State v. Jefferies

• Decision Date: 08 April 1993
• Docket Number: No. 396A91,396A91
• Citation: 333 N.C. 501,428 S.E.2d 150
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. James William JEFFERIES.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 150

428 S.E.2d 150

333 N.C. 501

STATE of North Carolina v. James William JEFFERIES.

No. 396A91.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

April 8, 1993.

Appeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a) from a judgment imposing a sentence of life imprisonment for first degree murder entered by Saunders, J., at the 9 July 1990 regular Criminal Session of Superior Court, Mecklenburg County, upon a jury verdict of guilty of first degree murder. The defendant's motion to bypass the Court of Appeals as to an additional judgment was allowed by the Supreme Court 28 January 1992. Heard in the Supreme Court 6 October 1992.

The defendant was tried for his life upon a bill of indictment charging him with the first degree murder of Anthony Scott McClam. He was also tried for assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury upon Darrell Leon Surginer.

The State's evidence tended to show that George Robinson was indebted to Anthony Scott McClam, the murder victim, for a drug purchase. The defendant accompanied Robinson to McClam's apartment on the night of 28 October 1986 around midnight. The three men discussed the debt and decided to go to Robinson's house to get the money. McClam told Darrell Leon Surginer, his roommate, that they were going to the store and asked him to accompany them. All four of the men left the apartment in Robinson's car. Robinson was driving, the defendant was in the front passenger seat, McClam was in the back seat behind the defendant, and Surginer was in the back seat behind Robinson. They proceeded past the local convenience store which was closed. Surginer became suspicious and asked McClam, "[w]hat's up?" McClam responded that they were going to Robinson's house to get the rest of his money. They reached Robinson's apartment, at which time Robinson went inside, but returned saying his money had not yet arrived. The defendant said, "[i]f you take me by my aunt and uncle's house, I'll give you the money...."

Robinson drove for awhile and appeared to be unsure of where he was going. McClam said to the defendant, "[y]ou sure act like you don't know where your aunt or uncle live." The defendant said, "[w]hat? What?," then, without warning, shot McClam twice in the face with a pistol. The defendant then shot Surginer twice. Robinson turned off the headlights and accelerated the automobile, saying, "[d]amn, I didn't mean for you to do this in my car." In fear for his life, Surginer jumped from the moving car and heard two more gunshots. He hid near some houses. Robinson stopped the car, turned around, and drove back down the street slowly, looking for Surginer. When the car left the area, Surginer was able to get a nearby resident to call the police. Robinson and the defendant dumped McClam's body in a nearby wooded area and abandoned the car.

On 29 October 1986, Robinson and the defendant had a friend drive them from Charlotte, North Carolina to Richmond, Virginia. In Richmond, the defendant left the car at an apartment complex. Robinson went to his grandmother's house with his friend where they spent the night. Robinson and his friend returned to Charlotte on 30 October 1986 and each consulted an attorney. The defendant was arrested two years later, on 11 October 1988.

At trial, the defendant was convicted of first degree murder and felonious assault. The jury recommended that the defendant be sentenced to life in prison and this sentence was imposed. The court imposed a sentence of ten years on the felonious assault conviction.

Lacy H. Thornburg, Atty. Gen. by G. Patrick Murphy, Sp. Deputy Atty. Gen., Raleigh, for the State.

Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender by Constance H. Everhart, Asst. Appellate Defender, Raleigh, for defendant appellant.

WEBB, Justice.

In his first assignment of error, the defendant, a black male, contends it was error not to dismiss the two indictments against him because the foremen of the two separate grand juries which indicted him were not selected in a racially neutral manner. The defendant made a motion to dismiss the indictments before pleading to them. In State v. Cofield, 320 N.C. 297, 357 S.E.2d 622 (1987) (Cofield I ), we held that a minority defendant, by showing that the selection process was not racially neutral or that for a substantial period in the past relatively few blacks have served as foreman on grand juries, although a substantial number have served on grand juries, may establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination in the selection of the foreman of a grand jury requiring that the indictment be dismissed unless the State can rebut the prima facie case by showing that the foreman was chosen in a racially neutral manner. In State v. Cofield, 324 N.C. 452, 379 S.E.2d 834 (1989) (Cofield II ), we held that a process for the selection of a grand jury foreman could not be racially neutral unless it operates so that all members of the jury are considered. This rule operates prospectively and does not apply in this case because the order overruling the defendant's motion was made before Cofield II was decided. A hearing on the defendant's motion was held prior to trial by Judge Hollis M. Owens, Jr.

