, v. Vernon G. JACK, V, Respondent.
• Court: Alaska Supreme Court

125 P.3d 311

STATE of Alaska, Petitioner, v. Vernon G. JACK, V, Respondent.

No. S-11051.

Supreme Court of Alaska.

December 12, 2005.

W.H. Hawley, Assistant Attorney General, Anchorage, Gregg D. Renkes, Attorney General, Juneau, for Petitioner.

Margi A. Mock, Assistant Public Defender, Barbara K. Brink, Public Defender, Anchorage, for Respondent.

Before: BRYNER, Chief Justice, MATTHEWS, EASTAUGH, FABE, and CARPENETI, Justices.

OPINION

MATTHEWS, Justice.

Vernon Jack is charged under the Alaska criminal code with committing a sexual assault while on an Alaska state ferry in Canadian waters. The question is whether Alaska has jurisdiction to prosecute him. We conclude that jurisdiction exists for two reasons. First, AS 44.03.010(2) grants offshore jurisdiction to the State to the extent that the United States has jurisdiction, and the United States has jurisdiction in this case. Second, Alaska has jurisdiction under the widely recognized "effects doctrine."

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

The facts as stated in Judge Stewart's opinion for the court of appeals are as follows:

On May 12, 2001, the Alaska state ferry Matanuska was navigating the Inside Passage on a voyage from Bellingham, Washington, to Southeast Alaska. According to the grand jury's indictment, while the Matanuska cruised through Canadian territorial waters, Vernon G. Jack, V, engaged in sexual contact and sexual penetration with S.N.F. and physically assaulted her. An Alaska State Trooper who happened to be aboard the Matanuska investigated Jack's conduct and arrested him. The grand jury in Ketchikan charged Jack with one count of first-degree sexual assault, one count of second-degree sexual assault, and four counts of fourth-degree assault for his misconduct aboard the Matanuska while it was in Canadian territorial waters.[¹]

Jack moved to dismiss the indictment on jurisdictional grounds. The superior court granted his motion. On the State's petition for review, the court of appeals affirmed. We granted the State's petition for review.

II. ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES

The statutory sections most directly involved are AS 44.03.010(2) and AS 44.03.030(1). These sections provide:

AS 44.03.010:

The jurisdiction of the state extends to water offshore from the coast of the state as follows:

. . . .

(2) the high seas to the extent that jurisdiction is claimed by the United States of America, or to the extent recognized by the usages and customs of international law or by agreement to which the United States of America or the state is a party[.]

AS 44.03.030:

This chapter does not limit or restrict

(1) the jurisdiction of the state over a person or subject inside or outside the state that is exercisable by reason of citizenship, residence, or another reason recognized by law[.][²]

The State argues in general that these sections reflect that the legislature intended to provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction³ that is as broad as may be permitted under the United States Constitution. Focusing on subsection .010(2) the State contends that this section gives the State of Alaska jurisdiction when the United States would have jurisdiction over acts committed on the high seas. The State contends that the term "high seas" was generally understood in 1959, when the statute was enacted, to encompass foreign territorial waters, and that the United States has jurisdiction over crimes committed aboard U.S. vessels in foreign territorial waters. The State contends that since the Matanuska is a U.S. vessel, the United States has jurisdiction, and therefore, under subsection .010(2), so does the State of Alaska.

The State notes that an additional element is needed for the exercise of state extraterritorial jurisdiction under any theory. The State must have a substantial interest that justifies the exercise of jurisdiction. This requirement is met, according to the State because it has a strong interest in protecting the personal safety of individuals onboard state-owned ferries.

Jack argues that neither subsection .010(2) nor subsection .030(1) was meant to extend state jurisdiction to the maximum that would be permitted by the federal constitution. As to subsection .030(1), Jack contends that it "simply authorizes the state to claim bases of jurisdiction other than territorial, to the maximum extent permitted by law." Jack argues that this authorization can only be exercised by additional legislation and there is no additional legislation that is applicable to this case.

