State v. Jacobs, 25147.
| Decision Date | 26 February 1926 |
| Docket Number | No. 25147.,25147. |
| Citation | 207 N.W. 648,166 Minn. 279 |
| Parties | STATE v. JACOBS. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Hennepin County; Frank M. Nye, Judge.
A. N. Jacobs was convicted of publishing a criminal libel, and he appeals. Affirmed.
Smith & Callahan and Wm. B. Movery, all of Minneapolis, for appellant.
C. L. Hilton, Atty. Gen., and Floyd B. Olson, Co. Atty., of Minneapolis, for the State.
Defendant appeals from a conviction for publishing a criminal libel. The sole ground for a reversal is that in a trial for such an offense the court may not instruct the jury as to the law. It is doubtful whether, on this record, defendant has raised the point. No objection was made to the jury being charged. In the motion for a new trial the action of the court in charging the jury was not assailed. The only fault therein specified ran to certain portions of the instructions. However, neither in the oral argument nor in the brief is any specific error pointed out in the court's statement of the law pertaining to criminal libel, or in the legal definition of the defenses available. The point of the appeal is simply this, since it appears that the jury were charged, the conviction cannot stand, for the court has no right to give any instruction to the jury in a case of criminal libel.
The statutes upon which defendant plants himself read:
"In all criminal prosecutions for libel, the truth may be given in evidence, and if it appears to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true, and was published with good motives and justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the fact." Section 9904. G. S. 1923.
Section 10710 of G. S. 1923, provides:
"On the trial of an indictment for any offense, questions of law shall be decided by the court, except in cases of libel, saving the right of the defendant to except, and questions of fact by the jury; and, although the jury may find a general verdict which shall include questions of law as well as of fact, they shall receive as law what shall be laid down by the court as such."
The argument of defendant, to the effect that our statute prohibits the court from informing the jury what the law is in respect to criminal libels, is attempted to be drawn from the fact that in the above-quoted section 9904 the Legislature saw fit not to add the words, "under the direction of the court," which are found in the Constitution or statutes of many states where juries are made judges of both law and fact. Therefore, it is said, our statute reveals an intent to prohibit the court from informing the jury as to what law or legal principles may be applicable or involved in respect to the matters in issue.
We do not think such an intent is to be inferred. The legislation in respect to criminal libel grew out of the fact that the practice had been established under the common law of only submitting the fact of the publication of the libel by the accused to a jury for a special verdict, so that if the verdict was against him as to the publication the court then passed on his guilt or innocence. The harsh results brought on the Fox Act, followed in this country in most states by constitutional or statutory provisions similar to our statute. An exhaustive history of the origin of the legislation is found in State v. Burpee, 25 A. 964, 65 Vt. 1, 19 L. R. A. 145, 36 Am. St. Rep. 775. It is not reasonable to suppose that the Legislature, by the statute quoted, intended to give the court no other function in a criminal libel case than to enforce decorum at the trial. It cannot be that, because the jury is the judge of the facts, any testimony the parties may wish to adduce or the jury desire may be introduced. The court has the right to determine according to the rules of law what is admissible. An attempt to pass by the court met with no success in People v. Pryal, 147 P. 114, 115, 25 Cal. App. 779. We think the trial court has also the right to advise the jury as to what the law is concerning the issues to be determined. The jurors are not lawyers. As a rule they are not persons who know or profess to know what the law is. It was never intended that they should be left entirely in the dark, or left to choose between the, perhaps, divergent statements of the interested advocates as to what the law is.
In the states having provisions precisely similar to our statute we have found only one decision which recognizes the right of the court to instruct the jury, viz.: People v. Seeley, 72 P. 834, 139 Cal. 118. But several states in the Constitution or by statute have exactly the same worded provision as to all criminal trials that our st...
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