State v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 06 July 2000
• Docket Number: No. 00-KK-0015.,00-KK-0015.
• Citation: 764 So.2d 64
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Leon JACKSON.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

764 So.2d 64

STATE of Louisiana v. Leon JACKSON.

No. 00-KK-0015.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

July 6, 2000.

Rehearing Denied August 31, 2000.

Richard P. Ieyoub, Attorney General, Harry F. Connick, District Attorney, Sanem Ozdural, New Orleans, Counsel for Applicant.

Bruce Gerard Whittaker, New Orleans, Counsel for Respondent.

TRAYLOR, J.¹

We granted a writ of certiorari to decide whether the use of checkpoints by the police to verify that vehicles contain proof of insurance deprives the vehicle's operator of his guarantee against unreasonable seizures under the federal and state constitutions. After reviewing the issue, we conclude that Article I, § 5 of the Louisiana Constitution does not prohibit use of checkpoints to "seize" an automobile and expressly overrule our prior holding in State v. Church, 538 So.2d 993 (La.1989). We find that checkpoints are a valid law enforcement tool when conducted pursuant to neutral guidelines that limit the discretion of the officer in the field. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the court of appeal and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 10, 1999, New Orleans Police Officer Richard LeBlanc arrested the defendant for a variety of traffic offenses and seized from his person a small plastic bag containing marijuana. LeBlanc and his partner, Officer Hajek, had been participating in an insurance checkpoint at the intersection of Earhart and Mistletoe. Traffic was backed up to the top of the Earhart overpass, causing some motorists to blow their car horns. The officers were busy checking every vehicle at the foot of the overpass for insurance when Officer LeBlanc observed a green 1992 Acura Legend attempting to back up in traffic to avoid the checkpoint.

Given the congestion, the vehicle's operator, defendant Leon Jackson, could not turn the car around, and opted instead to pull it over to the side of the road at the top of the bridge. The defendant then exited the vehicle and walked down to the foot of the bridge where LeBlanc greeted him and asked for his driver's license. When defendant told the officer he did not have a license, LeBlanc ran his name through the computer which revealed his license had been suspended. The officer issued defendant citations for impeding traffic, improper backing, reckless operation, driving under a suspended license, improper lane usage, no insurance, and no registration. During a pat-down search accompanying a full custodial arrest of the defendant,² LeBlanc recovered a small green zip-lock bag that contained marijuana.

The defendant was charged with possession of marijuana in violation of La.Rev. Stat. 40:966(D)(1). At the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress the marijuana, LeBlanc and Hajek explained that at the insurance checkpoint, officers checked all traffic coming through Earhart to Jefferson Parish. The checkpoint was conducted at approximately 10 P.M. by narrowing three lanes of traffic down to one lane with a row of six officers checking vehicles for driver's license, registration and proof of insurance. Officer Hajek further stated that when the vehicle's operator produced proof of insurance, the motorist would be allowed to proceed.

Officer Hajek explained that the insurance checkpoints were put in place under Chief Pennington's orders after the New Orleans Police Department began towing vehicles that did not contain proof of insurance. The officers' captain directed them to participate in one insurance checkpoint a week, whenever they worked the Second District Task Force.

On October 15, 1999, the trial court granted defendant's Motion to Suppress.³ In its judgment suppressing the evidence, the trial court relied on our decision in State v. Parms, 523 So.2d 1293 (La.1988), which not only invalidated a DWI checkpoint under the Fourth Amendment for lack of neutral criteria to govern the police performing the DWI stops, but also strongly questioned whether, in light of the "higher emphasis on individual freedom [placed by La. Const.1974, art. I, § 5] than that found in the federal constitution," checkpoints "could ever pass muster under the Louisiana Constitution." Parms, 523 So.2d at 1303. Finding that the insurance checkpoint in the present case similarly lacked neutral criteria for stopping motorists and opining that the DWI checkpoint "served a far more compelling state interest" than did the insurance checkpoint, the trial court found that the checkpoint violated defendant's constitutional protections against unreasonable seizures.

