State v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 07 March 1961
• Docket Number: No. 50147,50147
• Citation: 108 N.W.2d 62,252 Iowa 671
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Petitioner, v. Robert D. JACKSON, Judge of the Ninth Judicial District of Iowa, Respondent.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 62

108 N.W.2d 62

252 Iowa 671

STATE of Iowa, Petitioner, v. Robert D. JACKSON, Judge of the Ninth Judicial District of Iowa, Respondent.

No. 50147.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

March 7, 1961.

Norman A. Erbe, Atty. Gen., Marion Neely, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ray Hanrahan, Polk County Atty., and Lawrence F. Scalise, Asst. Polk County Atty., Des Moines, for petitioner.

Paul C. McDonnell, Des Moines, for respondent.

THOMPSON, Justice.

The chronology of the matters involved in the case before us is important. On January 20, 1958, an indictment charging Arthur Lee Burris with the crime of robbery with aggravation was returned by the grand jury of Polk County. A question as to Burris' sanity having been raised, he was tried on that issue and the jury found him insane at the time of the trial. He was accordingly committed to the criminal insane department of the Men's Reformatory at Anamosa, on February 10, 1958. He was first examined there by Dr. Joseph Stomel (referred to also in the briefs as Stamel), the director of the department of criminal insane at the reformatory. On January 27, 1960, upon a further examination Burris was found to be sane, and in accordance with Section 783.4 of the Code of 1958, I.C.A. notice was given to the Polk County authorities. The material part of Section 783.4 is quoted: 'If the accused is committed to the department for the criminal insane, as soon as he becomes mentally restored, the person in charge shall at once give notice to the sheriff and county attorney of the proper county of such fact, and the sheriff, without delay, must receive and hold him in custody until he is brought to trial or judgment, as the case may be, or is legally discharged * * *'.

Burris was thereupon returned to Polk County and appeared before the court on February 3, 1960, when counsel was appointed for him. Pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the commission of the offense were interposed, trial was had and on May 19, 1960, the jury returned its verdict finding Burris guilty as charged. On June 14, 1960, the respondent, the presiding judge at the trial, denied Burris' motion for new trial, but on the same date, and on his own motion, he entered an order that no judgment be rendered on the verdict, that the verdict be set aside and the indictment dismissed. From this order the petitioner State of Iowa brings certiorari.

I. The question for our determination here is whether the respondent acted illegally in making the order complained of. It was the evident thought of the respondent that Burris had been denied a speedy trial as required by the provisions of Section 10 of Article I of the Constitution of the State of Iowa, I.C.A., and Section I of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The constitutional requirement for a speedy trial for every accused is implemented in Iowa, so far as the circumstances of the present case are concerned, by Code Sections 795.2 and 795.3 which we quote:

'795.2 Delay in trial. If a defendant indicted for a public offense, whose trial has not been postponed upon his application be not brought to trial at the next regular term of the court in which the indictment is triable after the same is found, the court must order it to be dismissed, unless good cause to the contrary be shown.'

'795.3 Discharge on undertaking. If the defendant be not indicted or tried as above provided, and sufficient reason therefor is shown, the court may order the prosecution continued from term to term, and discharge the defendant from custody on his own undertaking, or on the undertaking of bail for his appearance to answer the charge at the time to which the same is continued, but no continuance under this section shall be extended beyond the following three terms of the court.'

We said in Pines v. District Court, 233 Iowa 1284, 1290, 10 N.W.2d 574, 578: 'These statutory provisions embody the legislative conception and declaration of what the term 'speedy trial', as used in the constitutions means.' See also McCandless v. District Court, 245 Iowa 599, 604, 61 N.W.2d 674, 677. The respondent's action must depend for its legality upon a finding that Burris was denied a speedy trial as defined by one or both of the foregoing sections. It is apparent that he was not brought to trial at the next term of court, and that in fact more than three terms elapsed between the indictment and the trial. Our question, then, is whether 'good cause' was shown for the delay; or whether the facts are such that Burris must be held to have waived his right to a speedy trial. We said in McCandless v. District Court, supra, 245 Iowa at pages 604, 605, 61 N.W.2d 674, at page 677: 'In order for an accused to enjoy the privilege of a 'speedy trial', he must make a demand to the court for an early trial. If he fails to do so he waives not only the privilege provided by the constitution but the requirements of the statute as well, and it is therefor unnecessary to show 'good cause' for the delay.'

II. Much attention is devoted by the parties to the question whether a motion in arrest of judgment may be granted on the ground that the defendant did not receive a speedy trial; and whether the court may set aside a verdict and indictment on its own motion. The questions are technical, and we shall not decide them. We think the error in the respondent's ruling clearly appears from the case as made by the record before us.

III. It is apparent the respondent based his conclusion Burris did not receive a speedy trial upon the testimony of Dr. Stomel. This witness, evidently a qualified psychiatrist, testified for the state at the May, 1960, trial. In part the record shows this: 'Q. So was there any period from April 10, 1958 to January 27, 1960 you weren't sure whether he (Burris) was sane or insane? A. Oh, yes. I was positive he was sane from the first examination but I always give a man the benefit of the doubt. I will never make any conclusive recommendations until I am dead sure. And it takes sometimes more than two years to be dead sure of it.' In other testimony, Dr. Stomel said Burris was 'a passive--aggressive personality disorder of the aggressive type with an occasional depressive mood. I recommended certain medication for him and psychotherapy and religious therapy which he received after I came into the institution on a full time basis. At that time I was only going to the institution occasionally. And he received that treatment until I saw him last, which was January 27, 1960, at which time I gave a complete psychiatric report to the warden.'

We do not think this testimony goes so far as the respondent believed. The doctor appears to be saying only that, while he believed from his first examination that Burris was then sane, he wanted in fairness to him to be doubly sure, since sometimes a study of a patient for two years is required for...