State v. Johnson, 13045.

• Decision Date: 29 December 1930
• Docket Number: No. 13045.,13045.
• Citation: 156 S.E. 351
• Parties: STATE. v. JOHNSON.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

156 S.E. 351

STATE.

v.JOHNSON.

No. 13045.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Dec. 29, 1930.

Appeal from Greenville County Court; M. P. Ansel, Judge.

C. I. Johnson was convicted of maintaining a nuisance, and he appeals.

Affirmed.

C. G. Wyche, of Greenville, for appellant.

Dakyns B. Stover, of Greenville, for the State.

STABLER, J.

The defendant Johnson was tried at the June, 1929, term of the Greenville county court, under an indictment charging him with maintaining a nuisance in violation of section 845 of the Criminal Code of 1922. At the close of the state's case, the defendant moved for a directed verdict on the ground that the evidence was "not sufficient to warrant a conviction at the hands of the jury." The motion was¹ overruled, and he was found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment for a period of twelve months. He now appeals to this court.

The appellant's first complaint is that the trial court erred in refusing to direct a verdict in his favor on the grounds stated. This assignment of error cannot be sustained. A careful examination of the record discloses that there was some evidence in proof of the charge as laid in the indictment, which warranted the court in submitting the case to the jury; the sufficiency of the evidence being a question for them.

Error is also imputed to the trial judge "in not charging the jury that the defendant was presumed to be innocent until his guilt was established beyond a reasonable doubt." In support of his position, the appellant relies upon Coffin v. U. S., 156 U. S. 432, 15 S. Ct. 394, 405, 39 L. Ed. 481, and several Georgia cases It is generally held that, if the "presumption of innocence" is evidence in favor of one charged with a crime, the trial judge is required, whether requested or not, to instruct the jury with reference to such presumption. As to whether such presumption is evidence, the law-writers and courts of last resort are not in agreement, but the great weight of authority seems to support the view that it is not.

In 16 C. J. 535, the following appears: "Some authorities regard the presumption of innocence as evidence; but this doctrine has been much criticized by courts and writers on the law of evidence, and some courts flatly refuse to adopt it and hold that it is not evidence, its only function being to cast upon the state the burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt."

In 8 R. 0. L. 174, the writer says: "According to some authorities the presumption of innocence is to be considered as evidence and abides with a defendant throughout the trial. Many courts, however, have asserted that the presumption of innocence is not evidence but merely determines the burden of proof; and this rule seems better to accord with reason."

In the Coffin Case, cited by the appellant, the Supreme Court of the United States, speaking through Mr. Justice White, held that "the presumption of innocence is evidence in favor of the accused, introduced by the law in his behalf." However, in the later case of Agnew v. U. S., 165 U. S. 36, 17 S. Ct. 235, 41 L. Ed. 624, the court virtually discarded that declaration.

By reference to 31 L. R. A. (N. S.") 1166, will be found the case of Culpepper v. State, 4 Okl. Cr. 103, 111 P. 079, 140 Am. St Rep. 668, in...