The State sought review at the Fourth Circuit, which granted writs. State v. Jackson, No. 99-K-2749 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/9/99). The State argued that, because of their administrative nature, insurance checkpoints should be treated differently than the DWI checkpoints roundly criticized by this court in Parms. The court of appeal acknowledged that this court has distinguished insurance checkpoints from DWI checkpoints, citing to State v. McHugh, 92-1852 (La.1/6/94), 630 So.2d 1259, and Fields v. State, 98-0611 (La.7/8/98), 714 So.2d 1244. Nonetheless, the appellate court affirmed, holding that the State violated defendant's constitutional rights under Parms and Church because it failed to establish that the checkpoint complied with objective standards and neutral criteria.

Subsequently, this court granted the State's writ. State v. Jackson, 00-0015 (La.2/25/00), 755 So.2d 244.

ANALYSIS

Constitutionality of Checkpoints under Federal Law

The Constitution of the United States guarantees "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. Amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961).

Although a police officer must normally have probable cause to effectuate a reasonable seizure, exceptions to this requirement have evolved. The United States Supreme Court has approved an exception for search and seizure by a governmental authority where the officer has no articulable suspicion of wrongdoing in the context of border checkpoints to reduce the flow of illegal immigrants, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976); checkpoints to verify driver's licenses, Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); and checkpoints to determine sobriety, Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990).

In Delaware v. Prouse, the reasonableness of the seizure was determined by "balancing [the] intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests." 440 U.S. at 654, 99 S.Ct. 1391. Random automobile inspections conducted without articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is in violation of a traffic regulation are prohibited unless there are previously specified "neutral criteria" which prevent the unfettered exercise of discretion by a police officer in the field. Id. at 662, 99 S.Ct. 1391. Notably, however, the Supreme Court suggested the "[q]uestioning of all on-coming traffic at roadblock-type stops" as a presumably constitutional alternative. Id. at 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391.

In Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979), the Court proposed a balancing test to evaluate the constitutionality of seizures made without articulable suspicion of wrongdoing that weighs "the gravity of public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty." 443 U.S. at 50-51, 99 S.Ct. 2637. Above all, such a seizure must be conducted under a plan "embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers." Id.

Subsequently, in Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, the Supreme Court upheld the use of a sobriety checkpoint. In doing so, the Supreme Court clarified the application of the balancing test enunciated in Brown. To measure the effectiveness of the seizure for "advancing the public interest," the Court noted that:

Brown was not meant to transfer from politically accountable officials to the courts the decision as to which reasonable alternative law enforcement techniques should be employed to deal with a serious public danger.... [F]or purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, the choice among reasonable alternatives remains with the governmental officials who have a unique understanding of, and a responsibility for, limited public resources, including a finite number of police officers.

496 U.S. at 453-54, 110 S.Ct. 2481. While a complete absence of empirical data may be constitutionally unacceptable, the Supreme Court disproved the searching empirical analysis done by the Michigan court that found a sobriety checkpoint ineffective when only 1.6% of the drivers passing through were found alcohol impaired. Id. at 454-55, 110 S.Ct. 2481.

In evaluating the "subjective intrusion" to the stopped motorist, the Court clarified that the potential for generating "fear and surprise" must be considered from the standpoint of the law-abiding citizen, not the fear of one who has been drinking. Id. at 452, 110 S.Ct. 2481. Finding the checkpoint to be a reasonable seizure, the Court noted the very brief detention that occurred to each motorist passing through the checkpoint and that the officers followed detailed guidelines which limited their discretion. Id. at 447, 110 S.Ct. 2481.

Under federal law, checkpoints such as the instant one presumably do not violate constitutional guarantees under the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Galindo-Gonzales, 142 F.3d 1217, 1221 (10th Cir.1998)

(holding that "a brief stop at a highway roadblock for the limited purpose of verifying a driver's license, registration, and proof of insurance is a...