State v. Jakshitz
| Decision Date | 01 November 1913 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE v. JAKSHITZ. [*] |
Department 1. Appeal from Superior Court, King County; J. T. Ronald Judge.
Theresa Jakshitz, having been convicted of an offense and fled the jurisdiction of the court, was returned ans surrendered herself and performed the judgment, whereupon her bondsmen petitioned for an order vacating the forfeiture of the bail or judgment against them and for the return of the cash bail paid to the county. From an order granting such relief, the State appeals. Affirmed.
John F Murphy and H. B. Butler, both of Seattle, for the state.
Edward Judd, of Seattle, for respondent.
Respondent was convicted of a crime. At the time of conviction she was under a penal bond to answer the judgment of the court. Pending the motion for a new trial appellant fled the jurisdiction of the court, whereupon one of the bondsmen substituted the sum of $2,000 in lieu of his personal liability. A release of personal liability was entered, and at the same time an order was made forfeiting the cash bail. About ten months thereafter respondent, 'owing to the persuasion of her friends and bondsmen,' as the court finds, voluntarily surrendered herself and has performed the judgment of the court. Upon petition the order of forfeiture or judgment, as the case may be, was vacated, and the cash bail ordered returned to the bondsmen. An appeal from this order is prosecuted by the county.
It is contended that the surrender was not made in time. Section 2233, Rem. & Bal. Code, is relied on: 'If a bond be given and execution stayed, as provided in the last preceding section, and the person for whose appearance such recognizance was given shall be produced in court before the expiration of said period of sixty days, the judge may vacate such judgment upon such terms as may be just and equitable otherwise execution shall forthwith issue as well against the sureties in the new bond as against the judgment debtors.' It is insisted that this court has so construed this section in State v. Johnson, 69 Wash. 612, 126 P. 56. We do not so read the case. It reaffirms the words of the statute and holds that, on the facts there found, the court had abused its discretion and as a further reason that the surrender had been made before the expiration of the stay. Whether a court has an inherent power to grant relief in such cases was not considered by the court.
It is said in 3 Enc. Pl. & Pr. 241, that the power of the court after forfeiture of a bail has been questioned, except as such power may be and frequently is given by statute. The text following, as well as many of the cases cited, shows that courts are constantly granting relief in such cases, and that the order of the court will not be reversed on appeal except for a manifest abuse of discretion. We shall not review the authorities. They are to be found in the footnotes of the text cited. There is sound reason for the order appealed from. Bail is not taken on forfeiture as money is taken for a debt due upon a valid consideration. The object of bail is to insure the attendance of the principal and his obedience to the orders and judgment of the court. There should be no suggestion of bounty or revenue to the state or of punishment to the surety. 'The object of an appearance bond is to secure the trial of offenders rather than to fill the state coffers by forced contributions from sureties.' State v. Williams, 37 La. Ann. 200 202. These things may result but should not be insisted upon when the purpose of the law (that is, the surrender, conviction, and incarceration of the principal) has been accomplished. State v. Johnson, supra.
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State v. Jones
...reversed on appeal only for manifest abuse.” State v. Reese, 15 Wash.App. 619, 620, 550 P.2d 1179 (1976); see also State v. Jakshitz, 76 Wash. 253, 254–55, 136 P. 132 (1913). Although $5 million is a high amount, the trial court heard arguments regarding the setting of bail on two different......
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Westerman v. Cary
...instances because the State is relieved of the burden of keeping the accused and the innocent are set free. See State v. Jackschitz, 76 Wash. 253, 256, 136 P. 132 (1913); State v. Johnson, 69 Wash. 612, 616, 126 P. 56 (1912). However, we have never mandated bail schedules; this is a choice ......
- State v. Wynne
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State v. Kramer
...discussed the policy and purpose of the original recognizance statutes in our seminal case on bond forfeiture in State v. Jackschitz, 76 Wash. 253, 136 P. 132 (1913). Our decision in Jackschitz explains the court's role in exoneration with precision and eloquence and warrants repeating at l......