State v. Johnson
| Decision Date | 31 December 2019 |
| Docket Number | 2019-UP-411 |
| Parties | The State, Respondent, v. Shane Isaac Johnson, Appellant. Appellate Case No. 2017-000873 |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
Submitted November 1, 2019
Appeal From Richland County R. Knox McMahon, Circuit Court Judge.
Appellate Defender Taylor Davis Gilliam, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr., Assistant Attorney General Vann Henry Gunter, Jr., and Solicitor Byron Gipson all of Columbia, for Respondent.
Shane Isaac Johnson appeals his conviction for inflicting great bodily injury upon a child under section 16-3-95(A) of the South Carolina Code (2015), arguing the trial court erred in (1) denying his motion for an independent psychological examination of the child victim (Child); (2) allowing the State to call an expert witness even though the State failed to give Johnson notice of the purpose of the expert's testimony; (3) denying his motions for a mistrial after the State's expert witness testified that Johnson burned Child as a form of discipline; (4) denying his motion for a directed verdict because the State did not prove he acted with specific intent; (5) admitting cumulative photographs of Child's burns; and (6) not charging the jury with accident or specific intent. We affirm.
On October 7, 2015, Johnson and Child's mother, Kristin Campbell, brought Child to a Columbia hospital with severe burns caused by hot water from a shower. At the time, Johnson and Campbell were in a relationship and living together, with Child, at Campbell's home. Due to the severity of Child's burns, the hospital transferred Child to a burn center in Augusta, Georgia. On October 19, 2015, after police questioned Johnson and searched his home, Johnson was arrested and charged with infliction of great bodily harm upon a child under South Carolina Code section 16-3-95(A).
At trial, Campbell testified Child has a history of autism spectrum disorder, but is highly functioning. However Campbell said Child was not allowed to shower by himself. Campbell testified that on the night Child was burned, she was too tired to bathe Child, so Johnson offered to do it. Campbell heard Child screaming, and when she got to the bathroom, she found Child curled up in the shower with Johnson standing over him. Campbell further testified that after she removed Child from the shower, she observed Child's skin peeling off. Finally, Campbell stated that when she asked Child what happened, Child stated Johnson did it to him.
The emergency room physician testified that when he asked Child about the burns, Child look at Johnson and stated, "You did this to me." The director of pediatric critical care, Dr. Richard Cartie, who treated Child at the Augusta Burn Center, testified Child suffered burns on over forty percent of his body and suffered third-degree burns on over twenty-six percent of his body. Dr. Cartie explained the third-degree burns required Child to undergo skin grafting. He further testified it was not possible for Child's burns to be self-inflicted and it was his medical opinion that Child's burns were the result of child abuse. Johnson was indicted for inflicting great bodily injury upon a child. A trial was held in April 2017. The jury found him guilty as charged, and the court sentenced him to twenty years in prison.
"In criminal cases, we review the decisions of the trial court only for errors of law." State v. Gilmore, 396 S.C. 72, 77, 719 S.E.2d 688, 690 (Ct. App. 2011). Thus, "this [c]ourt is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion." State v. Edwards, 384 S.C. 504, 508, 682 S.E.2d 820, 822 (2009). Accordingly, "[t]his [c]ourt does not re-evaluate the facts based on its own view of the preponderance of the evidence but simply determines whether the trial court's ruling is supported by any evidence." Id.
Johnson argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for an independent psychological examination of Child regarding Child's competency to testify at trial. We disagree.
"The question of the competency of witnesses is to be determined by the trial [court]," and "[the trial court's] determination will not be reversed unless a clear showing of abuse of discretion can be made." State v. Green, 267 S.C. 599, 603, 230 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1976). "A child's competency to testify depends on showing to the satisfaction of the trial [court] that the child is substantially rational and responsive to the questions asked and is sufficiently aware of the moral duty to tell the truth and the probability of punishment if he lies." S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Doe, 292 S.C. 211, 219, 355 S.E.2d 543, 547 (Ct. App. 1987). "If the child is mature enough (1) to understand questions and narrate answers, (2) to perceive facts accurately through the medium of the senses, (3) to recall them correctly, (4) to relate a true version of the facts perceived, (5) to know the difference between right and wrong, good and bad, (6) to understand it is right or good to tell the truth and wrong or bad to lie, (7) to be willing to tell the truth, and (8) to fear punishment if he lies, then he is competent to testify." Id.
Id. at 547, 602 S.E.2d at 732-33 (quoting State v. Delaney, 417 S.E.2d 903, 907 (W.Va. 1992)).
At his pre-trial hearing, Johnson requested the court order an independent psychological examination of Child. Johnson argued Child's young age, history of autism spectrum disorder, and previous difficulty differentiating between the truth and a lie were sufficient to show a compelling need for an independent examination of Child's competency. The trial court, however, denied Johnson's request, stating "there [would] be no psychiatric examination of [Child] at this time" because the court had not yet been able to assess whether Child was competent to testify.
After jury selection, Johnson renewed his motion, and the court heard proffered testimony from Child. Based on Child's testimony, the trial court found Child was competent to testify and denied Johnson's motion because "[it] d[id] not think, . . . considering all those factors outlined in Michael H., that a psychological examination would assist th[e] court." Following the proffered testimony, Johnson renewed his motion.
On appeal, Johnson argues all six Michael H. factors were satisfied and the trial court should have ordered an independent psychological examination to assess Child's competency. However, Child's proffered testimony was sufficient for the trial court to find Child was competent to testify because Child could differentiate between the truth and a lie; was committed to being truthful; and was able to recall details of the events resulting in Child's burns. Thus, we find the trial court did not err in finding a psychological exam was not necessary to determine Child's competency to testify at trial.
Johnson argues the trial court erred in allowing the State to call an expert witness when the State failed to give him notice of the purpose of the expert's testimony. We disagree.
Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the prosecution must "disclose evidence that is: (1) in its possession; (2) favorable to the accused; and (3) material to guilt or punishment." State v. Kennerly, 331 S.C. 442, 452, 503 S.E.2d 214, 219-20 (Ct. App. 1998), aff'd, 337 S.C. 617, 524 S.E.2d 837 (1999). "Evidence is material under Brady if there is a 'reasonable probability' that the result of the proceeding would have been different had the information been disclosed." Riddle v. Ozmint, 369 S.C. 39, 44-45, 631 S.E.2d 70, 73 (2006). A defendant asserting a Brady violation must show the State failed to disclose evidence, in its possession or known by the prosecution, that was favorable to the defendant as impeachment evidence or was material to the defendant's guilt or innocence. Id. at 44, 631 S.E.2d at 73.
Rule 5 of the South Carolina Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the State to make certain disclosures upon the defendant's request. Rule 5(d)(2), SCRCrimP, states that if the State fails to disclose material as required, "the court may order [the State] to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit [the State] from introducing evidence not disclosed[] . . . ." For the court to prohibit the introduction of undisclosed evidence, a defendant must show he was prejudiced by the State's failure to comply with his discovery request. See State v. Wilkins, 310 S.C. 81, 84, 425 S.E.2d 68, 70 (Ct. App. 1992) .
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