State v. Jackson
| Decision Date | 05 January 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 2008–T–0077.,2008–T–0077. |
| Citation | 26 N.E.3d 304 |
| Parties | STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Nathaniel JACKSON, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecutor, and LuWayne Annos, Assistant Prosecutor, Warren, OH, for Plaintiff–Appellee.
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Randall L. Porter, Assistant State Public Defender, Columbus, OH, for Defendant–Appellant.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Nathaniel Jackson, appeals from the July 16, 2008 judgment entry of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas, overruling his request for leave to file his motion for a new trial and his motion for a new trial. For the reasons that follow, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
{¶ 2} In November 2002, appellant was found guilty of two counts of aggravated murder, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of aggravated robbery. The charges stemmed from the shooting death of Robert Fingerhut. At the time of his death, Mr. Fingerhut was residing with his former wife, Donna Roberts. During the months prior to Mr. Fingerhut's murder, appellant and Roberts exchanged letters and phone calls in which they plotted for appellant to murder Mr. Fingerhut so that Roberts could collect life insurance proceeds in excess of $500,000. Roberts was also charged with murder for her role in Mr. Fingerhut's death.
{¶ 3} Appellant was found guilty, and the jury recommended the death penalty. After weighing the aggravating circumstances and the mitigating facts, the trial court concluded the death penalty was appropriate. In January 2003, appellant filed a direct appeal of his death penalty to the Ohio Supreme Court. The Supreme Court affirmed appellant's convictions and the imposition of the death penalty. State v. Jackson, 107 Ohio St.3d 300, 2006-Ohio-1, 839 N.E.2d 362.
{¶ 4} In June 2004, appellant's original and amended petitions for postconviction relief were denied by the trial court. This court affirmed the trial court's judgment. State v. Jackson, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2004–T–0089, 2006-Ohio-2651, 2006 WL 1459757. The Ohio Supreme Court declined jurisdiction. State v. Jackson, 111 Ohio St.3d 1469, 2006-Ohio-5625, 855 N.E.2d 1258.
{¶ 5} On August 2, 2006, the Ohio Supreme Court vacated Donna Roberts' death sentence on the basis of ex parte communication between the prosecution and Judge John M. Stuard, the common pleas court judge who presided over both Roberts' and appellant's trials. State v. Roberts, 110 Ohio St.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-3665, 850 N.E.2d 1168, ¶ 3. The ex parte communication at issue was the use of the prosecutor in preparing the court's sentencing opinion without the inclusion of defense counsel in the process. Id.
{¶ 6} On September 5, 2006, presumably based on the Roberts decision, appellant filed a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from the trial court's judgment entry denying his petition for postconviction relief.
{¶ 7} While his Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief was pending, appellant filed an application for disqualification of Judge Stuard, stating the following: “1) Judge Stuard has a personal stake in the outcome, 2) Judge Stuard has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts, and 3) Judge Stuard will be called as a material witness.” On November 29, 2006, former Chief Justice Thomas Moyer declined to disqualify Judge Stuard. In re Disqualification of Stuard, 113 Ohio St.3d 1236, 2006-Ohio-7233, 863 N.E.2d 636.
{¶ 8} The trial court denied appellant's Civ.R. 60(B) motion, and this court affirmed.
State v. Jackson, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2008–T–0024, 2010-Ohio-1270, 2010 WL 1176516. The Ohio Supreme Court declined jurisdiction. State v. Jackson, 135 Ohio St.3d 1470, 2013-Ohio-2512, 989 N.E.2d 70.
{¶ 9} On February 29, 2008, while his appeal from the trial court's denial of his Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief was pending with this court, appellant filed a motion for new trial and/or sentencing hearing. The basis of appellant's motion was the collaboration between Judge Stuard and the prosecution in drafting Judge Stuard's sentencing opinion.
{¶ 10} On May 4, 2009, the trial court denied appellant's motion for new trial and/or sentencing. Appellant appealed the trial court's judgment to this court. State v. Jackson, 190 Ohio App.3d 319, 2010-Ohio-5054, 941 N.E.2d 1221 (11th Dist.). We reversed and remanded the case for resentencing on the basis that the same drafting procedures involving the sentencing entry that occurred in Roberts took place in appellant's case. Id. at ¶ 29.1
{¶ 11} On June 24, 2008, appellant filed a request for leave to file his motion for a new trial and a motion for a new trial based on ex parte communications between Judge Stuard and the prosecution. This time, the ex parte communications involved the prosecution's involvement in writing Judge Stuard's findings of fact and conclusions of law overruling appellant's motion to suppress. Appellant's request for leave argued that the Ohio Supreme Court's review of the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress in his first direct death-penalty appeal was based upon the assumption that the trial court, not the prosecutor's office, made the required findings of fact overruling his motion to suppress.
