State v. Jacksonville Terminal Co.

• Citation: 27 So. 225,41 Fla. 377
• Parties: STATE ex rel. LAMAR, Atty. Gen., et al. v. JACKSONVILLE TERMINAL CO.
• Decision Date: 08 January 1900
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida

27 So. 225

41 Fla. 377

STATE ex rel. LAMAR, Atty. Gen., et al. v. JACKSONVILLE TERMINAL CO.

Florida Supreme Court

January 8, 1900

Error to circuit court, Duval county; Rhydon M. Call, Judge.

Application by the state, on the relation of W. B. Lamar, attorney general, and others, for a writ of mandamus against the Jacksonville Terminal Company. From a judgment granting a motion to quash the alternative writ, the state brings error. Reversed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

1. There is no impropriety in naming the special counsel for the railroad commissioners, along with the attorney general, as relators in a proceeding by mandamus instituted by the attorney general and special counsel, in compliance with the special directions of the commissioners, to compel the observance by a terminal company of a regulation made by the commissioners under the provisions of chapter 4700, Laws 1899.

2. Where the railroad commissioners, under the power conferred on them by section 6, c. 4700, Laws 1899, have made a regulation requiring a terminal company corporation to admit a railroad company to the privileges and benefits of its common passenger station or terminal, and it appears that the commissioners had power to make the regulation, such regulation is, under section 8 of said chapter 4700, to be deemed and held to be prima facie reasonable and just; and a writ of mandamus to compel observance of said regulation is properly addressed to the terminal company, where the duty devolves upon it as a corporation, and not upon a particular officer of the company.

3. The last clause of section 30, art. 16, of the constitution of 1885, 'and shall provide for enforcing such laws by adequate penalties and forfeitures,' does not, by implication, forbid the use of mandamus and other remedies for enforcing duties imposed by laws passed to accomplish the purposes specified in the first clause of the section. The clause quoted is a command to the legislature, leaving it no discretion upon that subject; but, being silent as to other remedies for enforcing duties growing out of laws passed to accomplish the purposes specified in the first clause of the section, it rests in the legislative discretion to provide such as it may see fit, and the courts may apply such of the ordinary remedies as may be applicable.

4. An alternative writ of mandamus to compel the observance of a regulation made by the railroad commissioners under the powers conferred by chapter 4700, Laws 1899, requiring a terminal company to admit a railroad company to the privileges and benefits of its common passenger station or terminal, and fixing rates for the uses and privileges of such terminal, to be paid by such railroad company, need not allege any fact tending to show that the rates so fixed are reasonable and just, as such regulation is, under the statute, to be deemed and held to be prima facie reasonable and just.

5. Mandamus will lie to compel the observ ance of a regulation made by the railroad commissioners under the powers conferred by chapter 4700, Laws 1899, requiring a terminal company to admit a railroad company to the privileges and benefits of its common passenger station or terminal, notwithstanding an action for damages or proceedings to enforce the penalty denounced by the statute for failure to comply with the regulation might be maintained as such remedies are inadequate, and neither of them is adapted to secure the performance of the duty to the public imposed by such regulation.

6. A regulation made by the railroad commissioners under the powers conferred by chapter 4700, Laws 1899, requiring a terminal company organized under the laws of this state, and operating a common passenger terminal station wholly within this state for the purpose of furnishing terminal facilities to railroad common carriers entering therein, to admit a railroad company operating a railroad from a point in Florida to a point in the state of Georgia to the privileges and benefits of its said passenger station or terminal, and fixing just and reasonable rates for the uses and privileges of such terminal, to be paid by such railroad company, is not an unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce nor does it deprive the terminal company of its liberty or property without due process of law; nor does it constitute an appropriation of the terminal company's property to a public use, so as to require the compensation therefor to be ascertained by a jury of 12 men, within the meaning of section 29, art. 16, of the constitution of 1885.

