State v. Jay
| Citation | 167 Idaho 592,473 P.3d 861 |
| Decision Date | 08 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 47062 |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Idaho |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Donald J. JAY, Defendant-Appellant. |
Terry S. Ratliff, Elmore County Public Defender; Shawn Wilkerson, Deputy Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; John C. McKinney, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
Donald J. Jay appeals from the district court's intermediate appellate decision, affirming his judgment of conviction for providing false information to a law enforcement officer and driving without privileges. Specifically, Jay challenges the denial of his motion to suppress. Because the magistrate court's findings were supported by substantial and competent evidence, the district court's order is affirmed.
Idaho State Police Trooper Rodean was on duty and traveling westbound on Interstate 84 (I-84). While driving near mile marker 98, he observed an SUV parked on the right shoulder of I-84, half-way on the paved portion of the shoulder and half-way on the gravel. Rodean pulled in and parked behind the vehicle. He did not turn on his overhead lights and only activated his rear lights so oncoming traffic would be alerted to the two cars on the right shoulder of the interstate. Rodean walked up to the driver's side door where he observed Jay in the driver's seat, slumped back, and apparently sleeping. The SUV's engine was off, and the hazard lights were not flashing. Rodean knocked on the window and did not receive a response. He knocked again, did not receive an immediate response, waited approximately three to five seconds, and then opened the driver's side door. The noise from the traffic and from the opening door made Jay "come to," but he was initially incoherent. Rodean explained that he was checking on Jay and informed Jay that he could not be parked on the interstate. Jay did not respond. Rodean asked to see Jay's driver's license and identification.
In the course of the conversation, Jay said he did not have a driver's license, did not have any identification with him, his name was "Darren Jacobson," and his date of birth was January 7, 1978. Rodean went back to his patrol vehicle and entered the information into the law enforcement database; the information returned as "non-found" which means Because of the "non-found" status of the information Jay provided, Rodean called for assistance from additional officers. Rodean returned to ask Jay about the information he provided, and Jay clarified the spelling of his name. When this information was entered into the database, it again came back as "no-return/non-found."
The second time Rodean was entering the information into his database, he saw Jay leaning into the passenger side of the SUV, so Rodean returned to Jay's SUV. Rodean informed Jay that he was being detained until he could be identified, asked him to step out of the SUV, handcuffed him, and placed him in the back of his patrol vehicle. Rodean then entered the SUV information into the law enforcement database, and the owner of the vehicle was not named "Darren." As a result, Rodean began investigating whether or not the SUV had been reported as stolen. When asked, Jay said the vehicle belonged to a friend (his cousin), who had let him borrow it.
Ultimately, Rodean told Jay he was under arrest for driving without privileges and advised him of his Miranda1 rights. Rodean searched Jay incident to his arrest and found Jay's wallet in his pants pocket. Jay's wallet contained Jay's Idaho identification card with Jay's correct name and date of birth. After running the correct information, Rodean learned there was an outstanding felony arrest warrant for Jay. Because the SUV was going to be towed, Rodean inventoried the contents of the vehicle, during which he found drug paraphernalia.
The State charged Jay with providing false information to a law enforcement officer, Idaho Code § 18-5413(2), driving without privileges, I.C. § 18-8001(3), and possession of drug paraphernalia, I.C. § 37-2734A(1). Jay filed a motion to suppress all the evidence obtained after Rodean opened Jay's car door on the basis that he was detained without reasonable suspicion and his vehicle was searched without probable cause. After a hearing, the magistrate court denied Jay's motion to suppress. Jay entered a conditional guilty plea to providing false information to law enforcement and driving without privileges. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the paraphernalia charge. The magistrate court entered a judgment of conviction pursuant to Jay's conditional guilty plea, and Jay timely appealed the decision to the district court. The district court affirmed the magistrate court's denial of Jay's motion to suppress. Jay timely appeals.
For an appeal from the district court, sitting in its appellate capacity over a case from the magistrate division, we review the magistrate court record to determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate court's findings of fact and whether the magistrate court's conclusions of law follow from those findings. State v. Korn , 148 Idaho 413, 415, 224 P.3d 480, 482 (2009). However, as a matter of appellate procedure, our disposition of the appeal will affirm or reverse the decision of the district court. State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965, 968, 318 P.3d 955, 958 (Ct. App. 2014). Thus, we review the magistrate court's findings and conclusions, whether the district court affirmed or reversed the magistrate court and the basis therefor, and either affirm or reverse the district court.
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995) ; State v. Schevers , 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).
Jay argues the district court erred when it affirmed the magistrate court's order denying Jay's motion to suppress. Specifically, Jay contends Rodean violated Jay's federal and state Fourth Amendment protections when Rodean opened the SUV's door because there was no reasonable suspicion of any crime or any misdemeanor committed in Rodean's presence. Consequently, any evidence obtained after Rodean opened the door must be suppressed. In response, the State asserts it was not violative of any constitutional provision for Rodean to open the door of Jay's SUV based on Rodean's belief that Jay had committed a traffic offense by illegally parking on the interstate. Alternatively, the State argues Rodean was legitimately executing his community caretaker function when he opened Jay's car door and, thus, there is no basis on which to suppress the evidence. Finally, the State asserts that because Jay never challenged the circumstances of his arrest in either the magistrate court or the district court, he cannot raise the issue for the first time on appeal.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution2 prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. Generally, evidence obtained as a result of an unreasonable search or seizure must be suppressed. Wong Sun v. United States , 371 U.S. 471, 485, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). Typically, seizures must be based on probable cause to be reasonable. Florida v. Royer , 460 U.S. 491, 499-500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants and implicates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) ; Atkinson, 128 Idaho at 561, 916 P.2d at 1286. Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal behavior if there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981) ; State v. Flowers , 131 Idaho 205, 208, 953 P.2d 645, 648 (Ct. App. 1998). The reasonableness of the suspicion must be evaluated upon the totality of the circumstances at the time of the stop. State v. Ferreira , 133 Idaho 474, 483, 988 P.2d 700, 709 (Ct. App. 1999). The reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable cause but more than mere speculation or instinct on the part of the officer. Id. An officer may draw reasonable inferences from the facts in his or her possession, and those inferences may be drawn from the officer's experience and law enforcement training. State v. Montague , 114 Idaho 319, 321, 756 P.2d 1083, 1085 (Ct. App. 1988).
While both parties cite to State v. Irwin , 143 Idaho 102, 137 P.3d 1024 (Ct. App. 2006), they disagree about its applicability. Jay argues that the holding of Irwin is inapplicable because there is not substantial and competent evidence supporting the magistrate court's conclusion that Jay had committed a traffic violation by parking along the interstate in violation of I.C. § 49-660(1)(a)(9). Second, Jay argues that Rodean's actions should not be protected because the State subsequently provided a legal justification for actions which were not legally justified based on the Rodean's initial basis...
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