State v. Jackson
| Decision Date | 18 April 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. S-06-1041.,S-06-1041. |
| Citation | 747 N.W.2d 418,275 Neb. 434 |
| Parties | STATE of Nebraska, appellee, v. Michael T. JACKSON, appellant. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
Paula B. Hutchinson for appellant.
Jon Bruning, Attorney General, and James D. Smith for appellee.
A jury convicted Michael T. Jackson of first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and two counts of use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. On direct appeal, we affirmed Jackson's convictions.1 In Jackson's postconviction petition, he alleges (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel, (2) ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal, and (3) prosecutorial misconduct. The district court overruled Jackson's petition. Jackson appeals. We conclude that none of his numerous assignments of error have merit.
The facts of Jackson's underlying offense are set out in his direct appeal.2 We briefly recount the facts necessary to provide context for Jackson's claims.
On February 4, 1996, Jackson met with Dionne Brewer and Jason Thornton to buy cocaine. They planned to travel from Omaha to Minneapolis to make the buy. Brewer and Thornton wanted to fly, but Jackson wanted to drive because he was concerned about flying with $11,500 in cash. Brewer and Thornton agreed to drive and picked Jackson up in Thornton's vehicle, but Jackson suggested that they make the trip in a car that he had rented.
Jackson then gave Thornton, the driver, instructions to drive to where the rental car was parked. Jackson, who purported to be under the influence of marijuana, repeatedly led the trio astray. Brewer grew impatient and urged Jackson to stop wasting time. Jackson then directed Thornton to the location where he said he had parked the rental car. When they arrived at the location, Thornton stopped near a car Jackson identified as the rental car. As Thornton opened the driver's-side door to get out, gunshots rang out and Brewer saw Jackson shooting at Thornton from behind.
Brewer leapt out of the vehicle and began running down the street. Jackson got out of the vehicle and shot Brewer. As she lay in the street, Jackson shot her several times in the head and torso. Ella R. Iler, a woman who lived on the street where the shootings occurred, heard the initial gunfire. She rushed to her kitchen window and observed Jackson shoot Brewer.
Brewer managed to survive by playing dead. When officers arrived, Brewer informed them that she did not know Jackson's last name, but that his first name was Mike and that she knew where he lived. Some officers went to the location Brewer provided, while others went to the home of Jackson's former girlfriend, Demeteria Gardner, now known as Demeteria Miller (Miller). Miller gave officers consent to search her vehicle, which was parked in front of Jackson's home. (Jackson had borrowed Miller's vehicle earlier that day.) In the vehicle, police found a duffelbag containing clothes matching the description of the clothing worn by the killer. The clothing also contained red stains. A test at the University of Nebraska Medical Center would later reveal that the stains came from Thornton's blood. Officers then obtained a warrant and entered Jackson's home, where they found Jackson. Police seized several items in the house, including two .38-caliber bullets, a gun case, and a knit cap matching the description of a cap worn by the shooter.
Michael J. Poepsel represented Jackson at trial. Before trial, Poepsel moved in limine to suppress (1) physical evidence that officers recovered from Jackson's home and Miller's car, (2) statements that Jackson made to police, and (3) DNA evidence. The court overruled the motion regarding the physical and DNA evidence. The prosecution, however, agreed not to introduce Jackson's statements at trial.
Several doctors and technicians affiliated with the University of Nebraska Medical Center testified that the bloodstains on the clothing found in the vehicle came from Thornton.
At one point, Poepsel objected to the admission of autopsy photographs of Thornton's body. The court overruled the objection. Poepsel also renewed his objection to the items of physical evidence when the State offered them at trial. After the prosecution rested, Poepsel moved to dismiss because the State had failed to prove premeditation. The court overruled the motion. Poepsel then rested without presenting any evidence. The jury found Jackson guilty on all counts.