7. Under chapter 4700, Laws 1899, a railroad operated from a point in this state to a point in another state is, in so far as the road is located within this state, and in so far as its business is confined to traffic in this state, subject to the regulation, control, and supervision of the railroad commissioners.

8. Section 30, art. 16, of the constitution of 1885 does not prohibit considerations of the public interest, comfort safety, and convenience in determining what is an 'abuse,' an 'unjust discrimination,' or an 'excessive charge,' within the meaning of those terms as used in that section.

9. The power conferred upon the railroad commissioners by section 6 c. 4700, Laws 1899, with reference to requiring the admission into passenger terminals of railroad companies desiring or required by the commissioners to enter, and to fixing reasonable rates of compensation for the uses of such terminals, has no reference to a terminal station owned and used exclusively for its own traffic by any common carrier or railroad company, but applies to those passenger terminals owned or operated by a terminal company or individual, or by a railroad company in connection with its main line, when such terminal company, individual, or railroad company undertakes the public business of furnishing terminal facilities to railroad common carriers.

10. Chapter 4700, Laws 1899, is not subject to the constitutional objection that it embraces more than one subject and matter properly connected therewith.

11. Section 6, c. 4700, Laws 1899, relating to the power of the railroad commissioners to compel admission into certain passenger terminals of railroad companies desiring or required by the commissioners to enter, and to fixing reasonable rates for the uses and privileges thereof, applies to all terminals of the class or character thereby contemplated, whether owned or operated by corporations companies, or individuals, and does not, therefore, discriminate between corporations and individuals who may own or operate terminals of the same class or character.

12. Under sections 8, 10, 17, 18, and 21 of chapter 4700, Laws 1899, ample provision is made to enable the railroad commissioners to ascertain the facts necessary to be known in order to arrive at and fix just and reasonable rates for the uses of passenger terminals, and the privileges thereof, which they are by section 6 empowered to prescribe and enforce.

COUNSEL

Geo. P. Raney, Alex. W. Smith, Charles S. Adams, E. J. L'Engle, W. B. Lamar, Atty. Gen., and J. M. Barrs, special counsel, for plaintiff in error.

John E Hartridge and John A. Henderson, for defendant in error. On September 11, 1899, the circuit court of Duval county issued an alternative writ of mandamus, directed to defendant in error. It alleged: 'That by a petition caused by the railroad commissioners to be filed in the name of the state by William B. Lamar, as attorney general, and Benjamin S. Liddon and John M. Barrs, as special counsel for such commissioners, it was made to appear that on September 4, 1899, at the city of Jacksonville, the commissioners being then in session in a certain cause pending before them, between the Atlantic, Valdosta & Western Railway Company, a body corporate under the laws of Georgia, engaged in operating a line of railroad as common carriers of freight and passengers from the city of Valdosta, in the state of Georgia, to the city of Jacksonville, in the state of Florida, and the defendant in error, in which cause the railway company had previously filed its petition with and before said commissioners, praying for an order to require the admission of the said railway company to the union depot and terminal facilities of the defendant in error, and to fix just and reasonable rates and charges to be paid to said defendant in error by said railway company for the uses of such depot and terminals, and the privileges thereof, and to which petition the defendant in error had filed its answer, and in which cause the commissioners had given a full hearing to the parties, testimony being introduced on both sides, and argument of counsel being heard; and the commissioners having viewed the premises in person, and investigated the business of defendant in error, they did on September 4, 1899, at their session, conclude and render in said cause a judgment and order substantially as follows: That the railway company and the terminal company are subject to the regulation, supervision, and control of the said railroad commission under the provisions of the act of the legislature of the state of Florida, and that it is essential to the best interest and convenience of the public that the said railway company should be furnished with the facilities by said terminal company in its common passenger station at the city of Jacksonville, the commission finding that the facilities of said terminal company are sufficient to enable it not only to accommodate said railways now furnished by it, but also to accommodate the said Atlantic, Valdosta & Western Railway Company, and thus afford a common passenger station or terminal to the railroads running into Jacksonville; that the terminal company is ordered to permit the said...