State v. Jackson

• Docket Number: 21-1319
• Decision Date: 30 August 2023
• Parties: STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DAVID DWIGHT JACKSON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Court of Appeals

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STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DAVID DWIGHT JACKSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 21-1319

Court of Appeals of Iowa

August 30, 2023

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Scott J Beattie (motion to suppress) and David M. Porter (trial) Judges.

The defendant appeals evidentiary rulings and the denial of his motion for a new trial. AFFIRMED.

Gary Dickey of Dickey, Campbell, & Sahag Law Firm, PLC, Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Considered by Bower, C.J., and Tabor and Greer, JJ.

GREER JUDGE.

Following a fatal accident, David Jackson was convicted of vehicular homicide by operating while intoxicated (OWI), reckless driving, leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death and operating a motor vehicle without the owner's consent. On appeal, he argues the district court should have suppressed the admission of a toxicology report obtained through the use of an inaccurate search warrant application. He also argues the district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial after allowing testimony regarding his medical records without a waiver of his physician-patient privilege. We affirm the district court's admission of the toxicology report; we also hold the district court did not err in allowing testimony about Jackson's medical records under Iowa Code section 622.10 (2020) or the rule against hearsay, so affirm the admission of that testimony.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings.

On the evening of August 9, 2020, a Toyota Prius^[1] was being driven southbound down a two-way, four-lane section of Martin Luther King Jr. Parkway (MLK) in Des Moines when the driver, later identified as Jackson, veered into the northbound lane. Eyewitnesses stated Jackson accelerated and crossed both northbound lanes before colliding with Bounleua Lovan, who was driving a Polaris Slingshot.^[2] The Slingshot hit a telephone pole, and the Prius went over the street's curb, through a parking lot, and eventually crashed into a building.^[3] One witness went to the car to offer assistance and noticed Jackson appeared dazed and confused as he got out of the driver's side door; Jackson then left the scene on foot. Police Officer Christopher Latcham was told Jackson's description and found him sitting at a nearby senior living facility; Jackson and Officer Latcham exchanged a few words before Jackson began to run away. Officer Latcham used pepper spray and eventually apprehended Jackson, who was then handcuffed by Officer Nathan Nemmers. Officer Nemmers testified that Jackson "had bloodshot, watery eyes, seemed a little paranoid, had some erratic behavior, [and was] sweating profusely," which indicated to him that Jackson was under the influence of either drugs or alcohol.

Jackson was transported to the hospital. Officer Nemmers later went there to conduct an OWI investigation. While he testified this would typically involve field sobriety tests (FSTs), he found Jackson was "incoherent and unable to follow, really, any commands or instructions. Just simply trying to talk to him before I could get to [FSTs], it was clear that he wasn't going to be able to perform the [FSTs] as requested." Officer Nemmers applied for a search warrant to collect a blood sample for testing. But he modified a previously used warrant application and did not delete the FST information already present on the computer form. The warrant was subsequently granted, and after running the testing, Jackson's blood sample came back positive for methamphetamine and amphetamines. The toxicology report showed the presence of methamphetamine at a level above the therapeutic dosage.

Jackson was charged with vehicular homicide by OWI, vehicular homicide by reckless driving, theft in the second degree, leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death, and operating a motor vehicle without the owner's consent.

Before trial, Jackson moved to suppress the admission of the toxicology report on his blood sample because of the defect in the warrant application. The district court denied the suppression motion.

At trial, Jackson's main defense was the accident occurred because he had a medical condition that caused him to pass out at the wheel. He testified about "black outs" he had before the accident and explained that, while driving down MLK, he "started to have, like, tightness in my chest, my breathing became restricted, and I passed out, blacked out at the wheel." Offering more details, Jackson went on to say he was admitted to the ICU, where "[his] heart rate had dropped, was at thirty-four" and care providers were concerned his "heart [might] stop again."