On appeal, James C. Hart, Jr., represented Jackson. Hart did not argue ineffective assistance of trial counsel in his direct appeal. Instead, Hart argued that the district court erred in (1) admitting the items of physical evidence seized from Jackson's residence, (2) admitting DNA evidence regarding the substance on Jackson's clothing, (3) admitting the gruesome photographs of Thornton's body, (4) overruling Jackson's motion to dismiss for lack of evidence on premeditation, and (5) overruling Jackson's motion for a new trial because of jury contamination. We rejected these claims and upheld Jackson's convictions.3
Following his unsuccessful appeal, Jackson filed a postconviction motion. In his motion, Jackson alleged: (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel, (2) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and (3) prosecutorial misconduct because the prosecution failed to provide potentially exculpatory evidence.
At the postconviction hearing, the State adduced testimony from Poepsel and Hart. Jackson adduced testimony from his mother; Miller; and Cindy Lee Welch-Brown, the mother of Jackson's nieces and nephews.
Poepsel testified that he met with Jackson regularly to discuss trial strategy. During these meetings, Jackson allegedly changed his story frequently. According to Poepsel, Jackson initially stated that he did not murder Thornton, then stated that he killed Thornton in self-defense, and then admitted to murdering Thornton. Poepsel testified that because Jackson admitted he killed Thornton and because of the DNA evidence, they changed strategy. Poepsel testified that he and Jackson would focus the defense on ensuring a conviction of a lesser offense. Hart testified that while preparing an appeal in Jackson's case, he found nothing in the record that indicated a viable ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
The district court denied Jackson's motion. On appeal, this court remanded with instructions that the district court enter a formal order with factual findings.4 In response, the district court entered an order in which it made numerous factual findings and conclusions of law. Notably, the court credited Poepsel's and Hart's testimony over the testimony of Jackson, Jackson's mother, and Welch-Brown.
Jackson assigns on appeal, restated, that the court erred in failing to find that Jackson received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Regarding this assignment, Jackson argues that trial counsel failed to (1) present Miller's testimony, (2) present Welch-Brown's testimony, (3) refute and undermine Iler's testimony, (4) undermine the State's use of the bullets and gun case found in Jackson's home, (5) obtain and present evidence of the gunshot residue analysis, (6) depose a University of Nebraska Medical Center medical technologist and undermine her testimony at trial, (7) consider and present testimony by a forensic pathologist, (8) effectively rebut Brewer's testimony, (9) present evidence that fingerprints found at the crime scene did not match Jackson's prints, (10) develop a clear trial strategy, and (11) subject the State's case to meaningful adversarial testing.
Additionally, Jackson assigns that the court erred in failing to find that Jackson received ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. He claims Hart was ineffective because of (1) an alleged conflict of interest stemming from Hart's personal relationship with Poepsel, Jackson's trial counsel, and (2) Hart's failure to argue on direct appeal that Poepsel was ineffective in the particulars listed above.
Jackson assigns that he was deprived of a fair trial because the State failed to disclose potentially exculpatory evidence.
Jackson assigns that the court erred when it denied the following discovery requests: (1) evidence found in a search of a drug kingpin's jail cell, (2) Brewer's drug abuse history, and (3) gunshot residue testing, either by a court-appointed expert or at Jackson's own expense.
A defendant requesting postconviction relief must establish the basis for such relief, and the district court's findings will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous.5 A claim that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance presents a mixed question of law and fact.6 We review ineffective assistance of counsel claims under the two-prong inquiry mandated by Strickland v. Washington.7 Under this inquiry we review the lower court's factual findings for clear error.8 Whether counsel's performance was deficient and whether that deficiency prejudiced the defendant are legal determinations that we resolve independently of the lower court's decision.9
On appeal, Jackson argues that he received ineffective assistance from his trial attorney. The State argues that Nebraska's procedural default rule bars Jackson's claim. Whether a claim raised in a postconviction proceeding is procedurally barred is a question of law.10 When reviewing a question of law, we resolve the question independently of the lower court's conclusion.11 A party cannot raise an issue in a postconviction motion if he or she could have raised that same...
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