State v. Johnson, 34610

Decision Date29 January 1974
Docket NumberNo. 34610,34610
Citation508 S.W.2d 18
PartiesSTATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Leroy JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant. . Louis District
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., G. Michael O'Neal, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, David A. Dalton, Pros. Atty., Ronald L. Boggs, Asst. Pros. Atty., St. Charles, for plaintiff-respondent.

Shaw & Howlett, C. Clifford Schwartz, Jr., Keith W. Hazelwood, Clayton, for defendant-appellant.

GUNN, Judge.

Defendant-appellant appeals from convictions of manslaughter, feloniously leaving the scene of an accident and operating a motor vehicle with operator's license suspended or revoked. Punishment was assessed by the jury at two years on each of the felonies and thirty days on the misdemeanor of operating a motor vehicle with license suspended. We affirm.

At approximately 6:00 p.m., on February 4, 1971, an automobile operated by defendant was observed striking St. Charles Deputy Sheriff Richard Henke as Deputy Henke was manning a road block at the Daniel Boone Bridge and Highway 40 in St. Charles County. The purpose of the road block is not germane to this case. The force of the blow mortally wounded Deputy Henke who was carrying a lighted flashlight and was standing near police cars with lights flashing at the time he was hit. Defendant did not stop his auto after colliding with Deputy Henke. Defendant was apprehended about three miles from the Daniel Boone Bridge shortly after hitting Deputy Henke. The front windshield of his auto was caved in and Deputy Henke's revolver and other of his equipment were found on the hood of defendant's car, having been separated from Deputy Henke by the force of impact. The alcohol blood test taken shortly after defendant's arrest established that defendant was in a highly intoxicated state. The certified suspension order from the Missouri Director of Revenue was received at trial to show that defendant's motor vehicle operator's license was under suspension at the time of the incident.

Defendant's first point of alleged trial error is the admission of photographs of the crime scene which defendant contends do not accurately depict the scene as it existed on the night of February 4, 1971. The photographs were taken during the day whereas the incident occurred at night when it was raining.

The admissibility of photographs is a matter primarily within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Wren, 498 S.W.2d 806 (Mo.App.1973); State v. Vineyard, 497 S.W.2d 821 (Mo.App.1973). The test is whether photographic evidence shows relevant facts which will aid the jury. Photographs taken of a crime scene which reveal different conditions from those existing at the time the crime occurred are admissible and any objections to such photographs go to the weight of the evidence; any differences in conditions may be developed in the evidence. State v. Redding, 357 S.W.2d 103 (Mo.1962); State v. Kinder, 496 S.W.2d 335 (Mo.App.1973).

Here the photographs did show different conditions from those existing at the time the crime took place. The state stipulated that the photographs were taken when it was daylight and dry. These differences were pointed out to the jury; thus, it was for the jury to consider their value and weigh them accordingly. The admission of the photographs was proper.

Defendant next contends that the trial court improperly admitted into evidence a portion of his suspension order because it was not certified by the Director of Revenue. The document was signed by the Director of Revenue and contained the statement that the attached documents '. . . are true and correct copies of said records, and that the following statements are true...

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8 cases
  • State v. McCrary
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • September 8, 1981
    ...v. Pittman, 569 S.W.2d 277, 280 (Mo.App.1978); State v. (Charles Deason) Johnson, 505 S.W.2d 11, 12 (Mo.App.1974); State v. (Leroy) Johnson, 508 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Mo.App.1974). See State v. Baker, 524 S.W.2d 122, 126 (Mo.banc 1975). However, Fed.R.Crim.P. 8(a) is broader than former Rule 24.04......
  • State v. Williams, 10420
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • July 19, 1977
    ...the interest of more efficient administration of criminal justice. State v. Brannom, 539 S.W.2d 747, 750 (Mo.App.1976); State v. Johnson, 508 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Mo.App.1974). Indeed there is authority to the effect that, at least in certain instances, the Double Jeopardy Clause requires joinder......
  • State v. Diercks
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • May 15, 1984
    ...taking of the photograph may be developed in the evidence. Any such differences go only to the weight of the evidence. State v. Johnson, 508 S.W.2d 18 (Mo.App.1974). VIII As his final point, defendant complains of the court's omission to give MAI-CR2d 2.10 and 2.12. Defendant says that ther......
  • State v. Pittman, 39489
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • June 6, 1978
    ...to be only evidentiary differences. Rule 24.04 is patterned after Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, State v. Johnson, 508 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Mo.App.1974), which is designed to encourage joinder of offenses in the interest of more efficient administration of criminal justice.......
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