State v. Jackson
Citation | 382 P.2d 229,94 Ariz. 117 |
Decision Date | 29 May 1963 |
Docket Number | No. 1263,1263 |
Parties | STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Alvord JACKSON, Appellant. |
Court | Supreme Court of Arizona |
Edwin R. Powell, Holbrook, for appellant.
Robert W. Pickrell, Atty. Gen., and Merton E. Marks, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Alvord Jackson was charged and convicted or murder in the second degree for the admitted shooting of one George Evans. His appeal presents questions concerning the rejection of testimony and the instructions to the jury on the issue of self-defense.
The nature of the appeal requires a somewhat detailed statement of the evidence. Defendant and Evans were both residents of McNary, Arizona, being employed by and living on the premises of Southwest Lumber Industries. On the premises was also a building described as the American Legion Club which contained a cafe, a barber shop and a room used as a game and clubroom. Defendant operated the barber shop for two years prior to the homicide. Both defendant and Evans were accustomed to visiting the clubroom. This room contained a pool table, a table for card games, vendors, stools and a stove and could accommodate twenty-five to thirty persons.
About 7:00 to 7:30 P.M. on the evening of March 17, 1961, defendant was in the clubroom shooting dice with several others. Evans came in and joined the game. Defendant first lost but then won by betting against Evans who had the dice. Evans became angry. The testimony of a state's witness gives generally the substance of what followed:
Defendant testified that after Evans left the club he, defendant, went to his room in a nearby house where he obtained a 38 caliber gun and then went to his barber shop and chatted with one Elgin North who was shining shoes and with Roland Jones, a deputy sheriff. Thereafter, he changed his jacket, went back home and returned to the club.
He stated:
Defendant testified that he saw Evans standing on the porch; that Evans then went inside; that defendant stayed outside for a few minutes; that he smoked a cigarette; that he then went into the building down the hallway to the opening of the clubroom.
The evidence generally places Evans at the corner of the pool table nearest the door. Defendant testified that as he stood in the doorway of the clubroom Evans turned and looked at him. He then described the shooting as follows (omitting questions):
'He (Evans) turned around, taken his hand and run it up to his coat.
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'I spoke to him, I says, 'George why did you do me like that'.
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'Then I kind of glanced over at Elgin (North). He still had his hand on his coat just like he did before, and then I heard a voice, I am looking almost at him and I am looking kind of at Elgin. I heard someone say, 'don't do that George.'
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'I was standing in the doorway when they said, 'don't do that George', I looked up and seen a gun like this.
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'Then I seen the gun and he did something like this, in this motion.
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'Like he was still trying to cock it.
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'I left my right foot in the doorway and stepped straight back.
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'I was standing in the doorway just like this, walked up in the doorway, and George was standing at an angle with me here. When he turned he had both hands on that gun, headed up like this and evidently trying to cock it to fire it.
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'I pulled the gun from my pocket, pulled the gun and fired it.
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'I fired it one time then.
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'* * * I pulled up and fired and he stepped forward and pointed down the hall again. I fired and I just stepped over to the other side and he put the gun right in my face again.
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'I backed up and he turned and started toward the wall; the door was to the right and then he turns and places the gun right down at me like that.
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'I fired again, and he turned and fell over in this corner and he stayed right there.
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'I heard Mr. Russell say, 'don't shoot, he is down, I got his gun.''
Defendant also testified that when he saw Evans put his hand in his coat he thought he was going to pull a gun out any time for the reason that he had seen the gun two weeks before when Evans had taken it out of his car pocket and once before when he had pulled it out in the barber shop. He also testified that he was afraid Evans was going to kill him and that he fired to protect himself.
In addition to the above defendant testified that about three months prior to March 17, on the occasion of a card game in Pinetop, Arizona, Evans had become angry and had threatened to kill him. The evidence of one Aubry Cheatham was offered by defendant to corroborate this. Further defendant offered the testimony of a witness to show that Evans carried a gun in his coat, and had made threats to use it and the witness had informed defendant of these facts a week before the shooting. The trial court rejected both offers. This was error.
The state concedes that evidence of the bad reputation of the deceased may be admitted when there is a prima facie showing of self-defense. However, it is contended that acts of deceased not directly observed by the defendant nor connected with him are inadmissible. In Mendez v. State, 27 Ariz. 82, 229 P. 1032, this Court expressly adopted the modern rule that an accused should generally be permitted to introduce evidence of specific acts of violence by the deceased toward other persons either coming under his own observation or known to the defendant prior to the homicide. Personal observation by a defendant is not required but only that he be informed of the acts. The purpose of such evidence is not to prove the deceased in fact performed such acts but that defendant may have had reason to believe he had and that this adds to a justifiable state of apprehension. See Anno. 121 A.L.R. 380, 390. Here, the excluded evidence tended to show that defendant had knowledge that deceased carried a weapon and that he was of a violent and turbulent disposition. It would have a bearing on defendant's state of mind and the reasonableness of his belief that Evans was capable of harming him at the time of the homicide.
Defendant requested an instruction that the law of Arizona does not require a person to retreat before he may act lawfully in...
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State v. Phillips
...is to prove conduct, usually there is nonhearsay evidence that can be tested by courtroom questioning."22 See e.g. State v. Jackson, 94 Ariz. 117, 382 P.2d 229 (1963); Morrison v. Lowe, 267 Ark. 361, 590 S.W.2d 299 (1979); McBride v. United States, 441 A.2d 644 (D.C.App.1982).23 The only ma......
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Celaya v. Stewart
...the defendant personally observed the victim's violent character or it was made known to him prior to the homicide. State v. Jackson, 94 Ariz. 117, 121, 382 P.2d 229 (1963). Then the evidence is admitted because it has a bearing on the defendant's state of mind and the reasonableness of his......
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State v. Fuentes, 2 CA-CR 2018-0067
...is not required before a defendant may engage in self-defense, Fuentes cites our supreme court’s decision in State v. Jackson , 94 Ariz. 117, 121, 382 P.2d 229 (1963), which appears to require that such an instruction be given if requested by the defendant, at least in some instances.15 How......
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Garcia v. State
...what he urges to be a majority view in other jurisdictions in the United States. He relies on such cases as State of Arizona v. Jackson, 94 Ariz. 117, 382 P.2d 229 (1963); People v. Clark, 130 Cal.App.3d 371, 181 Cal.Rptr. 682 (1982); Boykin v. People, 22 Colo. 496, 45 P. 419 (1896); Enyart......