State v. Jenkins
| Decision Date | 24 July 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 52484,52484 |
| Parties | STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Leo JENKINS, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Paul H. Zacks, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for petitioner.
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Frank B. Kessler, Chief Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for respondent.
This is a petition for writ of certiorari to review a decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal, reported at 349 So.2d 1192 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). The issue concerns the proper application of the existing speedy trial rule 1 after an interlocutory appeal has been filed by the state. The instant case relied on the decisions of Cannon v. State, 332 So.2d 127 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), and Mullin v. State, 307 So.2d 829 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). We find these decisions conflict with State v. Smail, 346 So.2d 641 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), and State v. Pearce, 336 So.2d 1274 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). There is not only irreconcilable conflict but also confusion on the proper application of the speedy trial rule when there has been an appeal. We have jurisdiction. 2
The Fourth District Court of Appeal in the instant case and in Cannon and the Third District Court of Appeal in Mullin held that the existing Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(d)(2) requires a trial court to extend or toll the speedy trial period under those circumstances enumerated in the rule. 3 Further, the Cannon court rejected the contention that section 924.071(2), Florida Statutes, grants the state an automatic stay, reasoning:
(I)t is obvious that the portion of Fla. Stat. § 924.071(2), which provides for an automatic stay during the pendency of such an appeal has been superseded by the provisions of the rule . . . . A contrary ruling would mean that the state could automatically deprive a defendant of the benefits of the Speedy Trial Rule, which did not exist when Fla. Stat. § 924.071(2) was adopted, merely by filing an appeal from an order of suppression and without any judicial determination that the appeal was not frivolous or had not been taken simply for the purpose of securing such a delay.
332 So.2d at 127. The Mullin court agreed with the Second District Court of Appeal in Esperti v. State, 276 So.2d 58 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1973), and held that extensions are to be granted, not presumed, and that the court order, not the circumstances, tolls the speedy trial rule.
On the other hand, both the Second District Court of Appeal in State v. Smail and the First District Court of Appeal in State v. Pearce held that an interlocutory appeal filed by the state pursuant to section 924.071 automatically tolls the speedy trial time, and consequently no trial court order is necessary. The Pearce court rejected the argument that rule 3.191(d) (2) superseded the automatic stay provisions of section 924.071, as adopted by Florida Appellate Rule 6.3.b., and stated:
(T)he speedy trial rule's provisions . . . may be seen as having a purpose to permit the trial court to grant or deny an extension of the speedy trial period and a stay of the trial when the State proposed an interlocutory appeal in circumstances justified by § 924.07 but not by § 924.071(1). (Footnote omitted.)
We disagree with the interpretation stated in Smail and Pearce that section 924.071(2) automatically stays the right to a speedy trial. Neither a rule of this Court nor an act of the legislature can change the constitutional right to a speedy trial. It is our view that existing rule 3.191(d)(2) and section 924.071(2) do not contradict each other. They each concern different matters. Section 924.071(2) is confined to the automatic staying of trial court proceedings when the state appeals certain pretrial orders. The staying provisions of this section do not concern or even refer to the tolling of the speedy trial time. This holding is in accordance with our prior decisions in Tucker v. State, 357 So.2d 719, 720 n. 6 (Fla. 1978), and Carroll v. State, 251 So.2d 866 (Fla. 1971). The manner of suspending the running of the speedy trial time during a state appeal is a question for the trial court. Our present rule recognizes that the trial judge has the sole responsibility for determining whether a defendant has been guaranteed his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The trial judge is in the best position to make certain under the individual facts of the case that an extension of time will not deprive the defendant of this constitutional right to a speedy trial. We note that the purpose of our procedural speedy trial rule is to ensure (1) the effective implementation of a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial, and (2) the effective and expeditious prosecution of criminal offenses.
To avoid further confusion, it is necessary that we specify the effect that the various appellate actions have upon the speedy trial rights of defendants under the existing rule.
