State v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 15 April 1930
• Docket Number: 12894.
• Citation: 152 S.E. 825,156 S.C. 63
• Parties: STATE v. JOHNSON et al.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

152 S.E. 825

156 S.C. 63

STATE v. JOHNSON et al.

No. 12894.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

April 15, 1930

Appeal from General Sessions Circuit Court of Spartanburg County; M M. Mann, Judge.

Paul Johnson and another were convicted of murder, and they appeal.

Affirmed.

Claude Taylor and Jennings Thompson, both of Spartanburg, for appellants.

I. C Blackwood, Sol., L. G. Southard, and Sam R. Watt, all of Spartanburg, for the State.

COTHRAN J.

The defendants were indicted in the court of general sessions of Spartanburg county charged with the murder of Earle Belue near the city of Spartanburg, on December 4, 1928. The trial was had before his honor, Judge Mann, and a jury at Spartanburg on Thursday, April 25, 1929, and resulted in convictions of murder without recommendation of mercy. The defendants were accordingly sentenced to death and have appealed.

The exceptions assign error in the following particulars:

1. That his honor, the presiding Judge, refused the motion of the defendants made on April 17, 1929, for an order directing the sheriff to place the defendants in jail where they might be interviewed jointly and at the same time by their attorneys.

2. That his honor erred in permitting the sheriff to bring the defendants into the courtroom in shackles and in refusing to order them removed.

3. That his honor erred in setting the case on Thursday, April 25th, after their arraignment on Monday, the 22d, the defendants having announced upon their arraignment that they were not ready for trial.

4. That his honor erred in refusing the motion of the defendants for a continuance upon the ground of the absence of a material witness.

5. That his honor erred in not excluding the witness Green from the courtroom after his order upon motion of the defendants that the witnesses be segregated and excluded.

6. That his honor erred in his charge defining "malice."

7. That his honor erred in his charge in reference to circumstantial evidence.

8. That his honor erred in charging the jury that in the findings of fact the jury was "higher than the Supreme Court."

9. That his honor erred in charging in reference to the testimony of an accomplice.

10. That his honor erred in refusing the motion of the defendants for a new trial "upon the grounds stated in the record and upon the further ground that the State failed to prove the venue in this case."

11. "That his honor erred in charging the jury that if two persons go out to steal a watch or money together, that they are jointly guilty of murder which ensues, thereby charging the jury of this case and stating in this portion of the charge that that is about all the law there is to murder in this case."

I. The statement in the transcript of record shows this: "It is admitted that the attorneys representing the defendants were permitted to see the defendants in jail, seeing each of the defendants separately, but as often as was desired and for any length of time desired."

We know of no authority, and counsel have cited none, sustaining the contention that defendants jointly indicted for any crime have the right to a joint consultation with their attorneys. The statement quoted above discloses that they were accorded all the rights to which they were entitled.

II. The statement referred to shows this: "The defendants were brought into Court handcuffed; during their trial, they sat with their counsel, without handcuffs, shackles, or in anywise manacled; they were carried from the jail to the court room and from the court room back to jail handcuffed, the handcuffs fastened to a chain."

Under the circumstances no criticism can be directed against the officers for their treatment of the defendants.

III. This objection is met by the decision of this court in State v. Platt, 154 S.C. 1, 151 S.E. 206.

IV. Motions for continuances are addressed to the discretion of the presiding judge, and his disposition of such a motion will not be disturbed in the absence of evidence of an abuse of that discretion which does not appear in the case at bar.

V. It appears that the witness Green was accompanying the deceased in the automobile at the time he was shot; he was a very material witness and his presence during the examination of witnesses, in aid of the solicitor, was apparent; the presiding judge, we think, wisely exercised his discretion in allowing him to remain.

VI. His honor charged the jury upon the subject of malice: "Now malice, you see, is the basis of murder, and it must be in the heart of the person inflicting the fatal blow at the time the blow was inflicted, the compelling force behind the infliction of the blow. The law has not fixed any arbitrary time that malice must be present." No possible objection...