State v. Johnson, ED 100856.

• Decision Date: 08 April 2014
• Docket Number: No. ED 100856.,ED 100856.
• Citation: 427 S.W.3d 867
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Appellant, v. Joe L. JOHNSON, Respondent.

427 S.W.3d 867

STATE of Missouri, Appellant,
v.
Joe L. JOHNSON, Respondent.

No. ED 100856.

Missouri Court of Appeals,
Eastern District,
Division Five.

April 8, 2014.

[427 S.W.3d 870]

Kathryn Reichenbach, St. Louis, MO, for appellant.

Robert Taaffe, Jr., St. Louis, MO, for respondent.

GARY M. GAERTNER, JR., Judge.
Introduction

The State of Missouri (State) appeals the trial court's grant of Respondent Joe Johnson's (Johnson) motion to suppress evidence seized by police officers from Johnson. In this interlocutory appeal, the State asserts that the trial court erred in granting Johnson's motion to suppress because the evidence was found in plain view during a lawful detention. We reverse.

Background

The State charged Johnson as a prior offender with the class C felony of possession of a controlled substance. Prior to

[427 S.W.3d 871]

trial, Johnson filed a motion to suppress evidence of a bag of heroin, in which Johnson argued the court should suppress, because Officer Daniel Chamblin (Officer Chamblin) seized it during an illegal detention. During the suppression hearing, the trial judge found Officer Chamblin, the sole witness at the hearing, “totally credible.” Officer Chamblin testified to the following facts.

On the night of April 9, 2013, around 10:45 p.m., Officer Kristopher Clark (Officer Clark) and Officer Chamblin traveled northbound in a marked police vehicle on Hamilton approaching Wells in the City of St. Louis. Johnson and two other men were congregating closely together in front of a known drug house. Upon seeing the police car, the two men quickly walked away from Johnson and entered the house. Johnson walked southbound toward where the officers had parked their car on the curb. The officers had not activated their emergency lights or siren on their vehicle.

Officers Clark and Chamblin exited their vehicle and approached Johnson for the purpose of conducting a field interview. Officer Clark requested Johnson's pedigree information. Johnson voluntarily complied with the request and stated, “My name is Joe Johnson. I think I've got some traffic warrants.” Following Johnson's statement, Officer Chamblin handcuffed Johnson for the officers' safety and according to standard police protocol. Officer Chamblin testified that “from [his] experience, when a subject advises they have warrants they are usually correct.” However, Officer Clark performed a computer inquiry, which revealed that Johnson had no traffic warrants. Upon this discovery, Officer Chamblin began to remove the handcuffs. Because it was dark, Officer Chamblin used a flashlight to see the handcuffs' keyhole. While removing the handcuffs, Officer Chamblin observed a “small plastic bag with tan powder protruding” from underneath Johnson's wristwatch. Officer Chamblin suspected this bag contained heroin and notified Officer Clark of his discovery; Officer Clark then arrested Johnson.

Johnson's motion to suppress asserted that the “detention, arrest, search and seizure of evidence” violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution as well as Sections 10, 15, and 18(a) of the Missouri Constitution, because the officers had no probable cause meriting Johnson's arrest or search. The trial court granted Johnson's motion to suppress the bag of heroin, finding the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to justify the search of Johnson as being lawful. The State filed this interlocutory appeal. See Section 547.200.1(3).¹

Standard of Review

In general, we will reverse a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress only if it is “clearly erroneous.” State v. Edwards, 280 S.W.3d 184, 188 (Mo.App.E.D.2009) (citing State v. Sund, 215 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Mo. banc 2007)). A ruling is clearly erroneous when we are “[left] with a definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made.” State v. Dienstbach, 313 S.W.3d 201, 204 (Mo.App.E.D.2010) (citing State v. Dixon, 218 S.W.3d 14, 18 (Mo.App.W.D.2007)). We review “all evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling.” Id. at 203. The State bears the burden of producing evidence showing that the motion to suppress should be overruled. State v. Bradshaw, 99 S.W.3d 73, 77 (Mo.App.E.D.2003). Whether conduct violates the Fourth

[427 S.W.3d 872]

Amendment is a question of law, which we review de novo. State v. Ross, 254 S.W.3d 267, 273 (Mo.App.E.D.2008); see also State v. Pike. 162 S.W.3d 464, 472 (Mo. banc 2005) (stating same analysis applies to cases brought under Missouri Constitution as under United States Constitution).

Discussion

The State's sole point on appeal asserts that the trial court clearly erred in granting Johnson's motion to suppress evidence because that evidence was found in plain view during a lawful detention. The State argues that Johnson's detention was lawful because he voluntarily informed the officers that he may have warrants, which created reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Furthermore, the State asserts that Johnson's detention was not more intrusive than necessary for an investigatory stop, and the evidence was found in plain view. We agree.

A. Consensual Encounter

Johnson argued that the initial stop was a detention, whereas the State contends it was a consensual encounter, outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment. There are three categories of police-citizen encounters: (1) an arrest requiring probable cause, (2) an investigative detention requiring only reasonable suspicion based upon specific articulable facts, and (3) a consensual encounter. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553–55, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208–09, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979); United States v. Brignoni–Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881–82, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). A consensual encounter does not implicate the Fourth Amendment until the officer restrains the individual's liberty to the extent that a reasonable person would feel that he or she was not free to leave or decline the officer's questions. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870. If the encounter is consensual, police officers have liberty to question individuals, “even without reasonable suspicion.” Sund, 215 S.W.3d at 723;see Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991). However, the encounter remains consensual only as long as a reasonable individual would feel free to leave and end the conversation. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382.

Here, Officer Chamblin and Officer Clark's initial encounter with Johnson was consensual. There is no “litmus-paper test” for distinguishing between a consensual encounter and a seizure. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 506, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). “A seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.” Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382. Officer Clark requested Johnson's pedigree information, and Johnson voluntarily complied. At this point, as confirmed by Officer Chamblin's testimony, Johnson was free to disregard the officers and go about his business. Seeid. Furthermore, Johnson made no attempt to leave and neither officer blocked Johnson's path, drew their weapons, or intimidated Johnson into answering their initial questions. SeeState v. Rowe, 67 S.W.3d 649, 656 (Mo.App.W.D.2002) (holding encounter was consensual because neither...