State v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 06 November 2018
• Docket Number: No. COA18-417,COA18-417
• Citation: 262 N.C.App. 329,821 S.E.2d 656
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Eugene Oliver JACKSON, Defendant.

262 N.C.App. 329

821 S.E.2d 656

STATE of North Carolina

v.Eugene Oliver JACKSON, Defendant.

No. COA18-417

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: November 6, 2018

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Jarrett W. McGowan, for the State.

David Weiss for defendant.

BERGER, Judge.

Eugene Oliver Jackson ("Defendant") was indicted for felony possession of cocaine and driving without an operator's license. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop. Defendant's motion to suppress was denied. On June 13, 2017, Defendant pleaded guilty to felony possession of a schedule II substance and driving without an operator's license. Defendant appeals arguing that his motion to suppress should have been granted because the arresting officer did not have reasonable suspicion to justify extending the traffic stop. Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in concluding the contraband seized from Defendant's person would have been ultimately or inevitably discovered through lawful means. We disagree.

Facts and Procedural Background

In the order denying Defendant's motion to suppress, the trial court found: On February 14, 2015, City of Winston-Salem Police Department Corporal J.B. Keltner ("Corporal Keltner"), who had more than sixteen years of experience in law enforcement, including training in narcotics investigation and highway interdiction, was on the lookout for a gold Kia sedan in connection with an earlier incident that occurred at the Green Valley Inn. As Corporal Keltner was monitoring the intersection of Patterson Avenue and Germanton Road, he observed a Kia sedan drive through the red light on Patterson Avenue approaching Highway 52 North. Corporal Keltner conducted a traffic stop. The Kia, driven by Defendant, stopped on the right hand side of the highway, but with its two left tires on the outside right fog line. Based on Corporal Keltner's training and experience, persons transporting narcotics sometimes engaged in the practice of "white lining," or parking on the white fog line to make approaching the vehicle and conducting investigations more difficult.

Corporal Keltner approached the passenger side of the vehicle, and immediately "observed a 24-oz. beer, open, in the center console." Defendant then rolled down the window and Corporal Keltner explained that he stopped the vehicle for running the red light, to which Defendant made spontaneous comments about a friend running off and not knowing the friend's location. Corporal Keltner then asked for his license and registration. Defendant responded that he did not have a license, but handed Corporal Keltner a Pennsylvania State I.D. card with his right hand, which was "shaky."

After noticing that Defendant "had red glassy eyes" and "a moderate odor of alcohol coming from the car," Corporal Keltner asked Defendant to exit the car so that he could search the car and have Defendant perform sobriety tests. Before searching the car, Corporal Keltner frisked Defendant for weapons. Upon searching the vehicle, Corporal Keltner found no further evidence or contraband. As Corporal Keltner returned to his police car to check the status of Defendant's license and for any outstanding warrants, "[D]efendant spontaneously handed" Corporal Keltner his car keys. Because it was cold outside, Corporal Keltner permitted Defendant to sit in the back of the patrol car un-handcuffed while he ran license and warrant checks. Corporal Keltner determined Defendant's license was expired, the Kia was not registered to Defendant, and Defendant had no outstanding warrants.

While Corporal Keltner was sitting with Defendant in his patrol car, Defendant voluntarily "made a variety of spontaneous statements to Corp[oral] Keltner about his missing friend, first saying he could not remember the friend's name, then that his name was "Ty," then "Ty Payne," and then that "Ty was in fact his brother-in-law." Defendant further asked if "he could give him a ride back to the Green Valley Inn after the traffic stop was finished."

After concluding his license and warrant check, Corporal Keltner conducted standardized field sobriety tests, which were performed to his satisfaction. Corporal Keltner then requested and received consent to search Defendant and found powder cocaine and crack cocaine in Defendant's pockets. Defendant was arrested for possession of cocaine and driving without an operator's license.

The trial court further found that Corporal Keltner would not have allowed Defendant to drive away from the traffic stop because he had no driver's license; and he would have searched Defendant's person before transporting Defendant in his patrol car to any other location or prior to arresting him. Corporal Keltner testified that it was his practice to search all persons who rode in his patrol car, even if not under arrest, for safety reasons and to avoid unwittingly transporting contraband.