After Jackson testified about his medical condition, the State called Dale Peterson in rebuttal to testify about the details in Jackson's hospital records. Peterson was the health services administrator at Polk County Jail, and he oversaw all medical records for the jail. Jackson objected, arguing that testimony about his medical records was hearsay and protected by HIPAA^[4] and he had not waived those protections. The district court allowed the evidence to be introduced at trial. Peterson testified that, after reviewing Jackson's medical records from the hospital, he believed Jackson's "vital signs were stable and within normal limits," including his blood-oxygen level. The jail medical staff was not alerted to Jackson having a history of blacking out. Upon his admission to the jail, Jackson was placed on a detoxification program. But, on cross-examination, Peterson clarified that he had not read all of the records and he could not pinpoint the timing of the testing of Jackson's vitals.

The jury ultimately found Jackson guilty of vehicular homicide by OWI, reckless driving, leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death, and operating a motor vehicle without the owner's consent.

Before sentencing, Jackson moved for a new trial and in arrest of judgment. He again pointed to Peterson's testimony, arguing it contained information protected by HIPAA and Iowa Code section 622.10, which provides:

A practicing attorney, counselor, physician, surgeon, physician assistant, advanced registered nurse practitioner, mental health professional, or the stenographer or confidential clerk of any such person, who obtains information by reason of the person's employment, or a member of the clergy shall not be allowed, in giving testimony, to disclose any confidential communication properly entrusted to the person in the person's professional capacity, and necessary and proper to enable the person to discharge the functions of the person's office according to the usual course of practice or discipline.

The district court, in an oral ruling denying the motion, explained that in the cases Jackson pointed to dealing with section 622.10's protections, the disclosure occurred in the pretrial process. It stated

From this Court's point of view, if Mr. Jackson noticed a witness who was going to testify about his condition, under the discovery rules, and particularly the reciprocal discovery agreement, that both parties signed on October 14, 2020, Mr. Jackson, as part of that discovery agreement, would have to turn over those records, because the State would then be entitled to the documents or records underlying that witness' testimony.

What Mr. Jackson did here was not call a witness to testify about his medical condition. Mr. Jackson himself talked about his medical condition. He talked about his blood pressure. He talked about whether his heart was going to stop again. He talked about the drugs that were in his system, both on that day and the days and weeks preceding that incident. He talked about the effects of the pepper spray. He talked about a whole host of issues regarding his condition on the day the event occurred.

Once he testifies about his condition, he absolutely opens the door for access to records that either support or refute that position. Effectively, what Mr. Jackson wants to do in Count II of the motion in arrest of judgment and motion for new trial is use chapter 622 both as a sword and a shield. He cannot do both.

Once Mr. Jackson talked about his condition, the State was entitled to produce evidence and obtain evidence that refuted that position.... Mr. Jackson was entitled to the protection of privilege, and because he opened the door for it, those records were fair game.

Jackson appeals.

II. Analysis.

Jackson asks our court to grant him a new trial based on the admission of (1) the results of the toxicology report and (2) Peterson's testimony regarding Jackson's medical records.

A. Toxicology Report.

Jackson argues the district court should have suppressed the results of the blood test obtained after the district court granted a search warrant application that contained inaccurate information.^[5] The framework for Jackson's claim known as a veracity claim, comes from Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978); Iowa courts adopted the Franks standard in State v. Groff, 323 N.W.2d 204, 20608 (Iowa 1982). Under the Franks standard, "a defendant [can] challenge the veracity of an affidavit by showing that the affiant: (1) intentionally and knowingly made a false statement, or (2) made a false statement with reckless disregard for the truth." Groff, 323 N.W.2d at 207. As our supreme court explained this limitation,

[t]he exclusionary rule "is not calculated to redress the injury to the privacy of the victim of the search and seizure." Rather, its purpose is to deter constitutionally violative police conduct. When a police officer through negligence or innocent mistake includes a false statement in a search warrant affidavit, little deterrent function is served by invalidating

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