In order to make a prima facie case of discrimination, the defendant relied on the second method prescribed by Cofield I. He offered evidence that for a substantial period in the past relatively few blacks had served as foreman of a grand jury in Mecklenburg County, although a substantial number have served on grand juries. This evidence consisted of certified documents listing all grand jury members and foremen for the previous nineteen years. He then offered two witnesses, one of whom testified that he had examined the documents and was able to determine that 83 foremen had been selected during that time. He testified further that he was able to identify the race of 78 of the foremen. He testified that 3.8 percent of these foremen were black while 19.73 percent of the members of the grand jury were black. The court found facts consistent with this evidence and concluded the defendant had established a prima facie case of discrimination in the selection of the grand jury foremen.

The State argues that documents on which the witness based his testimony were not sufficiently authenticated to be reliable. The State also contends that the witness made certain assumptions which were not valid in reaching his conclusions in regard to the composition of the grand juries and the race of the foremen for them. The State's argument goes to the weight of the evidence. We might have found different facts but the findings of fact by the superior court were supported by sufficient evidence and we are bound by them. State v. Corley, 310 N.C. 40, 311 S.E.2d 540 (1984). It was not error for the court to hold that the defendant had made a prima facie case of racial discrimination in the selection of the foremen of the grand juries.

We next face the question of whether the superior court committed error in holding that the State successfully rebutted the defendant's prima facie case of racial discrimination. We hold that the court did not commit error.

The defendant was tried on two separate indictments. One of them charged him with murder and the other charged him with a felonious assault. Judge Chase B. Saunders appointed the foreman of the grand jury that returned the murder indictment. He testified that he did not remember appointing the foreman, but he would have followed a procedure outlined in a grand jury manual for Mecklenburg County. Pursuant to this procedure, he would have followed the recommendation of the sitting grand jury at the end of its term as to the appointment of the foreman of the next grand jury. He testified, "it appeared to me that the jurors, by making that recommendation, were satisfied as to the leadership qualities of that individual and that that individual had a level of experience in conducting the proceedings which would be beneficial to the administration of justice in that hearing process."

The foreman of the grand jury, which sat immediately prior to the grand jury which returned the murder indictment, testified that he recommended a member of his grand jury to Judge Saunders for appointment as foreman of the next grand jury. Prior to making this recommendation, he talked to other people on the grand jury "as to the diligence or earnestness with which members were serving on the grand jury[.]" These discussions were about other members of the grand jury both black and white. He testified that the only qualification that was discussed was diligence or earnestness "[a]s to the performance of the job that had [to be] done[.]"

The court made findings of fact consistent with this testimony and held that the State had rebutted the defendant's prima facie case. In this we perceive no error. The essential requirement of Cofield I is that race must play no part in the selection of the foreman of a grand jury. This requirement is proved in this case by the testimony of Judge Saunders who appointed the foreman and the testimony of the foreman of the preceding grand jury. Their testimony was to the effect that their purpose in the selection process was to get the best possible person as foreman. They did not mention race in their testimony, but we can conclude from this testimony that their purpose was to select the best person for the job regardless of race. The State successfully rebutted the prima facie case of racial discrimination in the selection of the foreman of the grand jury which returned the indictment for murder.

The only evidence in regard to selection of the foreman of the grand jury that returned the indictment for felonious assault was the testimony of the foreman. He testified that near the end of the previous term, the foreman of the grand jury then sitting told him it would be necessary to select a foreman for the next term. At the last meeting of that grand jury, the...