When the state files an interlocutory appeal or an appeal from a dismissal of an indictment or information, the state must request an extension of the speedy trial time period in accordance with rule 3.191(d)(2). In ruling on the request, the trial court's only responsibility is to ensure that an extension does not violate the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial pursuant to the standards set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). The trial court should liberally allow requests for extension, and, when entering its order, it should provide a reasonable time period for the state to proceed to trial upon completion of the appeal. The trial court should deny a request only when the defendant affirmatively shows that his right to a speedy trial under the Barker standards is constitutionally prejudiced by the extension.
There are three ways that orders granting extensions have been entered and each has a different effect. First, if the trial court's order grants an extension for the period of the appeal but is silent as to the time when the defendant must be brought to trial after the appellate court's mandate, then the state must try the defendant within the time remaining as of the date of the notice of appeal of the original ninety-day or 180-day period. This is consistent with our decision in State v. Williams, 350 So.2d 81 (Fla. 1977). In Williams 135 days of the 180 days under the speedy trial rule had elapsed when the state filed an appeal. The trial court ordered a stay of the speedy trial rule but only "for the period of time necessary to complete appellate procedures . . .." Id. at 82. When the trial was not commenced within forty-five days after issuance of the appellate court's mandate, we held the defendant was entitled to a discharge under the order entered by the trial judge.
Second, if the trial court grants an extension for the period of the appeal plus "a reasonable period after issuance of the appellate mandate" without specifying the number of days, the time period under rule 3.191(a) is not controlling, and only the constitutional test of reasonableness is applied under the existing rule. The ninety-day period under rule 3.191(g) as it presently exists does not apply since the defendant is not being "tried again." This provision, however, has been changed effective January 1, 1981, and the ninety-day period under the new rule 3.191 will be applicable to state appeals.
Third, it is our view that the best practice in granting an extension under the present rule is for the trial court to specify the number of days, preferably ninety days, from the date of receipt of the appellate mandate as the time period in which the defendant must be brought to trial. It is important for the trial court to let both sides clearly know the period in which the case must be tried, and ninety days is the allowed period under the new rule 3.191(g) effective January 1, 1981.
First and foremost, it should be understood that any appeal by a defendant terminates the mandatory speedy trial period set forth in Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(a)(1) without the necessity of any action by the state to terminate or extend the speedy trial period.
When a defendant takes an interlocutory appeal, a remand for trial requires only that the state try the defendant within a reasonable time in accordance with constitutional standards.
The situation changes, however, when a defendant is to be retried as a result of a mistrial or the granting of a new trial by either trial court or appellate court action. In these instances, the provisions of the existing Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(g)...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Howell v. State
...trial pursuant to Rule 3.191, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, is always a point to be considered by a trial court. State v. Jenkins, 389 So.2d 971, 975 (Fla.1980). However, this seemingly simple factor, as noted in Edwards, supra, at 889, is a "particularly troublesome" point, which is......
-
State v. Nieman, 82-1808
...Florida Supreme Court entertaining state appeals from orders discharging defendants under the speedy trial rule. See, e .g., State v. Jenkins, 389 So.2d 971 (Fla.1980) (discharge of defendant under speedy trial rule approved when trial was not held within six-month extension granted by tria......
-
Kinzey v. State
...period for a retrial after a mistrial. Further, case law elaborates and supports this position taken by Florida. In State v. Jenkins, 389 So.2d 971 (Fla.1980), the Florida Supreme Court refers to Rule 3.191(g) in the course of its opinion. After noting that when a defendant takes an interlo......
-
Sherrod v. Franza, 60683
...defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial, and (2) the effective and expeditious prosecution of criminal offenses. State v. Jenkins, 389 So.2d 971 (Fla.1980). Prohibition is an appropriate remedy to prohibit trial court proceedings where an accused has been denied his right to a sp......
-
Speedy trial, speedy games.
...71-1(B), [section]6, Laws of Florida. (46) in re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 245 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1971). (47) State v. Jenkins, 389 So. 2d 971,974 (Fla. Angelica D. Zayas is an assistant state attorney in Miami, representing the state in criminal trial and appellate litigation. She ......