State v. Jacobs
| Decision Date | 20 July 1993 |
| Docket Number | Nos. WD,s. WD |
| Citation | 861 S.W.2d 621 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Evason JACOBS, Appellant. Evason JACOBS, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent. 44401, WD 46030. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Susan L. Hogan, Appellate Defender, Kansas City, for appellant.
Philip M. Koppe, Asst. Atty. Gen., Kansas City, for respondent.
Before KENNEDY, P.J., and BERREY and SPINDEN, JJ.
Defendant Evason Jacobs was found guilty after trial by jury of first degree murder, section 565.020.1 RSMo 1986, and armed criminal action, section 571.015.1 RSMo 1986. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole on the murder count and life imprisonment on the armed criminal action count. The court ordered that the sentences be served concurrently. Evason appeals his convictions and the denial, after an evidentiary hearing, of his Rule 29.15 motion for postconviction relief.
The evidence relevant to this appeal, and in a light favorable to the verdict, is as follows. In the spring and early summer of 1989, Evason was employed by Danguard Security as a security guard. He was assigned to an office building located at 1111 Grand in Kansas City, Missouri, and worked the night shift. Donald Pierce had a law practice on the third floor of 1111 Grand. Linda Culbertson was a longtime employee of Mr. Pierce and managed the office.
Donald Pierce was shot to death in the hallway outside his office on the evening of June 7, 1989. Police responding to a report of gunshots found a hysterical Linda and Donald Pierce's body. Hearing shouts, they ran to the top floor, where they found Evason with his hands tied behind his back. When asked what happened, Evason said he had been hit from behind and did not know anything else. He was taken to the hospital and then released.
After questioning Linda all night, police called Evason and asked him to come to the station for an interview. He agreed, and arrived at 7:30 a.m. on June 8. He signed a form waiving his Miranda rights at 7:40 a.m. After speaking to detectives for an hour and a half, Evason gave two videotaped statements in which he described his role in the murder of Donald Pierce. Those statements, and testimony at Evason's trial, revealed the following series of events.
Linda approached Evason in May of 1989 and discussed the possibility of finding someone to kill Pierce. Evason talked to his friend Quincy Brown about asking Quincy's brother, who was on parole for murder, to kill Pierce. Quincy's brother declined the offer, but Quincy agreed to kill Donald Pierce. Linda gave Evason $600 to give to Quincy, and Evason gave Quincy $200 of that money. When attempts by Evason and Quincy to buy a gun were unsuccessful, they agreed that Quincy would use Evason's .12 gauge shotgun, which Evason then brought to work.
Quincy came to 1111 Grand several times in May and June of 1989 with the intention of killing Donald Pierce, but, until June 7, always backed out at the last minute. At 7:30 p.m. on June 7, 1989, Quincy came to 1111 Grand dressed in black. He entered through the back door, which Evason had left open for him. Evason took Quincy to the place where he had hidden the shotgun, and then took him to the top floor, where Evason showed him how to open the doors to make it look like there had been a burglary. Linda then came and told them that Pierce was getting ready to leave. Quincy tied up Evason, hit him on the head, and scattered the contents of his wallet, all in furtherance of their plan to make it look like a burglary.
Linda and Quincy went down to the third floor, but a few minutes later Evason came down and told Quincy that he had neglected to open the door to the roof. Quincy returned to the top floor, opened the door to the roof, and retied Evason. Quincy then returned to the third floor.
At Evason's trial Quincy testified that, after he returned to the third floor, Donald Pierce came out of his office. Quincy fired the shotgun, hitting Pierce in the shoulder. Pierce cried for Linda to help him, but she pushed Quincy toward him and told Quincy to kill him, or else they'd all go to jail. Quincy shot Pierce again, hitting him in the knee. Quincy then handed the gun to Linda and fled from the building.
Donald Pierce died of a third gunshot wound to the eye, inflicted by Linda after Quincy ran away. Linda hid the gun, which police later found in a bag with Linda's fingerprints on it. It was after the discovery of the murder weapon that Linda made a statement implicating Evason and Quincy in the murder.
