State v. Johnson
| Decision Date | 16 January 1996 |
| Parties | 94-1077 La |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
Kevin V. Boshea, New Orleans, for Applicant in No. 94-KK-0595.
Richard P. Ieyoub, Attorney General, Harry F. Connick, District Attorney, Gregory G. Hangartner, New Orleans, Martin K. Maley, Baton Rouge, John J. Williams, Jr., Covington, for Respondent in No. 94-KK-0595.
Dorothy Ann Pendergast, Thomas Allen Usry, John Franklin Weeks, II, Metairie, for Louisiana Sheriffs Association (Amicus Curiae) in both cases.
Paul Carmouche, District Attorney, John F. McWilliams, Jr., Shreveport, for Applicant in No. 94-C-1077.
J. Jay Caraway, Shreveport, Ellis P. Adams, Jr., Baton Rouge, for Respondent in No. 94-C-1077.
Brett A. Sulzer, Baton Rouge, for Dept. of Public Safety and Corrections and Office of the State Police (Amicus Curiae) in No. 94-C-1077.
[94-1077 La. 1] BURRELL J. CARTER, Justice Pro Tem. 1
In these cases consolidated for review, we consider whether, under the circumstances presented herein, a civil forfeiture of property under LSA-R.S. 40:2601, et seq., the Seizure and Controlled Dangerous Substances Property Forfeiture Act of 1989 (the Drug Forfeiture Act), constitutes "punishment" for purposes of federal double jeopardy analysis. Based on our interpretation of recent United States Supreme Court jurisprudence, we conclude that, under the circumstances presented in these cases, the state's civil forfeiture of an individual's property under the Drug Forfeiture Act does not constitute "punishment" for the purposes of double jeopardy analysis.
[94-1077 La. 2] FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The underlying facts of these consolidated cases are as follows:
(Lester Johnson) No. 94-KK-0595: On May 20, 1992, New Orleans police officers received information via a confidential informant (CI) relative to narcotics trafficking by two individuals at a residence located at 1204 St. Ferdinand in New Orleans, Louisiana. One of the individuals was the defendant, Lester Johnson, and the other was Johnson's mother, Barbara Williams. The CI advised police officers that he could make a controlled purchase of cocaine from the St. Ferdinand residence. While under police surveillance, the CI purchased from the St. Ferdinand residence a clear, plastic bag containing a white powder suspected to be cocaine. The powder was subsequently tested; the test yielded a positive reaction for cocaine.
Pursuant to this information, police officers prepared to secure a search warrant for the St. Ferdinand residence. While obtaining the search warrant, police officers continued to conduct surveillance of the residence and observed heavy pedestrian traffic. Police officers also observed Johnson meet with the pedestrians and exit the St. Ferdinand residence with a firearm in his hand. Johnson then left the premises in his automobile.
Fearing that Johnson may have removed contraband from the residence, police officers stopped the Johnson vehicle a few blocks from the St. Ferdinand residence and observed a revolver on the floorboard of the vehicle. Police officers advised Johnson of his Miranda rights, that he was under investigation for narcotics trafficking, and that a search warrant was being obtained for the St. Ferdinand residence. Johnson admitted that cocaine, which he acknowledged belonged to him, was present in the St. Ferdinand residence. Johnson was arrested for possession of cocaine. A search of Johnson's person revealed $900.00 in currency in his rear pocket. The currency and the weapon were seized. After the search warrant was obtained, police officers searched the St. Ferdinand residence. A pill bottle containing crack cocaine, an ounce of cocaine, a triple beam scale, two plastic bags containing a white powder residue, a large plastic bag containing sixteen smaller bags of white powder residue, and an additional $76.00 in currency were recovered from the residence. Johnson's mother, Barbara Williams, was also arrested for possession of cocaine.
[94-1077 La. 3] On June 23, 1992, prior to instituting the criminal charges, the state, pursuant to LSA-R.S. 40:2608(3)(a), notified Johnson and Williams that it intended to seek forfeiture of the $976.00 seized at the time of their arrest. By bill of information filed July 20, 1992, 2 the state charged Johnson and Williams with violating LSA-R.S. 40:967F(1)(c) by possessing more than 400 grams of cocaine. On August 6, 1992, the trial court rendered a judgment of civil forfeiture against the defendants, granting the state an in rem forfeiture of the $976.00.
