State v. Jaynes

• Citation: 78 N.C. 504
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina
• Decision Date: 31 January 1878
• Parties: STATE v. RANSOM JAYNES.

78 N.C. 504

STATE

v.RANSOM JAYNES.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

January Term, 1878.

INDICTMENT for Burning a Mill removed from ROWAN and tried at Fall Term, 1877, of DAVIDSON Superior Court, before Cox, J.

The defendant was indicted as follows: The jurors &c., present that Ransom Jaynes &c., feloniously, unlawfully and maliciously did set fire to and burn one mill &c., the property of John C. Ford and John Lindsay with intent thereby to injure &c. (See Laws 1874-'5, ch. 228.)

There was no evidence of express malice but there was evidence tending to show that the defendant, who was in the employment of the prosecutor as a miller, had been stealing grain and flour from the mill, and that he had been informed before the burning that he was suspected of the same. His Honor was requested to instruct the jury that if defendant burnt the mill with intent to prevent detection of the alleged embezzlement or theft although he knew incidental injury would be occasioned thereby, the jury should acquit. This was given with the addition,--that the State was not bound to prove malice or any facts or circumstances besides the unlawful burning, from which the jury might presume malice, and the defendant might negative the same by evidence either of the State's witnesses or his own.

It was also in evidence that the mill was burned on the night of the 24th of April, 1876, and the defendant relying on an alibi introduced witnesses who testified that they were with the defendant on that night at his house, and that he and they retired between eight and nine o'clock and were aroused by an alarm of fire, about twelve o'clock. They ran immediately to the mill about 250 yards distant and found it nearly consumed. As to this defence, His Honor charged the jury as stated in paragraph 2 of the opinion of this Court. He also admitted parol evidence to prove the title to the property, and the defendant excepted. Verdict of Guilty. Motion in arrest of judgment. Motion denied. Judgment. Appeal by defendant.

Attorney General, for the State .

Mr. W. H. Bailey, for the defendant .

BYNUM, J.

1. There was no evidence that the prisoner burned or caused the mill to be burned with the intent to prevent the detection of his alleged embezzlement or theft. His Honor then might well have refused to give the instructions asked upon this point. But he did give instructions upon the hypothesis that such evidence had been offered, and though they ought to have been refused, we think they were substantially correct as given.

2. The Court charged the jury that it was “essential to the successful proof of an alibi that it should cover the whole time of the transaction in question, and when it fails to do so it is regarded as the most suspicious of evidence; that the witnesses all testified to having retired by ten o'clock; and it was for the jury to say whether the prisoner might have left, or did leave his bed, commit the deed, and return before the alarm of fire was given.” The first part of this charge would have been erroneous, but for the correction and qualification subsequently added. It is not “essential to the successful proof of an alibi, that it should cover the whole time of the occurrence.” Whether it covers the whole, or a part only, the effect of the evidence is a matter for the jury and they may give it the weight they may think it entitled to. The evidence was competent and therefore admissible, and it was an invasion of the province of the jury to tell them that unless the proof covered the whole time of the transaction, it lacked the essential element of...