State v. James
| Decision Date | 13 August 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 16591.,16591. |
| Citation | 261 Conn. 395,802 A.2d 820 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Joseph Alexander JAMES. |
Marjorie Allen Dauster, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James E. Thomas, state's attorney, and Victor Carlucci, Jr., assistant state's attorney, for the appellant (state).
Nicholas P. Cardwell, with whom, on the brief, was Matthew J. Costello, for the appellee (defendant).
Following our grant of certification, the state appeals from the Appellate Court's dismissal of its appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The state claims that the Appellate Court improperly: (1) refused to incorporate the inquiry of Lozada v. Deeds, 498 U.S. 430, 432, 111 S.Ct. 860, 112 L.Ed.2d 956 (1991), into the abuse of discretion standard for review of denials of state requests for permission to appeal pursuant to General Statutes § 54-96;1 and (2) dismissed the state's appeal. The state also requests that this court exercise its general supervisory power and review its claim that the trial court improperly concluded that the police lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant. We reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The defendant, Joseph Alexander James, was charged with criminal attempt to possess four ounces or more of marijuana in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a)(2)2 and 21a-279 (b),3 possession of four ounces or more of marijuana in violation of General Statutes § 21a-279 (b), conspiracy to transport with intent to sell one kilogram or more of marijuana in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 (a)4 and 21a-278 (b),5 criminal attempt to possess with intent to sell one kilogram or more of marijuana in violation of §§ 53a4-9 (a)(2) and 21a-278 (b), and possession with intent to sell one kilogram or more of marijuana in violation of § 21a-278 (b). The trial court, McMahon, J., granted the defendant's motion to suppress his postarrest voluntary statement and evidence of a shipping receipt obtained in a search incident to his arrest on the grounds that the police lacked probable cause for the underlying arrest. This suppression led to a dismissal of the charges. Pursuant to § 54-96, the state requested permission to file an appeal. The trial court denied that motion. The state appealed to the Appellate Court from that denial, and sought to challenge on that appeal the granting of the motion to suppress. The Appellate Court upheld the trial court's denial of permission to appeal, and did not reach the substantive merits of the case because it had dismissed the state's appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. State v. James, 64 Conn. App. 495, 501, 779 A.2d 1288 (2001). This certified appeal followed.6
The following facts and procedural history are relevant for the resolution of the state's claims in this appeal. After a "controlled delivery"7 of a package containing marijuana by an undercover police detective to the defendant's workplace in West Hartford, the defendant was arrested for attempted possession of four ounces or more of marijuana, possession of four ounces or more of marijuana, conspiracy to transport with intent to sell one kilogram or more of marijuana, attempt to possess with intent to sell one kilogram or more of marijuana, and possession with intent to sell one kilogram or more of marijuana. Thereafter, the defendant moved to suppress, as involuntary, certain written statements that he had made.8 The trial court denied that motion. The defendant then moved to dismiss the charges on the basis that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him. An evidentiary hearing was held on that motion, at which the defendant made an oral motion to suppress certain other evidence, consisting of his written confession and a Federal Express shipping receipt discovered on the defendant in a search incident to his arrest. The trial court granted that motion to suppress, concluding that the police lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant.9
The state moved in the trial court for reconsideration of its suppression decision on the basis that the subsequently obtained evidence was sufficiently attenuated from the arrest to be admissible, even if the arrest was considered to have been illegal. The state also moved for written articulation of the trial court's decision on the motion to suppress. In addressing these motions, the trial court orally articulated its position with regard to probable cause and stated that the evidence seized was not sufficiently attenuated from the illegal arrest to be admissible.
Subsequent to this articulation, the trial court granted the defendant's motion for dismissal of all charges. The trial court also stated that, with respect to the probable cause determination, "[t]he sole issue" that it had to decide was what had actually transpired during the course of the arrest. The court explained that, based upon its own knowledge and experience, probable cause did not exist on the facts of this case and that, therefore, the "evidence seized and the statements made by the defendant [were] fruit of the poisonous tree and tainted by the illegal arrest." After the case was dismissed, the state immediately moved for permission to appeal pursuant to § 54-96.
