State v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 17 April 2012
• Docket Number: No. COA11–876.,COA11–876.
• Citation: 727 S.E.2d 322
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Travaras Vashaun JACKSON.
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals

727 S.E.2d 322

STATE of North Carolina
v.
Travaras Vashaun JACKSON.

No. COA11–876.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

April 17, 2012.

[727 S.E.2d 325]

Appeal by writ of certiorari review of the order denying Defendant's motion for appropriate relief entered 15 November 2010 by Judge Arnold O. Jones, II, in Wayne County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 December 2011.

Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Kathleen N. Bolton, for the State.

North Carolina Prisoner Legal Services, by D. Tucker Charns, Durham, for Defendant-appellant.

ERVIN, Judge.

Defendant Travaras Vashaun Jackson appeals from an order denying his motion for appropriate relief and related discovery motion. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by summarily denying his motion for appropriate relief and an accompanying discovery motion. After careful consideration of Defendant's challenges to the trial court's order in light of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court's order should be reversed and that this case should be remanded to the Wayne County Superior Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

I. Background A. Substantive Facts

On 23 October 2006, Sergeants Dan Peters of the Wayne County Drug Squad and Seth Harris of the Goldsboro Police Department gave an unidentified informant $25.00 for use in making a controlled drug purchase at an apartment located in Goldsboro. The informant

[727 S.E.2d 326]

claimed to have gone to the apartment, returned with a bag of white powder, and told the officers that an unidentified black male in the apartment had stated that the powder was cocaine. At that point, Sergeant Harris prepared and executed an affidavit, with which he obtained the issuance of a warrant authorizing a search of the apartment. In the affidavit, Sergeant Harris stated that:

The applicant states that he has a confidential source which[ ] is also known to Sgt. D. Peters of the Goldsboro Police Department, that has proven reliable in the past to the applicant by providing information in the past that has led to the seizure of a controlled substance in Wayne County. On October 23, 2006 the source told the applicant that the source was inside the above mentioned residence [within] the past 48 hours and had seen a quantity of off white powder substance that was represented to be cocaine by a black male and in the possession of the black male while inside the residence listed above. The source has in the past provided information to the applicant that has led to the seizure of controlled substances, therefore the applicant knows that the source knows cocaine when the source sees it.

Later that day, Sergeant Harris, Sergeant Peters, and other law enforcement officers executed the search warrant. The officers knocked on the apartment door and, after failing to receive a response, used a battering ram to force an entry into the apartment. When the officers entered, Defendant, who was immediately inside the door, ran towards a bathroom. Sergeant Peters pursued Defendant and retrieved a plastic bag from the toilet bowl before Defendant had a chance to dispose of it. The plastic bag held three other bags that appeared to contain controlled substances. The officers handcuffed Defendant, searched the apartment and Defendant, and seized various items, including Defendant's identification cards, which were discovered in the bedroom; an apartment key, which was removed from Defendant's pocket; and an electric bill identifying Heather Seagraves, who arrived toward the end of the search, as the individual in whose name utility service was provided to the apartment.

After executing the search warrant, Sergeant Harris arrested Defendant and took him to the Goldsboro Police Department. After Sergeant Harris informed Defendant of his Miranda rights, Defendant agreed to answer questions without invoking his right to the assistance of counsel. In a written statement that Sergeant Harris prepared and Defendant signed, Defendant stated that:

The bag of drugs I was trying to hide today were mine and nobody else's. There was crack, [cocaine] powder and ecstasy in that bag. It had to be 5 or 6 grams of crack, 3 or 4 grams of powder, and 10 or 15 pills. I've been selling drugs out of that apartment since about June of this year. I make an average of about 300 [ ] or 400 dollars a day. My girl knows I sell drugs, but she doesn't get involved with it. She's not even there during the daytime. She doesn't know what I do when she's not there.

Chemical testing performed by the State Bureau of Investigation indicated that the plastic bag retrieved from the toilet held 3.3 grams of 3, 4 methylenedioxymethamphetamine, more commonly known as MDMA or ecstasy; 3.6 grams of cocaine hydrochloride powder; and 6.3 grams of cocaine base.