Defendant was indicted for possession of cocaine and driving without an operator's license, and in February 2016, he filed a motion to suppress. The trial court denied Defendant's motion to suppress in an order filed on July 24, 2017. On June 13, 2017, Defendant pleaded guilty to felony possession of a schedule II substance and driving without an operator's license. Defendant was placed on supervised probation for eighteen months.

Defendant appealed the trial court's denial of his Motion to Suppress, but did not give notice of his appeal from the underlying judgment. As a result, Defendant petitioned this Court on May 23, 2018 for a writ of certiorari in light of the defect in his notice of appeal. Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying the Motion to Suppress because the arresting officer's reason for extending the traffic stop failed to distinguish Defendant from other innocent travelers and did not establish reasonable suspicion. We grant Defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari, and address the merits.

Analysis

Defendant argues that Corporal Keltner lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the stop after determining Defendant was not intoxicated. He further argues that the State failed to prove discovery of the cocaine was inevitable. We disagree.

Our review of a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress is "strictly limited to determining whether the trial judge's underlying findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, in which event they are conclusively binding on appeal, and whether those factual findings in turn support the judge's ultimate conclusions of law." State v. Cooke , 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982). "The conclusions of law ... are reviewed de novo ." State v. Downey , ––– N.C. App. ––––, ––––, 796 S.E.2d 517, 519 (2017), aff'd , 370 N.C. 507, 809 S.E.2d 566 (2018).

Here, the trial court's findings of fact were supported by competent evidence. Based upon those findings, the trial court concluded as a matter of law that "the purpose of the traffic stop was concluded after the field sobriety tests were administered, and before Corp[oral] Keltner requested consent to search [D]efendant's person." However, "based on the totality of the circumstances Corpor[al] Keltner had reasonable articulable suspicion to extend the stop for the purpose of asking for consent to search the [D]efendant's person." The factor's supporting Corporal Keltner's reasonable suspicion to extend the stop for the purpose of asking consent to search Defendant's person included:

[D]efendant's nervousness and shakiness, the vehicle being registered to a third party not present, the [D]efendant presenting an out-of-state identification; the [D]efendant giving conflicting information about where he lived; the [D]efendant's repeated offering of unsolicited information about a missing friend and conflicting information about the name of the friend while ultimately volunteering that the friend was in fact his brother-in-law; and the [D]efendant's parking the vehicle on the fog line where officers could not approach the driver's side of the vehicle without having to stand in the lane of travel.

The trial court also concluded that Defendant's "consent to the search of his person was voluntarily given," and that Defendant "suffered no constitutional violations as a result of this stop and search." Moreover, the trial court stated that, even if Defendant had not consented to the search of his person,

the drugs located on [D]efendant's person would have been inevitably discovered: if Corp[oral] Keltner had merely written [D]efendant a citation and given [D]efendant the ride he had requested following the completion of the traffic stop, and searched him prior to that ride as was Corp[oral] Keltner's practice, the drugs would have been located at that point; or, they would have been located pursuant to a search incident to arrest for No Operator's License.

I. Reasonable Suspicion

The Fourth Amendment of the United States protects individuals "against unreasonable searches and seizures." State v. Barnard , 362 N.C. 244, 246, 658 S.E.2d 643, 645 (2008) (citing U.S. Const. amend. IV. and N.C. Const. art. I, § 20 ). A traffic stop is constitutional if the officer has a "reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot." Id. at 246, 658 S.E.2d at 645 (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow , 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S.Ct. 673, 675, 145 L.Ed.2d 570, 576 (2000) ). "[R]easonable suspicion is the necessary standard for traffic stops, regardless of whether the traffic violation was readily observed or merely suspected." State v. Bullock , 370 N.C. 256, 261, 805 S.E.2d 671, 676 (2017) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Reasonable suspicion is a "less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence." Barnard , 362 N.C. at 247, 658 S.E.2d at 645 (quoting Wardlow , 528 U.S. at 123, 120 S.Ct. at 675, 145 L.Ed.2d at 576 ). Reasonable...