State v. Johnson
Decision Date | 05 April 2016 |
Docket Number | No. COA15–793.,COA15–793. |
Citation | 246 N.C.App. 671,784 S.E.2d 633 |
Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. James L. JOHNSON. |
Attorney General, Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General, J. Rick Brown, for the State.
Jeffrey William Gillette, for Defendant.
James L. Johnson ("Defendant") appeals from an order denying his motion to suppress. On appeal, Defendant argues that the police officer who made the investigatory stop lacked sufficient reasonable suspicion to do so.
After careful review, we reverse the judgment below and remand for further proceedings.
The evidence presented at Defendant's suppression hearing tended to establish the following: Around 10:00 p.m. on 16 February 2013, Officer Garrett Gardin ("Officer Gardin"), a patrol officer with the Hendersonville Police Department since 2011, was on duty in his patrol vehicle stopped at a red light at the intersection of King Street and Bearcat Boulevard when Defendant's black Chevy truck pulled beside him in the left-hand turning lane. It was snowing, and the snow was just beginning to stick to the ground. Defendant was "blaring" his music "really loud" and was "revving" his engine. The speed limit was 35 miles per hour.
When the light turned green, Defendant "revved his engine" and "immediately took a left turn onto Bearcat Boulevard, screeching the tires toward the back end, ... and the tailgate went towards the corner." Defendant's car never made contact with the sidewalk, and Defendant was able to "correct[ ]" the car, all the while maintaining proper lane control. According to Officer Gardin, Defendant "sped down Bearcat [Boulevard]" and then stopped at the next red light without incident. Officer Gardin "immediately" initiated a traffic stop based on "unsafe movement for the conditions of the roadway." Officer Gardin testified that, in his opinion, Defendant was driving "too fast" down Bearcat Boulevard "for what was going on at the time as far as weather was concerned."
Defendant stopped his truck promptly after Officer Gardin initiated the stop. When Officer Gardin approached the truck, he observed that Defendant had red, glassy eyes and a red face. When Defendant spoke, his speech was slurred. Defendant admitted that he had consumed a few beers that evening. After performing various field sobriety tests, Officer Gardin placed Defendant under arrest for driving while impaired ("DWI"). Defendant blew a .13 on the Intoxilyzer.
On cross-examination, Officer Gardin stated that he did not know how fast Defendant was driving down Bearcat Boulevard, noting only that he believed that it was "too fast" for the conditions given that Defendant "almost lost control making the left turn." Officer Gardin admitted that there were no other cars or pedestrians in the area and that he did not cite Defendant for any traffic violations.
Defendant filed a motion to suppress the traffic stop in District Court, which was granted by Judge Peter Knight on 5 June 2014. The State appealed to Superior Court for de novo review. Following an evidentiary hearing on Defendant's motion to suppress, Judge Powell denied the motion and remanded the matter back to District Court for entry of an order and further proceedings. Defendant pled guilty to DWI in District Court and appealed the judgment to Superior Court. Defendant refiled his motion to suppress, which was again denied. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant again pled guilty but preserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. Defendant received a suspended sentence of 12 months of unsupervised probation. Defendant timely appeals.
Defendant's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because Officer Gardin lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop him. We agree.
"The standard of review in evaluating the denial of a motion to suppress is whether competent evidence supports the trial court's findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law." State v. Biber, 365 N.C. 162, 167–68, 712 S.E.2d 874, 878 (2011). We review the trial court's conclusions of law de novo. Id. at 168, 712 S.E.2d at 878.
Pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 911 (1968), an officer may conduct a traffic stop if he or she has reasonable suspicion that "criminal activity may be afoot." This includes investigatory stops made on the basis of a readily observed traffic violation or an officer's suspicion that a violation is being committed. State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 415–16, 665 S.E.2d 438, 440–41 (2008). As our Supreme Court has explained, an officer "must be able to point to specific and articulable facts, which taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion." State v. Foreman, 351 N.C. 627, 630, 527 S.E.2d 921, 923 (2000).
Based on the testimony of Officer Gardin, the trial court found that:
Based on these findings, the trial court denied Defendant's motion to suppress, concluding that:
Although the trial court's findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, they do not support the conclusion that Officer Gardin had reasonable, articulable suspicion that Defendant had committed a violation of "unsafe movement" or "traveling too fast for conditions," the purported traffic offenses Officer Gardin claimed Defendant had committed.
Essentially, Officer Gardin stopped Defendant based on his belief that Defendant was engaging in the following "unsafe movements" given the winter weather conditions: (1) Defendant spun his tires when making the left-hand turn onto Bearcat Boulevard; (2) the back end of Defendant's truck swerved or "fish-tailed"; and (3) Officer Gardin's belief that Defendant was driving "too fast" down Bearcat Boulevard.
Generally, "unsafe movement" offenses are based on N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20–154(a), which provides:
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