While Evason made no mention of compensation in his statement, Quincy testified that Evason often talked about how he was to receive a Corvette and a job from Linda for the murder of Donald Pierce. Quincy was to receive $1,000 and a job for pulling the trigger.
Evason consented to a search of his car, where police found four $100 bills and a box of shotgun shells that matched a spent shell found at the murder scene and two live shells found in the murder weapon.
Dr. Daniel Claiborn, a psychologist, testified for the defense at trial. Dr. Claiborn interviewed Evason and performed several psychological and intelligence tests on him. Based on his observations and the results of the tests, Dr. Claiborn gave the opinion that Evason is borderline mild mentally retarded, is perceptually dysfunctional, and has a dependent personality disorder. Dr. Claiborn believes these defects prevent Evason from being able to coolly reflect and deliberate.
In his first point on appeal Evason argues that the trial court erred in allowing the introduction of Evason's statements made to police and the items found in his car. Evason asserts that he did not make a knowing, intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights.
Evason filed a pretrial motion to suppress the statements and evidence. After a hearing the trial court denied the motion. Dr. Claiborn testified at the suppression hearing that three different intelligence tests had been performed on Evason, and the results showed he has an IQ in the range of 63.5 to 78. Dr. Claiborn felt that Evason's actual IQ was closer to the lower scores. Evason can read at least at a second grade level, would occasionally read the newspaper, and was holding down two jobs at the time of the murder. Neither Dr. Claiborn nor the other person who administered the tests to Evason read the Miranda warnings to him in order to ascertain whether Evason understood them.
The police officers who interviewed Evason testified that there was no indication that Evason had any trouble understanding what his legal rights were. On the videotaped statement, which was admittedly taken after Evason had already been questioned by police for a few hours, Evason appears quite articulate and able to understand the questions being asked of him. He states on the tape that he had viewed the Miranda waiver, signed and understood it.
The state has the burden of proving that the defendant properly waived his rights. State v. Powell, 798 S.W.2d 709 (Mo. banc 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1259, 111 S.Ct. 2914, 115 L.Ed.2d 1077 (1991). We will reverse the trial court's finding that the waiver was voluntary only if such finding is completely erroneous. Id. Having carefully read the transcript of the suppression hearing and viewing the taped statement, we find that the trial court's determination that Evason knowingly and intelligently waived his rights was supported by substantial evidence and was not clearly erroneous.
In State v. Powell, the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence of a man charged in connection with a double murder. The defendant challenged the admission of statements he made after waiving his Miranda rights. The evidence at the suppression hearing showed defendant had an IQ of between 65 and 83 and could read at the third grade level. None of the experts who examined the defendant attempted to discover whether he understood the meaning of the Miranda waiver.
"The requirement that a waiver of rights be knowing and intelligent does not mean that a defendant must know and understand all of the possible consequences of the waiver." State v. Powell, 798 S.W.2d at 713 (citation omitted). While Evason's decision to speak to police and to consent to a search of his car may have been very poor judgment, there is no evidence to suggest that he did not understand that he could refuse to speak to police without an attorney present. Point denied.
Evason next complains about the trial court's sustaining the state's motion in limine to exclude certain evidence that showed that Linda Culbertson participated in the thefts of computer equipment from Donald Pierce's law firm, paid herself four extra paychecks during 1988, had approached another security guard with the idea of killing Donald Pierce in December of 1988, and may have vandalized various cars belonging to Donald Pierce and his wife between September of 1988 and January of 1989. There was no evidence that Evason was aware of Linda's actions in these instances. The court sustained the state's objection that this evidence was irrelevant and too remote in time to the murder.
Evason argues that this evidence shows that Linda was "consistently and uniformly deceptive and manipulative of those around her." He asserts that the evidence is relevant to show that, given his dependent personality disorder, he was susceptible to manipulation by Linda and was unable to deliberate and refuse to participate in her scheme.
"The trial court has broad discretion as to the relevancy of evidence and this court will not interfere with the trial court's ruling absent a clear showing of abuse." Lewis v. State, 806 S.W.2d 89, 93 (Mo.App.1991) (citation omitted). If the offered evidence would divert the jury's attention from the question to be decided, it should be...
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