{¶ 12} On July 8, 2008, appellee filed a response in opposition to appellant's request for leave and motion for a new trial.
{¶ 13} On July 16, 2008, in a single judgment entry, the trial court held that “defendant's Motion for Leave to File a Motion for New Trial is granted [and] defendant's Motion for New Trial is overruled.” The trial court overruled appellant's motions on the basis that “Crim.R. 33 is not the appropriate vehicle for a new sentencing hearing”, and even if Crim.R. 33 were applicable, appellant “failed to provide that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the evidence upon which his motion is based.”
{¶ 14} Appellant timely appealed the trial court's judgment entry. On December 3, 2008, this court ordered, sua sponte, “that all appellate proceedings in this court are hereby stayed pending the resolution of the appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio, or until further order of this court [.]” The stay was dissolved on December 31, 2009, and the appeal was dismissed upon motion of appellee. This dismissal entry was vacated by the Ohio Supreme Court on June 5, 2013, and the appeal was reinstated with this court on September 5, 2013. The parties subsequently filed supplemental briefs.
{¶ 15} On appeal, appellant sets forth three assignments of error. In his first assignment of error, appellant argues:
{¶ 16} “The trial court erred when it presided over appellant's motion for a new trial.”
{¶ 17} Within this assignment of error appellant asserts he was denied his right to a fair and impartial tribunal. R.C. 2701.03(A) provides:
If a judge of the court of common pleas allegedly * * * has a bias or prejudice for or against a party to a proceeding pending before the court or a party's counsel, or allegedly otherwise is disqualified to preside in a proceeding pending before the court, any party to the proceeding or the party's counsel may file an affidavit of disqualification with the clerk of the supreme court * * *.
Similarly, Article IV, Section 5 of the Ohio Constitution provides that “[t]he chief justice of the supreme court or any judge of that court designated by him shall pass upon the disqualification of any judge of the courts of appeals or courts of common pleas or division thereof.”
{¶ 18} R.C. 2701.03(A) and Article IV, Section 5 of the Ohio Constitution reflect the oft-repeated position that courts of appeals do not have the authority to rule upon the disqualification of a trial judge nor do they have the authority to void a judgment of the trial court upon that basis. State v. Ramos, 88 Ohio App.3d 394, 398, 623 N.E.2d 1336 (1993), citing Beer v. Griffith, 54 Ohio St.2d 440, 441–442, 377 N.E.2d 775 (1978).
{¶ 19} In the present case, appellant sought to disqualify Judge Stuard using the procedure set forth in R.C. 2701.03. Former Chief Justice Thomas Moyer declined to remove Judge Stuard from the case. In re Disqualification of Stuard, supra. In overruling appellant's motion to disqualify Judge Stuard, former Chief Justice Moyer stated there was “no evidence in the record * * * to suggest that [Judge Stuard] has shown any hostility or bias toward either party, and there is no indication that [Judge Stuard] is unable or unwilling to resolve any remaining disputed matters with an open state of mind.” Id. at ¶ 8. This court cannot substitute its own judgment for that of Chief Justice Moyer.
{¶ 20} Accordingly, because neither the Ohio Constitution nor the legislature has granted jurisdiction to this court to review the administrative actions of the Chief Justice, we do not have jurisdiction to review this issue.
{¶ 21} Appellant's first assignment of error is without merit.
{¶ 22} Appellant's second and third assignments of error state:
{¶ 23} As both appellant's second and third assignments of error ask us to review the trial court's decision to overrule appellant's request for leave and motion for new trial, they are considered in a consolidated fashion.
{¶ 24} Before trial, appellant sought to suppress his confession made to Howland Township Police. The trial court overruled appellant's motion to suppress after concluding that appellant was sufficiently advised of his Miranda rights and voluntarily waived those rights. Jackson, 107 Ohio St.3d 300, 2006-Ohio-1, 839 N.E.2d 362, at ¶ 83. In overruling appellant's motion to suppress, the trial court also found that appellant had not unambiguously or unequivocally requested counsel before or during questioning. Id. In his direct...
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