B. Procedural History

On 6 August 2007, a Wayne County grand jury returned bills of indictment charging Defendant with possession of cocaine with the intent to sell and deliver, possession of MDMA with the intent to sell and deliver, possession of marijuana with the intent to sell and deliver, maintaining a dwelling for the purpose of using controlled substances, and having attained the status of an habitual felon. On 14 March 2008, Defendant filed a motion seeking the suppression of the evidence seized during the search of the apartment. Defendant argued, among other things, that the affidavit submitted in support of the application for the issuance of the search warrant contained statements that “were in violation of the principle set forth in

[727 S.E.2d 327]

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978),” and also filed a motion seeking the disclosure of the identity of the alleged informant.

The charges against Defendant came on for trial before Judge Jerry Braswell and a jury at the 17 March 2008 criminal session of Wayne County Superior Court. After denying Defendant's suppression motion on the grounds that no affidavit had been attached to the motion and that Defendant had failed to show standing to challenge the search of the apartment, Judge Braswell allowed Defendant to examine Sergeant Harris concerning the extent to which there was any additional discoverable evidence that had not been provided to Defendant as of that date. In response to Defendant's questions, Sergeant Harris testified that: (1) he had never worked with the informant before the date upon which he sought the issuance of the search warrant; (2) when the informant returned with the white powder, the officers did not remove it from the bag, smell it, field test it, or otherwise attempt to identify the substance; and (3) although Sergeant Harris “understood” that the informant was a former drug user, he did not know if the informant had a criminal record or was knowledgeable about the drug trade. After hearing this testimony and engaging in a further colloquy with counsel, the trial court denied Defendant's request for a continuance and a dismissal of the pending charges, both of which were predicated on Defendant's need to interview the alleged informant and alleged discovery violations.

At the conclusion of the evidence, Judge Braswell dismissed the charge of possession of marijuana with the intent to sell and deliver. The jury returned verdicts convicting Defendant of possession of cocaine with the intent to sell and deliver and possession of MDMA with the intent to sell or deliver. However, the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict with respect to the issue of Defendant's guilt of maintaining a dwelling for the use of controlled substances, leading the trial court to declare a mistrial with respect to that charge. After the required separate hearing, the jury found that Defendant had attained habitual felon status. Based upon the jury's verdicts, Judge Braswell entered judgments sentencing Defendant to two consecutive terms of 85 to 111 months imprisonment. Although Defendant noted an appeal to this Court from Judge Braswell's judgments, this Court filed an opinion on 5 May 2009 finding no error in the proceedings leading to the entry of Judge Braswell's judgments. State v. Jackson, 196 N.C.App. 790, 675 S.E.2d 720 (2009) (unpublished).

On 8 June 2010, Defendant filed a motion for appropriate relief in which he alleged that:

[Defendant]'s motion to suppress was denied because trial counsel failed to file a statutorily required affidavit with the motion. Therefore, trial counsel was ineffective. In the alternative, to the extent appellate counsel was required to allege ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, appellate counsel was also ineffective.

In addition, Defendant moved “pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A–14l5(f) for discovery of the complete files of all law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies involved in the investigation of the crimes committed, or the prosecution of, the Defendant.” After a hearing held on 3 November 2010, the trial court entered an order summarily denying Defendant's motions for appropriate relief and discovery on 15 November 2010. In its order, the trial court stated that:

1. The Affidavit supporting the search warrant at issue did not contain “false statements” under the theory argued by the Defendant;

2. Even in the absence of a supporting Affidavit, the trial judge nevertheless fairly considered the arguments requested within this Motion and rejected them;

3. The Defendant has failed to adequately show that trial counsel's actions in failing to file an Affidavit prejudiced his defense;

4. A determination that this Motion for Appropriate Relief is without merit can be determined on the face of the record and, therefore, the Defendant's

[727 S.E.2d 328]

Motion for additional discovery is moot.

On 14 January 2011, this Court granted Defendant's request for certiorari review of the trial court's order.

II. Legal Analysis A. Standards of Review
1. Motion for Appropriate Relief

a. Entitlement to...