State v. Johnson
| Decision Date | 21 May 2018 |
| Docket Number | A17-0610,A17-1623 |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Leslie Paul Johnson, Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Minnesota |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).
Affirmed in part and remanded
Watonwan County District Court
File Nos. 83-CR-15-490, 83-CR-15-465
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Edwin W. Stockmeyer, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Stephen Lindee, Watonwan County Attorney, St. James, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jodi Proulx, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Cleary, Chief Judge; and Rodenberg, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
In these consolidated appeals, appellant Leslie Paul Johnson challenges his convictions for criminal sexual conduct and possession of pornographic work. He argues that the district court erred by finding that the search warrant, which enabled police to obtain the child-pornography evidence, was supported by probable cause. He also argues that, ancillary to that probable-cause finding, the district court erroneously denied his motion to suppress evidence seized from his apartment.1 Appellant also argues that the district court erred by not making a factual finding concerning which offense occurred first before sentencing. Appellant also argues in a pro se brief that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel in file A17-1623. We affirm appellant's convictions in both appeals, and remand to the district court for additional findings in appellate file A17-1623.
An employee with Brown County Family Service Center contacted Madelia Police Officer Travis Bottelson on May 15, 2015 regarding a report of sexual abuse alleged to have occurred between 2010 and 2012. T.B., age 15 at the time, told his therapist that appellant sexually molested him during those years, when T.B. was between 10 and 12 years old. Officer Bottelson interviewed T.B. on May 16, 2015.
T.B. told the officer that he knew appellant from the Younger Brothers organization, and that T.B. often spent the night at appellant's home. T.B. reported that appellant would tell T.B. that T.B. was "dirty" and would help T.B. shower, which included washing T.B.'s hair and body. He reported that appellant grabbed T.B.'s backside, fondled T.B.'s genitals, tried to convince T.B. to sleep in appellant's bed with appellant, laid on the couch behind T.B. in a "spoon" position, stroked T.B.'s side, "place[d] his hands in the back of T.B.'spants and digitally penetrate[d] T.B.'s rectum." T.B. also told Officer Bottelson that appellant would grab his backside while they wrestled. T.B. estimated that appellant touched him inappropriately about 30 times.
Officer Bottelson spoke with appellant on June 8, 2015 at the police station. The officer read the Miranda warning to appellant and asked appellant about the incidents that T.B. had reported. Appellant admitted that T.B. would spend the night at his house and admitted that he helped T.B. shower, but appellant denied any inappropriate touching. Officer Bottelson noted that appellant seemed "nervous as he was stammering his words when answering [the officer's] questions."
Officer Bottelson arrested appellant after the interview. Appellant asked if he could retrieve his medications from his apartment. Officer Bottelson took appellant to his apartment, but appellant changed his mind and told the officer that he did not need to go inside the apartment and would have someone else get the medications instead. As of the next day, appellant had not arranged for anyone to retrieve his medications or to care for the pets that he told Officer Bottelson were in his apartment. Officer Bottelson later took the keys for appellant's apartment building to return them to the building owner. While Officer Bottelson was returning the keys, an officer from the jail called Officer Bottelson to tell him that appellant had, on learning that Officer Bottelson was going to appellant's apartment with the keys, become "visibly upset and nervous" and spilled his coffee.
In his affidavit accompanying a search-warrant application, Officer Bottelson stated that he learned through his investigation that appellant "carries a camera on his person at all times," that appellant "likes to use his video recorder," and that appellant "had accessto children previously while babysitting." Officer Bottelson had found a camera in a pouch on appellant's belt when appellant was booked into jail. He included in the affidavit that appellant had been investigated about 25 years earlier for sexual misconduct with a child, but that there was insufficient evidence to file charges then. Officer Bottelson also explained that, from his training and experience, he "knows that computers and the internet ha[ve] become a common tool for those who get sexual gratification from viewing images of children, and/or interacting with minors," and that those who have access to minors may exploit them through photographs or video.
A district court judge signed the search warrant on June 9, 2015, authorizing the search of appellant's apartment for evidence of child pornography. Law enforcement officers executed the search warrant and recovered "multiple hard drives, computers, camera recording equipment, digital cameras, multiple CDs [and] DVDs." Forensic analysis of the recovered devices revealed "several hundred" photographs and 18 videos of children who were partially or fully naked, including some photographs that were cropped to highlight the children's private parts.
The state charged appellant, in what is now appellate case file A17-1623, with three counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, one count of using minors in sexual performances or pornographic work, one count of possessing child pornography, one count of malicious punishment of a child, and one count of indecent exposure to a minor. In a separate complaint, now appellate case file A17-0610, the state charged appellant with three counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, two counts of using minors in sexual performances or pornographic work, two counts of possessing pornographic workon a computer disc or electronic storage system, and one count of malicious punishment of a child.
Appellant challenged the validity of the search warrant and moved to suppress all evidence obtained from it. The challenge to the search warrant was heard by a different judge than the one who signed the warrant. This second judge found that the warrant was supported by probable cause, and denied appellant's motion to suppress.
Later, the charges of using minors in sexual performances or pornographic works and the charge of malicious punishment in both files, and the indecent-exposure charge in file A17-1623, were dismissed on statute-of-limitations grounds. One count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct in each file was dismissed because the child's age did not qualify as a mental impairment under the statutory provision charged. None of these dismissed charges are significant to this appeal.
Appellant waived his right to a jury in file A17-0610. After trial to the court, the district court found appellant guilty of two counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct and two counts of possessing pornographic work. Appellant appealed, arguing that the search warrant was unsupported by probable cause and that the resulting evidence should therefore have been suppressed.
In file A17-1623, appellant submitted the charges to the court for a stipulated-facts trial, and the parties agreed that the dispositive issue in that case was the validity of the search warrant. The district court described in detail the rights that appellant would be waiving by agreeing to a stipulated-facts trial, including the right to testify at trial. Appellant indicated that he understood the rights that he was giving up, and the districtcourt found that appellant had validly waived those rights. The district court found appellant guilty of two counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct and one count of possession of pornography in that file.
The presentence investigation (PSI) in file A17-1623 recommended that the district court sentence appellant to 119 months in prison on the first criminal-sexual-conduct conviction, 300 months in prison on the second criminal-sexual-conduct conviction, and 60 months in prison on the pornography conviction. The state asked the district court to follow that recommendation. Appellant's attorney did not object. The district court then sentenced appellant to 142 months in prison on the first criminal-sexual-conduct conviction, 300 months in prison on the second criminal-sexual-conduct conviction, and 60 months in prison on the pornography conviction, to be served concurrently. Appellant appealed.
This court issued an order consolidating the two appeals. Both appeals challenge the probable cause supporting the search warrant, and the appeal in file A17-1623 challenges appellant's sentence. Appellant separately filed a pro se brief in file A17-1623 alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.
Appellant argues that the district court erroneously denied his motion to suppress the evidence seized from his apartment because the search warrant lacked probable cause.
The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. 1, § 10. A search warrant may be issued by a neutral and detached magistrate only upon a finding of probable cause. State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Minn. 1999). When determining whether probable cause supports the issuance of a...
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