On July 22, 1993, Lester Johnson was convicted by a twelve-person jury of possession of more than 400 grams of cocaine, a violation of LSA-R.S. 40:967F(1)(c). Johnson filed a motion for a new trial, contending that the charges against him should be quashed because the forfeiture of the $976.00 constituted an initial punishment such that the double jeopardy clauses of the federal and state constitutions precluded the state from seeking a criminal conviction for the same conduct in a subsequent proceeding. The trial court granted the motion on federal or state double jeopardy grounds, or both, and the state appealed. The court of appeal reversed the trial court judgment, concluding that the money forfeiture was remedial, rather than punitive, and thus did not constitute prior punishment implicating the double jeopardy clause. State v. Johnson, 93-2557 (La.App. 4th Cir. 2/11/94); 632 So.2d 817, 818. We granted Johnson's application for writ of certiorari, State v. Johnson, 94-0595 (La.9/23/94); 642 So.2d 1302, and consolidated the matter for review with State v. 1979 Cadillac Deville, No. 94-C-1077.
(Frank L. Wilson) No. 94-C-1077: On April 10, 1991, a Shreveport police officer observed Frank L. Wilson exceeding the speed limit in his 1979 Cadillac. The officer attempted to stop the Wilson vehicle by activating his emergency lights and siren and pursuing Wilson. However, Wilson maintained a constant speed and refused to comply with the officer's instructions. The officer observed Wilson throw a plastic bag from the passenger window of the Cadillac. Wilson later stopped his vehicle, and the discarded item was recovered. The plastic bag held seventeen smaller plastic bags containing rock cocaine. Thereafter, Wilson was arrested, and $24.00 in currency was seized from his person. A search of the Cadillac revealed a pistol, a pyrex tube that tested positive for [94-1077 La. 4] cocaine residue, and a set of mini-scales. On June 11, 1991, Wilson pleaded guilty to attempted possession of cocaine, LSA-R.S. 14:27 and 40:967 C, and was subsequently sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor for one year.
On June 10, 1991, the state filed a Petition for Forfeiture of the 1979 Cadillac Deville, VIN # 6047599101001, as well as the $24.00 seized from Wilson at the time of his arrest. Wilson denied the allegations of the petition of forfeiture and filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the forfeiture proceeding constituted the imposition of a second punishment for the same offense and was violative of the protections against double jeopardy contained in the federal and state constitutions. The state also filed a motion for summary judgment. Both motions for summary judgment were denied.
At the trial of the merits, it was established that Wilson had purchased the Cadillac, which had an odometer reading of 180,000 miles, for $2,800.00 and that towing and storage fees of $50.00 and $2,454.50, respectively, had been incurred to the date of the forfeiture hearing. After the hearing, the trial court determined that the forfeiture proceeding was against the property, and thus double jeopardy did not apply. On August 14, 1992, the trial court rendered a judgment of civil forfeiture in favor of the state and against Wilson, ordering that the Cadillac and the $24.00 be forfeited.
Wilson appealed the trial court judgment, contending that the forfeiture of his vehicle violated the double jeopardy provisions of the United States and Louisiana constitutions. 3 A divided five-judge panel of the court of appeal reversed the trial court judgment. State v. 1979 Cadillac DeVille, 24954 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 2/28/94); 632 So.2d 1221. A majority of the panel determined that recent United States Supreme Court decisions mandated a finding that the forfeiture proceeding constituted punishment for the purposes of double jeopardy. State v. 1979 Cadillac DeVille, 632 So.2d at 1228-29. We granted the state's application for writ of certiorari to consider the double jeopardy issues in consolidation with those raised by State v. Johnson. State v. 1979 Cadillac DeVille, 94-1077 (La.9/23/94); 642 So.2d 1302.
[94-1077 La. 5] FEDERAL LEGAL PRECEPTS APPLICABLE TO A
DETERMINATION OF WHETHER A CIVIL SANCTION
CONSTITUTES "PUNISHMENT" UNDER A DOUBLE
A person cannot twice be placed in jeopardy for the same offense. U.S. Const. amend. V; LSA-Const. art. 1, § 15; LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 591; State v. Knowles, 392 So.2d 651, 654 (La.1980).
LSA-Const. art. 1, § 15 provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o person shall be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense." Amendment V of the United States Constitution, in pertinent part, provides that "nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be put in jeopardy of life or limb." From our analysis of the language of these provisions and the constitutional history of the state provision, we conclude that the drafters and ratifiers of the state constitution did not intend for this court to define "punishment" for purposes of double jeopardy analysis any more broadly in favor of individuals subjected to the civil forfeiture of property than "punishment" has been construed by the United States Supreme Court...
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