Jack also argues that AS 44.03.010(2) does not apply because the Canadian territorial waters where the alleged crime occurred are not "high seas" within the meaning of the statute. Further, and "[m]ore importantly," Jack contends the waters are not "offshore from the coast of the state."⁴ In addition Jack argues that subsection (3) of AS 44.03.010 and AS 44.03.020 indicate that the reach of subsection .010(2) should be circumscribed because they extend jurisdiction to and assert ownership of submerged land including subsurface resources "lying under the water mentioned" in section .010. Jack argues that subsection (2) can extend only to waters over submerged lands to which the State might have a reasonable jurisdictional and ownership claim. No such claim could be asserted concerning submerged land in Canadian territorial waters.

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Statute Should Be Broadly Construed

The statutory sections involved here were enacted in 1959 by the First Alaska Legislature as part of Chapter 89 of the 1959 Session Laws of Alaska. We set forth in the margin the full text of Chapter 89.⁵ The revisor of statutes revised Chapter 89 as a part of the bulk formal revision that took place in 1962, but it has not otherwise been amended. Because the revisor of statutes is not permitted to change the meaning of a statute, we consider the original session law language when interpreting what the statute means.⁶

Section 1 of Chapter 89 contained, in its original form, language indicating that the state's jurisdiction should be broadly construed. The first sentence of section 1 stated that the jurisdiction of the state not only "extends to water offshore"⁷ but "shall extend to and over, and be exercisable with respect to, waters offshore. . . ."⁸ Further, subsection (2) underscored the breadth of the intended reach of state jurisdiction by use of inclusive words and phrases such as "whatever," "may be," "any," and "or otherwise." Thus in its original form section 1(2) provided:

The jurisdiction of this State shall extend to and over, and be exercisable with respect to, waters offshore from the coasts of this State as follows . . . (2) The high seas to whatever extent jurisdiction therein may be claimed by the United States of America, or to whatever extent may be recognized by the usages and customs of international law or by any agreement, international or otherwise, to which the United States of America or this State may be party.[⁹]

That Chapter 89 was intended to reflect a broad assertion of state jurisdiction is also evident from its other sections. Both section 3(1) and section 4 make it clear that the provisions of Chapter 89 are not to be construed to limit state jurisdiction. Section 3(1) also suggests that extraterritorial jurisdiction over a person or subject "is exercisable by reason of citizenship, residence or for any other reason recognized by law."¹⁰ Similarly, section 4 implies that state jurisdiction over an area may be extended "under another provision or rule of law."¹¹ Thus Chapter 89 implies that state jurisdiction is to be defined by recognized legal principles even if they are not part of any statute. It is unlikely that a legislature expressing this position would intend anything other than that a broad construction be given to the statutory jurisdictional provisions that it enacted.

B. Jurisdiction Under AS 44.03.010(2)

1. High seas

One issue that must be resolved is whether the term "high seas" as used in AS 44.03.010(2) encompasses the Canadian territorial waters where the alleged sexual assault took place. The State argues that the term as understood in 1959 when the statute was enacted "includes all ocean waters outside the boundaries of the low-water mark and therefore the territorial waters of Canada." Jack, by contrast, argues that "high seas" encompasses "only those seas beyond the territorial waters of any nation." Jack agrees that at one time "it was undisputed that the term `high seas' included all waters outside the boundary of the low water mark" but contends that "by the second half of the twentieth century" the general understanding had changed to the more narrow view that he espouses.

The revised fourth edition of Black's Law Dictionary, published in 1968, gives several definitions of the term "high seas," including those advocated by the parties. Thus, in support of the State's view, Black's defines "high seas" as simply "the ocean" or as beginning "according to the American view, at low-water mark," or still further, as "any waters on the sea-coast which are without the boundaries of low-water mark."¹² In support of Jack's view, Black's also defines "high seas" as "the waters of the ocean without the boundary of any country."¹³

In view of the broad interpretation that should be given to the statute, we think that the State's definition encompassing all ocean waters beyond the boundaries of the low-water mark is appropriate. Relatedly, since AS 44.03.010(2) provides that jurisdiction of the state duplicates the high seas jurisdiction of the United States, case law pertaining to the high seas jurisdiction of the United States is also relevant. There is case law that applies the term "high seas" to foreign territorial waters.¹⁴

2. Water offshore from the coast of the state

Jack argues that the introductory language of AS 44.03.010 extending the jurisdiction of the state "to water offshore from the coast of the state," necessarily excludes...