State v. Jason Parsons
| Decision Date | 15 November 1996 |
| Docket Number | 96-LW-4514,96 CA 20 |
| Parties | STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee v. JASON PARSONS, Defendant-Appellant Case |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
William F. Schenck, S.C. Regis. No. 0015243, Greene County Prosecutor, and David J. Cusack, S.C. Regis. No. 0063880 Greene County Courthouse, 45 N. Detroit Street, Xenia, Ohio 45385, Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
Ronald H. Sebree, S.C. Regis. No. 0063210, THE SEBREE CO., L.P.A 35 Rockridge Road, Suite B-1, Englewood, Ohio 45322-2751 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
Jason Parsons ("Parsons") appeals the revocation of his probation.
In 1993, Parsons fell off the back of a truck in the course of his employment. As a result, Parsons suffered physical and psychological injuries. Parsons sought help for his psychological maladies from Dr. Kenneth Welty, a psychiatrist. Dr. Welty diagnosed Parsons as having explosive personality disorder and noted suicidal as well as homicidal tendencies. Individuals with explosive personality disorder are prone to explode into fits of anger.
On April 15, 1994, Parsons got into an argument with his grandparents. The argument led to a physical altercation with Parsons' grandfather, and Parsons' grandmother calling the police. When the police arrived, Parsons allegedly tried to commit suicide by inducing a police officer into shooting him. Parsons did so by retrieving a knife and threatening a police officer with it. In response, the police officer drew his weapon and began speaking with Parsons in order to dissuade him from acting irrationally.
Once Parsons calmed down, he was arrested and charged with attempted felonious assault on a police officer. Parsons pled not guilty and, in the alternative, not guilty by reason of insanity. Parsons also moved the court to order an evaluation of his competency to stand trial. A hearing on the issue of his competency was held on June 2, 1994. Both the State and Parsons stipulated to the report submitted to the court by Dr. Ormiston of the Forensic Psychiatry Center for Western Ohio. On June 7, 1994, after reviewing the psychological report, the court found Parsons competent to stand trial.
Parsons ultimately pled guilty to the charge. The court ordered the case referred to the Adult Probation Department for a pre-sentence investigation and report. The Greene County Adult Probation Department moved the court to order that Parsons undergo an evaluation at the Forensic Psychiatry Center for Western Ohio to determine whether he was a candidate for probation. The final hearing on his eligibility for probation was held on October 26, 1994. After reviewing the Parsons' psychological testing, the court sentenced him to an indefinite sentence of not less than five years or more than fifteen years of incarceration. The court, however, suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Parsons on probation. The conditions of Parsons' probation included counseling for Parsons' emotional and drug problems.
On August 3, 1995, Kathryn Wilson ("Wilson"), the Director of the Greene County Adult Probation Department, filed a motion requesting that Parsons' probation be revoked. Along with the motion, Wilson filed an affidavit outlining numerous violations of his probation. A capias was issued for Parsons' arrest. Parsons was arrested in Oklahoma, and was brought back to the Greene County Jail on September 7, 1995.
On January 11, 1996, Parsons, represented by counsel, waived his right to a probable cause hearing on the alleged violations of his probation conditions. The matter was set for an evidentiary hearing on February 9, 1996. After the hearing, the court determined that Parsons violated six conditions of his probation, and ordered his sentence reimposed. Parsons now brings this timely appeal of that decision.
In his first assignment of error, Parsons argues that:
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY NOT GRANTING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR CONTEMPT BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE [SIC] THE PROSECUTION DID NOT COMPLY WITH CRIMINAL RULE 16.
Prior to the evidentiary hearing on the issue of Parsons' probation revocation, Parsons served the State with a discovery request. The State refused to comply with the discovery request, claiming that the discovery rules do not apply to probation revocation hearings. At the evidentiary hearing, Parsons made an oral motion requesting that the court find the State in contempt for refusing to comply with his discovery request. Furthermore, Parsons asked the Court to sanction the State under Crim.R. 16 (E) by not allowing the State to present its evidence. The court overruled Parsons' contempt motion and permitted the State to introduce its evidence.
Parsons argues that the court's decisions to not find the State in contempt and to permit the state to introduce its evidence were abuses of its discretion. Therefore, Parsons requests that this court vacate the trial court's decision to revoke his probation and to reinstate his probation. In the alternative, Parsons asks this court to reverse the trial court's decision and remand the action to the trial court for another hearing with instructions that the State be prohibited from introducing any of its evidence.
To determine the merits of Parsons' claim we must first consider whether a probationer is entitled to discovery pursuant to Ohio Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. Our search of Ohio's case law has unearthed two opinions on this subject -- State v. Steen (June 28, 1994), Vinton App. No. 93-CA-490, unreported, and State v. Kight (Aug. 22, 1990), Jackson App. No. 629, unreported. In both cases the courts were called upon to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in failing to order the state to comply with the probationer's discovery request. Without explicitly considering whether Crim.R. 16 applies to probation revocation hearings, the courts in Steen and Kight implicitly found that it applies by proceeding as if it did. Because the courts in Steen and Kight did not explicitly consider the wisdom of applying Crim.R. 16 to probation revocation hearings, we will proceed as if this is an issue of first impression in Ohio.
A review of the positions other states have taken on this matter is helpful to understand the competing interests and policies that underlie this issue. Therefore, we will in great detail recount the discourse in other states on this question. The Illinois Supreme Court in People v. DeWitt (1979), 397 N.E.2d 1385, analyzed whether probationers have a right to discovery in probation revocation hearings under either the due process clause or the Illinois pretrial criminal discovery rules. The Court answered both questions in the negative.
As to whether the due process clause guarantees discovery, the Court recognized that although the due process clause guarantees a criminal defendant disclosure of exculpatory evidence, the due process clause does not guarantee a criminal defendant full discovery rights. The Court further acknowledged that a probationer is entitled to less due process protections than a criminal defendant. In view of those propositions, the court adduced that the due process clause must not guarantee a probationer, who is entitled to less due process protections, general discovery rights.
Regarding the state criminal discovery rules, the Court reasoned that the rules did not apply to probation revocation hearings because the language of the rule on the scope and application of the criminal rules suggested that the rules were not intended to apply to such proceedings. The rule provided that " Id. at 1386-87, quoting 65 Ill.2d R. 412. The Court discerned that although a decision that a probationer has violated the condition of his probation may result in imprisonment in a penitentiary, that sentence is imposed for the conviction on the original offense rather than for the conduct constituting the probation violation. The Court further explained that even though the discovery rules do not explicitly exclude probation revocation hearings, it was clear that they were designed to be used in connection with criminal trials. Given that a decision to revoke one's probation is not a conviction and that the proceedings are not the equivalent of a criminal trial, the Court concluded that the pretrial discovery rules did not apply.
The Court also refused the defendant's request to expand the discovery rules to include probation revocation hearings so as to aid in implementing the probationers' due process and statutory rights of confrontation, cross-examination, and representation. The Court cited, among others, Weatherford v Bursey (1977), 429 U.S. 545, and Wardius v. Oregon (1973), 412 U.S. 470, for the proposition that discovery is not constitutionally required to protect those rights. The Court went on to state that in the absence of a constitutional requirement, the decision of whether to allow discovery in probation revocation proceedings depends on the nature of the interests of the state, probationer, and society. The Court determined that society's interest in expeditiously incarcerating a probationer who has committed further antisocial acts is compelling. The court concluded, "[h]e has already been convicted of the underlying offense, and we believe the statutorily guaranteed procedural rights in hearings to revoke probation are adequate to protect the probationer's interest in his...
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