State v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 31 December 1924
• Docket Number: No. 25630.,25630.
• Parties: STATE v. JACKSON.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

267 S.W. 855

STATE v. JACKSON.

No. 25630.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

December 31, 1924.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jackson County; Charles R. Pence, Judge.

E. L. Jackson was convicted of arson in the first degree, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Benj. H. Leventhal, of Kansas City, for appellant.

Jesse W. Barrett, Atty. Gen., and William L. Vandeventer, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

DAVID B. BLAIR, P. J.

Defendant was convicted in criminal division A of the Jackson county circuit court of the crime of arson in the first degree, was sentenced to serve five years in the state penitentiary, and has appealed.

A full transcript of the proceedings and evidence has been filed in this court, but defendant has filed no brief. It therefore becomes our duty to examine the entire record, in the light of the motion for new trial, to see that defendant was accorded a fair and impartial trial. The so-called motion in arrest is merely a restatement of the motion for new trial.

The sufficiency of the information was assailed by the motion to quash on the ground that it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a crime against defendant. The information alleges every element required by section 3282, R. S. 1919, and is in the identical form approved in State v. Jones, 171 Mo. loc. cit. 404, 71 S. W. 680, 94 Am. St. Rep. 786, and is sufficient.

The main contention, made in the motion for new trial, is that the evidence is insufficient to authorize conviction of the crime charged. A consideration of this point requires a statement of the facts.

The evidence relied upon by the state is altogether circumstantial. Defendant and a woman known as Willie May Harris had previously sustained an illicit sexual relation and she had apparently broken off that relation over defendant's objection. " He apparently attempted to reinstate himself by "cave man" tactics, and had assaulted her. He had also made threats to others that he would have his revenge. It appears that he had written some sort of note to the woman a day or two before the fire. She forgot to bring the note to court with her and its contents were not divulged to the jury.

The Harris woman lived with her mother, Sarah Logan, at 1317 Independence avenue in Kansas City. Mrs. Logan rented the house, and she and her husband and family lived on the first floor, and Mrs. Harris occupied the upper floor as her dwelling house. About 11 p. m., May 16, 1923, the house was discovered to be on fire. It was a frame house and the evidence tends to show an incendiary origin, in that the brush end of a broom was found inserted between the weatherboarding and the lath, and the same was afire, and the flames had followed upward to the attic between the studding timbers from the point where the blazing broom was found.

If complete destruction of the dwelling house or the injury or death to those who were asleep therein at the time was contemplated, the house was unfortunately located for the accomplishment of such design. A regular station of the city fire department happened to be next door, and the occupants of the house were aroused and escaped serious injury, and the fire was extinguished before the house was destroyed.

Defendant was seen loitering in the immediate vicinity of the dwelling house for some time that night. Apparently his loitering thereabout had attracted attention, for he was positively identified by two witnesses. The evidence tends to show that he was seen within a few feet of the house as late as 10:30 p. m. The fire was discovered at 11 p. m. and one of the firemen testified that it would have taken about 15 minutes for the fire to have reached the development attained when it was discovered. This testimony tends to show that the fire started about 10 :45 p. m.

A "pick up" order for defendant was issued by the police department of the city and he was arrested the next morning. He at first denied having been in the vicinity of the dwelling house that night at all, but, upon being informed by the inspector that he had been seen loitering within a few feet of the house, he admitted having been there. However, he said he had left there, and arrived at his rooms at 1219 East Twenty-Second street at 9:30 p. m., and at once went to bed.

On the trial defendant denied having made such statement and testified that he had not been near the house that night, and claimed that he went to a show and got out at 8 o'clock, p. m., and "loafed around" for an hour or so, and then went to his room and to bed. He could not tell a place where he had been or name a person to whom he had spoken after the show was over. No one was produced from his rooming house to corroborate his statement that he returned there at 9:30 p. m., or even that he had attended a show.

He denied firing the house or threatening to have his revenge because the Harris woman refused to continue her relations with him. He admitted having lived with her, and having assaulted her, and having written notes to her. He could not remember the contents of such notes. He did not put his good character in issue, but produced one witness, for whom he had previously worked, who testified that he was steady, trustworthy, and a fair worker. This witness had never known defendant to be in trouble, but knew nothing about his morality or reputation.

I. We think the evidence was sufficient to make a case for the jury. The corpus delicti was sufficiently proven. That the dwelling house was actually in flames is undisputed. The circumstances indicate very strongly that the fire was started by criminal agency. The place where it started makes accidental origin highly improbable. The finding of the burning broom at the point where the fire apparently originated is a fact strongly pointing to incendiarism.

The facts connecting defendant with the origin of the fire are not so clear, but point so strongly to defendant as the agency thereof that we think his criminal agency was a question for the jury. Arson is not a crime which may be expected to be committed Openly and in broad daylight. It is a crime usually undertaken in stealth and under cover of darkness and at an hour when few, if any, observers are likely to be about. Unless accused confesses his crime or is caught in the act, guilt must usually be proven by circumstantial evidence.

In this case we have evidence of bad feeling and of threats of revenge for fancied wrongs of the Harris woman. Motive, therefore, existed for defendant to commit the act. Presence of motive, without other evidence, is insufficient, just as absence of motive is not sufficient to set aside a conviction otherwise sustained by positive evidence of guilt.

Here we have proximity and opportunity. Defendant was seen within a very few feet of the house and loitering there for some time, without any explanation of his presence there. He was last seen there about 10:30 and the fire apparently started about 10:45. There is no testimony that other persons were seen near the house.

Defendant's contradictory statements concerning his presence at the place of the fire lend additional force to the other circumstances pointing to his guilt. When first arrested, he denied his presence there at all that night. When confronted with the statement of the inspector that he had been seen there, he changed his story and said he had been there and left about 9 o'clock. His attempt to account for his whereabouts during the evening is, to say the least, very unsatisfactory.

Cases where convictions have been set aside are usually those where no motive has been shown, and where there has been no proof of the presence of defendant upon the scene of the fire at a...