State v. Jefferson

• Decision Date: 06 September 2013
• Docket Number: No. 98,742.,98,742.
• Parties: STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Jazwane JEFFERSON, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

297 Kan. 1151

310 P.3d 331

STATE of Kansas, Appellee,

v.Jazwane JEFFERSON, Appellant.

No. 98,742.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Sept. 6, 2013.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Section 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights provides the same guarantee.

2. A warrantless seizure of a vehicle is per se unreasonable unless one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement applies.

3. Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, which is a subclass of the probable-cause-plus-exigent-circumstances exception, the mobility of the vehicle provides the exigent circumstances without the necessity of proving anything more. If a vehicle is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime, the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not require a warrant for police to search the vehicle.

4. If the State fails to meet its burden to establish the lawfulness of a challenged search or seizure, any evidence obtained through exploitation of the illegal search or seizure may be suppressed through application of the exclusionary rule.

5. The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is one facet of the exclusionary rule and extends the scope of the exclusionary rule to bar admission of evidence directly or indirectly obtained as a result of unlawful police conduct.

6. One exception to the exclusionary rule is the attenuation doctrine. Under the attenuation doctrine, courts have found that the poisonous taint of an unlawful search or seizure dissipates when the connection between the unlawful police conduct and the challenged evidence becomes attenuated.

7. The State bears the burden to establish sufficient attenuation to purge the taint of an illegal search or seizure and avoid application of the exclusionary rule.

8. In determining whether a defendant's confession is sufficiently attenuated from a preceding illegal search or seizure, a court should consider: (1) whether Miranda warnings were given, (2) the temporal proximity of the illegal conduct and the statement, (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the officers' misconduct, and (4) other intervening circumstances. But no one factor controls, and other factors may be relevant to the analysis.

9. State v. Kirby, 12 Kan.App.2d 346, 744 P.2d 146 (1987), aff'd242 Kan. 803, 751 P.2d 1041 (1988), is disapproved to the extent it suggests a defendant's act of contacting law enforcement officers to retrieve the defendant's illegally seized property is purely personal and will automatically constitute an act of free will sufficient to purge the taint of an illegal seizure.

10. Convictions of felony murder and criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied vehicle or dwelling are not multiplicitous even when the charges arise from the same conduct and involve the same victim.

11. Under K.S.A. 21–3107(2)(a), criminal discharge of a firearm, as defined in K.S.A. 21–4217(a), is a lesser included offense of criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling, as defined in K.S.A. 21–4219(b).

Michael J. Bartee, of Michael J. Bartee, P.A., of Olathe, argued the cause and was on a brief for appellant, and Jazwane Jefferson, appellant pro se, filed a supplemental pro se brief.

Edmond D. Brancart, deputy district attorney, argued the cause, and Michael A. Russell, chief deputy district attorney, Jerome A. Gorman, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by MORITZ, J.:

Jazwane Jefferson appeals his convictions of first-degree felony murder and the underlying felony of criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling. Jefferson primarily argues the district court erred in failing to suppress his statements, which Jefferson contends were obtained through the officers' exploitation of the illegal seizure of his car. We agree with Jefferson that the officers unlawfully seized his car and then used that illegal seizure to obtain his incriminating statements. Further, we conclude the State failed to establish under the totality of the circumstances that Jefferson's statements were sufficiently attenuated from the preceding illegal seizure. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's suppression ruling, reverse Jefferson's convictions, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Factual and Procedural Background

Deborah Jackson was shot and killed in her home in Kansas City, Kansas, the victim of a drive-by shooting. After an investigation, the State charged Jefferson with several counts relating to Jackson's murder, including first-degree felony murder based on the underlying felony of criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling, criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling resulting in great bodily harm, and conspiracyto commit criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling.

Before trial, Jefferson moved to suppress incriminating statements he made to detectives during an interview, claiming his statements stemmed from the detectives' illegal seizure of his car. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Jefferson's suppression motion.

At trial, the State presented evidence related to the crime scene and homicide investigation, including Jefferson's videotaped statement to detectives. In that statement, Jefferson identified the participants in Jackson's shooting as himself, Marcus Carson, Arthur Herron, Joshua Jones, and Steve Coleman. According to Jefferson, on the day of the shooting, he and the other men armed themselves with guns before getting into a white van driven by Coleman. Jefferson carried a .40 caliber Smith and Wesson pistol. When they arrived at the Jackson home, Carson told everyone to “shoot the house,” and everyone in the van fired their weapons. Jefferson stated he did not know which house he was shooting at, but he fired his weapon so that the other men in the vehicle would not think that he was scared or would report the crime. At trial, Jefferson essentially reiterated the admissions he made in his videotaped interview.

Through the testimony of several witnesses, including Jefferson, the State established that Jackson's shooting was the last in a series of shootings that occurred on that day. Some of the shootings were committed either by Carson or Jackson's adult son, Eric Jackson. Jackson's husband testified that Eric Jackson and the Carson family had an ongoing feud.

At the close of evidence, the district court granted Jefferson's request to dismiss the conspiracy charge. During the jury instruction conference, the district court denied Jefferson's request for a lesser included offense instruction on criminal discharge of a firearm. The jury found Jefferson guilty of first-degree felony murder and the underlying felony of criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling resulting in great bodily harm.

The district court sentenced Jefferson to life in prison with no possibility of parole for 20 years, plus a consecutive prison term of 59 months. Jefferson appeals.

Our jurisdiction to consider this appeal arises under K.S.A. 22–3601(b)(1) (Furse 1995) (direct criminal appeal; life sentence imposed; off-grid crime).

The District Court Erred in Denying the Defendant's Suppression Motion

Citing the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Jefferson claims the district court erroneously denied his motion to suppress incriminating statements he made to detectives. Jefferson argues the detectives illegally seized his car without a warrant or probable cause and his statements derived from this illegal seizure should have been suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.

The State contends the detectives lawfully seized Jefferson's vehicle based on probable cause to believe the vehicle might contain evidence related to the homicide and properly impounded the vehicle until they could obtain a search warrant based on that belief. Alternatively, the State argues the district court properly denied the suppression motion because Jefferson's statements were sufficiently attenuated from any illegal seizure.

Standard of Review

Without reweighing the evidence, we review the factual underpinnings of a district court's suppression ruling under a substantial competent evidence standard. But we review the court's ultimate legal conclusion regarding suppression de novo. State v. Edwards, 291 Kan. 532, 545, 243 P.3d 683 (2010).

Suppression Hearing and District Court Ruling

The following factual summary is based on the testimony of the only witness at the suppression hearing, Detective Greg Lawson.

Jackson was shot on September 20, 2004. About 30 minutes after the shooting, officers located the white van used in the shooting but found no weapons in the van. Based on their investigation, including their knowledge of other shootings occurring the same day as Jackson's shooting, Lawson and his partner, Detective Michael York, initially suspected Marcus Carson and brothers Arthur Herron and Alex Herron of participating in Jackson's shooting.

But 9 days after the shooting, Jefferson became a suspect when Alex Herron advised Lawson that Carson and Jefferson came to the Herrons' home after Jackson's shooting. After speaking with Alex Herron, the detectives verified Jefferson's address and identified a Monte Carlo parked in his apartment complex's parking lot as belonging to Jefferson.

Nearly 1 month after Jackson's shooting, Arthur Herron advised Lawson that Jefferson participated in the shooting. Then, on Saturday, October 23, 2004, Arthur Herron gave a videotaped statement to detectives implicating himself, Jefferson, Carson, Coleman, and Jones in the shooting.

Immediately after obtaining Arthur Herron's statement, Lawson and York went to...