State v. Jenkins, No. A06-2437 (Minn. App. 12/16/2008)
| Decision Date | 16 December 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. A06-2437.,A06-2437. |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Ronald L. Jenkins, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the District Court, Hennepin County, File No. 05045647.
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota and
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Michael Richardson, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Lawrence Hammerling, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leslie J. Rosenberg, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Hudson, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Huspeni, Judge.*
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant Ronald L. Jenkins challenges his conviction of being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm. Because the district court did not err in finding that appellant's statements to police were voluntary, and because there is insufficient evidence of prosecutorial misconduct or ineffective assistance of counsel, we affirm.
A little before 8:00 a.m. on July 24, 2005, a shot was fired through a guest's door at the Radisson Hotel in Plymouth following an apparent dispute over drugs. Thirty seconds later another shot was fired, not outside the door but from further away. A hotel maintenance worker, J.J., was in the lobby of the hotel and started walking toward the sounds. When J.J. opened the door to a stairwell near the elevators, he saw a thin black man holding a gun. The man looked upset and had blood on his face. According to J.J., the man had on a blue or white shirt, white sneakers, and blue shorts.
When Police Officer Goodwin arrived at the scene, she saw a man, later identified as appellant Ronald Jenkins, running near highway 494. Officer Goodwin was approximately one city block from appellant and saw what appeared to be a black handgun in his left hand. Goodwin told appellant to stop and face her with his hands up; appellant complied but had nothing in his hands. When asked where he had thrown the gun, appellant stated that he did not have a gun but had thrown down his cell phone. Appellant was wearing a camouflage baseball cap, a blue t-shirt, jean shorts, and was wearing only one shoe—a black shoe with red lettering on it. Officer Goodwin handcuffed appellant and placed him in the squad car, at which point she noticed that appellant had puncture wounds and scratches on his left arm and face. When asked how the injuries occurred, he stated that three black males at the hotel, who were inside a car, had shot at him. Appellant complained that he felt his face was burning and his eyes hurt. Officer Goodwin called for paramedics, who treated appellant for his injuries, but he was not transported to the hospital because his injuries were non-life-threatening and appellant told the paramedics that he did not want to be transported at that time. Upon arresting appellant, Officer Goodwin testified that appellant did not seem to be intoxicated but appeared to be under the influence of a narcotic. A different officer, however, testified that appellant smelled of alcohol and appeared intoxicated. Officer Goodwin also testified that throughout the morning, appellant asked approximately three times why he had been shot by the officer. Appellant was never tested for alcohol or drugs.
Following his arrest, appellant was taken to a park about six miles away for a series of "show-ups" in front of eight to ten witnesses. The show-ups began around 10:10 a.m., and ended around 11:00 a.m. It had been 45 minutes since appellant was placed in the squad car. Appellant complained again that his face was burning. Officer Goodwin again contacted the paramedics, who arrived and washed appellant's eye, whereupon they found a metal fragment in his eyelid. At the suggestion of one of the officers, appellant was taken to the hospital. Appellant's behavior at the hospital was uncooperative, and he would not let the doctor treat him. One of the police officers who accompanied appellant testified that appellant was given water at his request. Appellant however, testified that he was not only denied water, but that a police officer kicked him in the knee and threatened him.
Upon leaving the hospital, appellant was taken to the police station for interrogation. Officer Goodwin and the appellant gave conflicting testimony about whether the air conditioning was left on in the squad car during the numerous hours between appellant's arrest and the interrogation. Appellant stated that it was not left on and the windows were closed, but he was not certain. Officer Goodwin stated that the squad car had air conditioning on while appellant was in it.
Appellant was interrogated at the police station at approximately 2:30 p.m. He had been awake all night. At least one of the interrogating officers testified that appellant did not appear to be intoxicated, although appellant told the interrogating officers that he had been doing cocaine all night. Appellant again asked for water numerous times, and officers testified that he was given "full" cups of water five times. During the interrogation, appellant again asked for medical assistance because his eye hurt; appellant was told that he would have his medical needs attended to once he answered their questions. Appellant repeatedly asked whether someone had been hurt, and expressed concern over having possibly hurt somebody at the hotel.
When appellant was first arrested, he told officers that black men were chasing him at the hotel, but he later stated that he told that story because he did not want to be kept sitting in the squad car anymore and because he did not feel well. He then told officers a different story. He testified at trial that he only told police this story because he thought it would "get him out of the situation." Appellant testified that it was actually an acquaintance who was the shooter, but he did not want to identify the person because he feared it would subject him to physical violence.
Before trial, defense counsel moved to suppress the show-up identification procedures; the district court denied the motion. At trial, the court allowed the "show up" identifications to be entered into evidence over defense counsel's objections. J.J. testified that before he identified appellant at the show-up, the police told him they were "going to take [him] to a spot . . . where [he] could see it was the person that they had found, the person with the gun in [his] hand." J.J. also testified that the police told J.J. that "that was him, that they had found him" before he made the identification and that the police never showed him any other suspects. Defense counsel did not renew the objection to the show-up identification after J.J. testified.
Appellant was convicted of possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. On June 14, 2007, appellant filed a postconviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel because, among other things, trial counsel did not renew the objection to the show-up identification after J.J. testified about the police officers' impermissible remarks. At the postconviction hearing, appellant's trial counsel stated that it may have been an error for her to not renew her motion to suppress J.J.'s testimony after learning that the show-up procedure was possibly overly suggestive. However, counsel went on to explain that it was her understanding that the district court did not agree with her that the show-up procedure was impermissibly suggestive. Appellant's trial counsel testified that she tried to call J.J.'s credibility into question in other ways. Additionally, appellant's trial counsel was questioned as to why she did not call T.C.—a potentially exculpatory witness—to testify on behalf of appellant at trial. She testified that because of the theory she created for the defense, T.C.'s identification or lack of identification of appellant was irrelevant.
On September 27, 2007 the district court denied postconviction relief. This appeal follows.
Appellant argues that his statements to police were involuntary and therefore should have been suppressed. A confession is admissible only if it is freely and voluntarily made. State v. Wilson, 535 N.W.2d 597, 603 (Minn. 1995). Where evidence suggests a defendant's custodial statement may be involuntary and should be suppressed, a district court should make specific factual findings at the omnibus hearing. State v. Buchanan, 431 N.W.2d 542, 551 (Minn. 1988). A reviewing court will not reverse those factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous but will "make its own independent evaluation of whether the waiver was knowing, intelligent and voluntary, based on the facts as found." Id. at 552. When determining the voluntariness of a statement, a court must look at the totality of the circumstances. State v. Merrill, 274 N.W.2d 99, 106 (Minn. 1978). Physical deprivations such as a lack of food are a factor in considering whether a confession was voluntary. State v. Moorman, 505 N.W.2d 593, 600 (Minn. 1993). Finally, the requirement that a statement be made voluntarily is aimed at deterring improper police conduct during interrogations. State v. Williams, 535 N.W.2d 277, 287 (Minn. 1995). A finding of coercive police activity is a prerequisite to concluding that a statement was involuntary. State v. Riley, 568 N.W.2d 518, 525 (Minn. 1997).
Appellant argues that his statements were not voluntary because (1) he was intoxicated and under the influence of cocaine; (2) he was suffering from an eye injury and was kept awake for over 24 hours; (3) the length and conditions of the confinement and interrogation were impermissible, specifically his eye condition, his unanswered requests for water, and the lack of air conditioning in the squad car created unacceptable interrogation conditions; and (4) he was...
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