The trial court refused to grant the state permission to appeal, citing State v. McMillan, 51 Conn.App. 676, 725 A.2d 342, cert. denied, 248 Conn. 911, 732 A.2d 179 (1999), for the applicable abuse of discretion standard of review under § 54-96. The trial court stated that, pursuant to McMillan, the only question it had to ask itself in denying the state permission to appeal was, "Did I abuse my discretion?" The trial court answered: "I don't think so," and explained that an appeal was unnecessary because its probable cause determination was based on "a full evidentiary hearing" with witnesses, arguments, and motions for articulation and reconsideration.
The state appealed from the trial court's denial of permission to the Appellate Court. State v. James, supra, 64 Conn.App. 495. The state claimed that a trial court's denial of the state's request for permission to appeal is subject to the inquiry of Lozada v. Deeds, supra, 498 U.S. 432, as is the denial of certification of a petition to appeal from the denial of a petition for a new trial, Seebeck v. State, 246 Conn. 514, 534, 717 A.2d 1161 (1998), and the denial of a petition for certification to appeal from the dismissal of a habeas corpus petition, Simms v. Warden, 230 Conn. 608, 616, 646 A.2d 126 (1994). See State v. James, supra, 498-99. The state argued that denial of permission for its appeal "constitutes an abuse of discretion if the state demonstrates that another court could resolve the issue in a different manner." Id., 498, 779 A.2d 1288. The Appellate Court rejected the state's claims and held that the trial court did not engage in "such clear, arbitrary and extreme abuse of discretion that we can conclude that an injustice appears to have been done." Id., 500, 779 A.2d 1288. It then dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, noting that the trial court's grant of permission to appeal under § 54-96 is a jurisdictional prerequisite. Id., 501, 779 A.2d 1288. This certified appeal followed.
We first consider whether the Appellate Court improperly refused to incorporate the three factor inquiry articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Lozada v. Deeds, supra, 498 U.S. 432, into the abuse of discretion standard that governs our review of a trial court's decision to deny the state permission to appeal pursuant to § 54-96. The defendant argues that the Lozada inquiry is applicable only where a criminal defendant's federal right is at issue. The defendant also argues that application of the Lozada inquiry would "diminish to a virtual nullity" the trial court's discretion in the § 54-96 context. We agree with the state and conclude that the Appellate Court improperly failed to adopt the three factor inquiry of Lozada v. Deeds, supra, 432, 111 S.Ct. 860. For the reasons discussed herein, we hold that a trial court has abused its discretion in denying permission to appeal under § 54-96 if the state demonstrates that: (1) "the issues are debatable among jurists of reason"; (2) "a court could resolve the issues [in a different manner]"; or (3) the questions are "adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
It is well established that trial court denials of permission for state's appeals under § 54-96 are subject to review for "clear and extreme" abuse of discretion. See, e.g., State v. Bergin, 214 Conn. 657, 660-61, 574 A.2d 164 (1990); State v. S & R Sanitation Services, Inc., 202 Conn. 300, 308, 521 A.2d 1017 (1987); State v. Avcollie, 174 Conn. 100, 109-11, 384 A.2d 315 (1977); State v. Anonymous, 55 Conn.App. 250, 252-53, 739 A.2d 298 (1999). Although the abuse of discretion standard is highly deferential to the trial court, when denial of permission to appeal under § 54-96 presents a "manifest abuse ... where injustice appears to have been done," the "statute's condition requiring the [trial] court's permission to appeal cannot serve to insulate a trial court from review by this court ...." State v. Avcollie, supra, 110, 384 A.2d 315.
A trial court's discretion under § 54-96 is certainly not unfettered. Even when a trial court's decision denying the state permission to appeal questions of law under § 54-96 is based upon "considered reasons," the deferential standard of review will not insulate the decision from appellate review if the decision is rooted in incorrect legal principles. For example, in State v. Bergin, supra, 214 Conn. 661, we held that, even where a trial court issued a four page memorandum of decision on issues briefed by the parties, it...
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