State v. James

• Decision Date: 05 July 1889
• Citation: 9 S.E. 844,31 S.C. 218
• Parties: STATE v. JAMES.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

9 S.E. 844

31 S.C. 218

STATE v. JAMES.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

July 5, 1889

Appeal from general sessions circuit court of Darlington county PRESSLEY, Judge.

Joseph W. James was convicted of murder, and appeals. The following is the charge referred to in the opinion:

"We have listened very patiently to the testimony and the argument in this case, and now comes the time when we are to do our duty. The main duty in this case is with you. There is very little law involved in it, and I have nothing to do with any implications or any opinion whatever on the facts. My duty ends when I shall call your attention to the law,--the settled legal principles by which you are to be governed in arriving at a correct conclusion in a trial of this sort. I shall do that to the best of my ability. If this defendant hired another to kill his father, and his father was killed, one thing is certain: none of that father's blood shall rest on my hands when I get through and I have no reason to suppose that any of you differ from me in your determination on that point. Now, let us see what are the principles upon which you are to start out in deciding a case of this sort. The law says, first, that you shall give the defendant the benefit of all reasonable doubts, and it is my duty to explain to you what is a reasonable doubt. That is very easy. It is when the testimony in the case, taken all together, with all its facts and circumstances, does not bring your mind to an unshaken conviction that the thing charged is true. Then, if that be not the case, it is a reasonable doubt; but, if that be the case, you are not at liberty to say, 'It may be this,' or 'It may be that,' or 'It may be something else.' You are to follow the convictions of your mind, as the testimony has brought your mind to. That is what you are bound to do--follow the convictions of your mind if they be of such a nature as, in the solemn affairs of your life, you would be willing to say: 'I am satisfied that such and such is true. I will act.' Well, what next? In investigating this case, you are not to take one circumstance by itself, or two circumstances by themselves, or three facts, or any number of facts, by themselves, and say 'These are not enough, they don't satisfy us.' That won't do. You must take them all together,--you must take all the testimony and all the circumstances together and say whether they all, united together into one strand, form a strand that cannot be broken. A single strand is easily broken, two or three may be easily broken, but you are to put them all together, and then say what is their effect. Do they produce conviction or not? If they do not, then say, 'Not guilty;' if they do, then say, 'Guilty.' The next thing is: You are to start out assuming that William Scott is not a credible witness. The law says so. You are to start out assuming that, taking his testimony by itself, neither reason, nor common sense, nor the law permits you to rely upon it in so serious a matter as this. If you take it by itself. I say that, not with regard to the testimony brought by the defense to contradict him and discredit him on various points. I say it in reference to the law that what he confesses of his own guilt in the matter renders him, in the eyes of every reasonable man, as a witness that is not credible; and, therefore, the law says it is very unsafe to convict a person for a murder, or any serious offense, on the testimony of one who acknowledges he has had such connection in the transaction, unless what? unless that testimony, in the number and the manner of the details, is such as that he could not have manufactured it, or unless it be stated in such manner, and be accompanied by such circumstances, that you are not able to discredit it, or unless it is corroborated by the circumstances which, taken with that testimony--those other circumstances not taken by themselves, nor that testimony taken by itself, but whether the two together,--the other circumstances and his statement taken together,--whether they produce conviction. The difference is this: That though the witness is not credible, yet he may tell the truth; and you are to judge, not whether you can rely on his testimony, but whether his testimony so tallies with all the other circumstances of the case as that you regard it corroborated, and, therefore, are brought to the conviction that whether he can be relied upon or not, yet, whether he is telling the truth in this case. That is the rule you are to follow. Next, it is indicated that the testimony of some of the witnesses for the state in this case is influenced by improper motives, and the expectant reward is mentioned as one of the improper motives that would influence the testimony. Well, gentlemen, if one is to be influenced by a motive of that sort, he would be influenced by the stronger motive, and you are to judge now whether this insinuation,--this hint,--be correct or incorrect, from the fact whether the stronger motive would be to go against Scott and get the thousand dollars that was offered, or whether it would be to go against the defendant and get only the reward which the governor has offered. That is a question for you. In weighing their testimony you are bound to consider that whether, if improper motives influenced them, on which side was the stronger motive, the motive to let James escape and get the thousand dollars he offers, or the motive to try him and lose the reward he offers, and only get that the governor offers. Next, some records have been introduced going to show that when Bell was tried for shooting the old man, that when Daniels was tried for shooting the old man, and when Fields was tried for shooting the old man, in each case his son, now the defendant, was a state's witness against them. It is introduced with the idea that the legal inference is to be drawn from that going to show that he has taken part in trying to prosecute and follow up those that were trying to kill his father. Well, now, gentlemen, I am bound to say to you that the bare proof of the fact, standing by itself, does not furnish ground for legal inference that he was so doing. It is not testified that he took part in

getting up those prosecutions; it is not testified in any way whatever that he was active in the matter; the testimony that he gave against those parties is not before you, except in one case a witness was put on the stand by the defendant to say whether he testified in that case against Bell, and the witness replied: 'He testified against him and for him. And that Bell was acquitted.' In the case of Daniels he testified, but no witness says how he testified, and, therefore, no inference can be drawn. Nobody knows,--and you are to judge by the testimony,--nobody knows whether he was a willing witness, or whether the state brought him up and compelled him to testify." Mr. Dargan. "May it please your honor, a witness testified that the defendant assisted in the arrest of John Daniels." The Court, (to Mr. Dargan.) "And I say no inference is to be drawn from that." Mr. Dargan. "I think your honor's language was that he took no part."

The Court, (to the jury.) "What I mean, gentlemen, is that there is no proof that he assisted in ferreting out the parties and bringing them to trial. The mere fact that he assisted in the arrest you can draw no legal inference from. Furthermore, let me call your attention to the fact that two of those parties escaped; one was convicted. Now, the law holds that the one who was convicted was guilty, and the law also holds that the two who were acquitted were not guilty. Then the guiltless parties escaped, and we do not know really who it was that directed attention towards the innocent parties who were acquitted. We don't know who directed attention towards the innocent parties. All I mean to say is, that no inference can be drawn from the fact that he was put up as a witness; because you are not to know whether he put the state's officers on the wrong track. You don't know that he did, and you don't know that he did not. There is no proof that he did, and there is no proof that he did not. All I mean to say, gentlemen, is that you are not to consider those matters as proving that he took an active part in trying to find out who was shooting his father from the mere fact that he was a witness on the record. Well, now, these are the general principles which will guide you in the investigation of this case. And now we will come down to that, and assuming that William Scott is not a credible witness, let us come down to the investigation of the fact of what he has said, and how far he is corroborated. And, first, gentlemen, your first inquiry should be, who killed the old man? Who killed him, or, in other words, did William Scott kill him or take part in it? Did he kill him, or was he present aiding and abetting? He says that he did. He says he was present acting as captain. I am not enough familiar with matters of this sort to know whether the captain should stand off and watch,--should stand off where he could see the parties that were to do the deed, and at the same time watch for anybody coming from the outside. I will not undertake to say. I will not indicate whether the proper place for the captain was where he said he was or whether he should have been in the face of danger, and had somebody else to watch. I don't know that you know. I don't know whether persons who go to do things of this sort always have somebody on the watch or not. But the first question now is, did he either do the thing himself, or place the parties that did it? Well, he says he placed the parties there, and for the purposes of this case, except as it affects his credibility, and that is gone already, for the purposes of this case it

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