State v. Jenkins
| Decision Date | 03 October 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 75--498,75--498 |
| Citation | 319 So.2d 91 |
| Parties | STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Leo JENKINS, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
David H. Bludworth, State's Atty., and Jerome Davis, Asst. State's Atty., West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and James R. Bean, III, Sp. Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
This is an appeal by the state from an order granting defendant's motion to suppress certain evidence found during a search of the defendant's vehicle.
The record reflects that on August 26, 1974, at 3:00 A.M. a police officer stopped the defendant's vehicle for a routine traffic violation, i.e. making an improper U-turn on a highway. The defendant was unable to produce a driver's license; however, he did produce the motor vehicle registration which was located in the trunk of the automobile. (The registration which was produced was in another person's name.) While the trunk remained open the officer saw that it contained a shotgun. At that point the defendant was placed under arrest for failure to exercise due care (in the operation of a motor vehicle) and for failure to have a valid driver's license.
At or about the same time the defendant was placed under arrest the officer received information from a computer check that the defendant did not have a valid license. The arresting officer advised the defendant that it would be necessary for the defendant to be taken into custody in order to post a bond and that defendant's vehicle would have to be towed. The testimony in the record indicates that the arresting officer had intended to permit the defendant to drive his car to the police station and post the bond; however, he later realized that a person without a driver's license could not operate a motor vehicle thereby necessitating that it be towed.
Within 10 or 15 minutes another officer arrived at the scene and proceeded to conduct an inventory search of the vehicle prior to its being towed. The arresting officer testified that it was standard police procedure that whenever an individual was taken into custody the automobile is impounded (towed away) and the contents inventoried. The record reflects that defendant was the sole occupant of the automobile and that no indication was given to the officer of any other individual that might be available to secure the vehicle. The record further reflects that defendant offered no protest to the inventory search; however, no permission to conduct the inventory was obtained from the defendant. The inventory search conducted on the scene led to the discovery of some 216 grams of marijuana resulting in the defendant's additional arrest for the possession of marijuana.
The order granting defendant's motion to suppress does not contain any findings or reasons therefor. A review of the transcript of the proceedings on defendant's motion reveals that the court determined the search to be illegal because it was an 'exploratory search'. The trial court, seemingly, was of the view that in order to conduct a search of a vehicle it is first necessary to tow the vehicle and secure a search warrant or for some probable cause to exist upon which to predicate such search.
Although some of the observations made by the trial court correctly reflect certain instances where a search of a vehicle is permissible, we are of the opinion that the trial court overlooked the circumstance of the 'inventory search' and misconceived the legal effect of the evidence in connection therewith.
As a general proposition a warrantless search is illegal; however, the search of an automobile (as distinguished from a house) has produced two recognized exceptions: (1) a search incident to a lawful arrest, and (2) a search based upon probable cause. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973). Neither of these exceptions is applicable to the instant situation. Instead, what we have is a third exception to the warrantless search, namely, the 'inventory search'. 1 The often-stated purpose for conducting an inventory of the contents of an automobile lawfully taken into custody is to protect the defendant's property and safeguard the police from unfounded claims for lost possessions. United States v. Kelehar, 470 F.2d 176 (5 Cir. 1972); 48 A.L.R.3d 547, Inventory Search of Impounded Vehicle. 2
Regardless of the resort to a play on semantics suggesting that a distinction exists between an 'inventory' and a 'search' an 'inventory' search is a 'search' within the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures--A rose by any other name would smell as sweet--Shakespeare. See Gagnon v. State, Fla.App.1968, 212 So.2d 337; Knight v. State, Fla.App.1968, 212 So.2d 900; Godbee v. State, Fla.App.1969, 224 So.2d 441; Urquhart v. State, Fla.App.1971, 261 So.2d 535; State v. Volk, Fla.App.1974, 291 So.2d 643; State v Ruggles, Fla.App.1971, 245 So.2d 692; 48 A.L.R.3d 537, 548, supra. See also Cady v. Dombrowski, supra.
The foregoing cases support the proposition that a search conducted for the purpose of making an inventory of the contents of an automobile is not 'unreasonable' within the proscription of the Fourth Amendment if the totality of the circumstances demonstrate that the search is a bona fide inventory made in the ordinary course of police procedures. The general standard to be applied is reasonableness. Cady v. Dombrowski, supra. An 'inventory' search will be unreasonable if it is utilized as a pretext to conduct an 'exploratory' search in order to hunt for incriminating evidence. Whether or not an inventory search is unreasonable and has been misused will depend upon the particular facts and circumstances of each case.
Utilizing the standard of reasonableness and recognizing the existence of exceptions to the search warrant requirement the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized the warrantless inventory or caretaking search. Cady v. Dombrowski, supra. See also footnotes 1 and 2, Supra. In United States v. Ducker, 5 Cir. 1974, 491 F.2d 1190, 1192, the Fifth Circuit Court...
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Miller v. State
...of impoundment. Session v. State, 353 So.2d 854 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Jones v. State, 345 So.2d 809 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); State v. Jenkins, 319 So.2d 91 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla.Const. We resolve the conflict and approve the doctrine of an inventory se......
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...States, 287 A.2d 85 (D.C.Ct.App.1972) (automobile illegally parked in bus zone and driver had no operator's license); State v. Jenkins, 319 So.2d 91 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1975) (following traffic arrest, driver did not have valid operator's license, failed to produce registration card, and viola......
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State v. Callaway, 80-1333-CR
...is willing to accept the responsibility for the safekeeping of the contents of such vehicle." (Emphasis in original.) State v. Jenkins, 319 So.2d 91, 94 (Fla.App.1975), quoted with approval, Session, III v. State, 353 So.2d 854, 855 (Fla.App.1977). It is very possible that the state could h......
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U.S. v. Ullrich
...was in a public place, contained contraband. This impoundment and inventory search were proper under Florida law. See State v. Jenkins, 319 So.2d 91 (Fla.App.1975).7 If an automobile is not physically present on the dealership's lot, for example, because it is being test driven by a potenti......
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Shakespeare in the Law
...Systems, Inc. v. LeLoup, 307 So. 2d 166, 171 (Fla. 1974). 68 Delatte v. State, 384 So. 2d 245, 247 (Fla. App. 1980).; State v. Jenkins, 319 So. 2d 91, 93 (Fla. App., 1975). 69 Kapiolani Park Preservation Society v. City and County of Honolulu, 69 Haw. 569,75 (1988). 70 McIntosh v. Helton, 8......