State v. Johnson
Decision Date | 13 July 1970 |
Docket Number | No. 1,No. 54829,54829,1 |
Citation | 456 S.W.2d 1 |
Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Robert Lee JOHNSON, Appellant |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., Peter H. Ruger, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.
James C. Jones, III, St. Louis, for defendant.
Defendant appeals from a judgment of a conviction of first degree murder, with a life sentence.
The state's evidence was that on the evening of May 23, 1968, Sam Travis and his wife were tending their confectionary store at the southwest corner of Webster Avenue and Thomas Street in St. Louis. Witness Willie Nettles testified he was on the corner across the street with some other teenagers. Three other youths, Glenn Valentine, Michael Quinn, and defendant Robert Johnson, whom Nettles had seen together around the neighborhood, joined the group. The three said they were going in the store to rob Travis and wanted Nettles to join them, but he did not. The three entered the store, there was a struggle between Travis and the two, Quinn and Johnson. Several shots were fired and Travis was killed. The three ran out of the store and scattered. Nettles reported what he had seen to the police and defendant was arrested later that evening.
Defendant testified. His defense was that he was at his sister's house where there was a party going on. He knew nothing about the attempted robbery and shooting until someone who had been at the corner came to the house and told them Mr. Travis had been shot and then they all went up to the corner to see what had happened. He was supported in this by his sister and by two of his friends. Glenn Valentine, who had earlier pleaded guilty to the Travis murder, testified for defendant that it was Willie Nettles and Mike Quinn who came out of the confectionary and that defendant was not involved.
Defendant does not contend the state did not make a submissible case. His contention is that the trial court committed prejudicial error and that a new trial is required because of error in refusing a motion to suppress and later admitting into evidence a letter written by defendant when he was in jail awaiting trial, which letter was censored by the guards as outgoing 1 mail and turned over to the police, who informed the circuit attorney about it.
The letter, written in the city jail November 7, 1968, reads as follows:
'Dear Dent
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the warden of the municipal jail testified the jail employees censor outgoing and incoming mail for security purposes to avoid escapes or the smuggling in of instruments which would facilitate escapes, and contraband, such as narcotics. The warden did not instruct his employees to inspect or confiscate any mail which may contain an admission of guilt.
At the trial, the guard officer testified that when a person comes in the jail he signs a slip authorizing the jail authorities to censor all mail--incoming and outgoing. The paper signed by defendant, although an exhibit in the case, seems to be lost and thus we do not know exactly what it was defendant signed or how it read. Outgoing letters come to the jail authorities unsealed; they are censored, then sealed and sent out. The grounds for the motion to suppress were that the letter was obtained and used in violation of specific constitutional provisions, state and federal, pertaining to search and seizure and self-incrimination. At the trial when the letter was offered in evidence these objections were repeated and, in addition, objections were made to that portion of the letter reading, and , on the ground these portions were so prejudicial to defendant that their introduction would deprive defendant of a fair trial.
Addressing ourselves first to the objections to the admission of the letter at all, what we have here is a letter containing an admission of guilt which defendant says should not be used against him and which no doubt was helpful to the state in convicting defendant. His objection that the admission was obtained by an unconstitutional search and seizure is not well taken, because he composed and released the letter knowing it would be read by the jailer prior to mailing. This is the only way he could get a letter mailed, but he was not cut off from using the mail altogether and could have written for help without incrimination. In the final analysis, he himself laid in front of the jailer that which he now seeks to preserve as private. The authorities did not act surreptitiously or lead him to think that what he wrote would be held secret and then...
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...because Smith in fact testified, the jury could equally infer that they had heard all of the evidence. Appellant cites State v. Johnson, 456 S.W.2d 1 (Mo.1970), in support of his claim of prejudicial error. In Johnson, the defendant wrote a letter to a third person in which he stated that a......
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