State v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 06 December 2011
• Docket Number: SC 91182,SC 91214,Nos. SC 91173,SC 91429.,s. SC 91173
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Howard D. JOHNSON, Appellant.State of Missouri, Appellant, v. Andrea M. Hicks, Respondent.State of Missouri, Appellant, v. Dustin Tom Kingsley, Respondent.State of Missouri, Appellant, v. Heather Sue Kingsley, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

354 S.W.3d 627

STATE of Missouri, Respondent,

v.Howard D. JOHNSON, Appellant.State of Missouri, Appellant,

v.Andrea M. Hicks, Respondent.State of Missouri, Appellant,

v.Dustin Tom Kingsley, Respondent.State of Missouri, Appellant,

v.Heather Sue Kingsley, Respondent.

Nos. SC 91173

SC 91182

SC 91214

SC 91429.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.

Dec. 6, 2011.

Ellen H. Flottman and Alexa I. Pearson, Public Defender's Office, Columbia, for Howard D. Johnson, in No. SC91173.

Joshua N. Corman, Howell County Prosecutor's office, for State, in No. SC91182.

Terrence M. Messonier, Attorney General's Office, Jefferson City, for State, in Nos. SC91214 and SC91429.

Daniel N. McPherson, Attorney General's Office, Jefferson City, for State, in No. SC91173.Matthew M. Ward, Public Defender's Office, Columbia, for Andrea M. Hicks, in No. SC91182.Sarah Duncan, Johns, Mitchell & Duncan LLC, Clinton, for Dustin Tom Kingsley and Heather Sue Kingsley, in Nos. SC91214 and SC91429.MARY R. RUSSELL, Judge.

Four appeals have been consolidated ¹ because each involves the issue of whether evidence obtained in a search of a motor vehicle incident to a traffic arrest is admissible. The defendants were secured at the time of search, and there was no reason to believe that evidence of the crime for which each defendant was arrested was in any of their vehicles. The searches were performed in compliance with binding appellate precedent. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981); State v. Harvey 648 S.W.2d 87, 89–90 (Mo. banc 1983). However, while these four cases were pending, Arizona v. Gant was decided, holding that such searches were unlawful. 556 U.S. 332, 343, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 1719, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009). Each defendant, relying on Gant, filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from these searches. The question before this Court is whether the exclusionary rule suppresses evidence obtained in a search conducted in compliance with binding appellate precedent when such precedent was later overturned.

This issue was resolved under a similar factual situation in Davis v. U.S., ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011). There, the Supreme Court held that a motor vehicle search incident to a traffic arrest that occurred prior to Gant, violated the Fourth Amendment when the arrestee was secured, and when there was no reason to believe that there was evidence of the crime of the arrest in the vehicle. Id. at 2431. Davis concluded, however, that this Fourth Amendment violation did not warrant the harshness of the exclusionary rule because the officer was acting in “objectively reasonable reliance” on binding appellate precedent. Id. at 2434.

Article I, section 15 of the Missouri Constitution protects against unreasonable searches and seizures to the same extent as the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Oliver, 293 S.W.3d 437, 442 (Mo. banc 2009). Accordingly, in light of Davis, this Court holds that when an officer conducts a search incident to arrest in “objectively reasonable reliance” on binding appellate precedent that is later overturned, the exclusionary rule does not suppress the evidence obtained as a result of that search.

The judgment overruling the motion to suppress in Howard Johnson's case is affirmed. The judgments sustaining the motions to suppress in Dustin Kingsley's, Heather Kingsley's, and Andrea Hicks' cases are reversed and remanded.

I. Facts

A. Johnson

Howard Johnson was arrested for driving without a valid license. Incident to the arrest, the arresting trooper searched Johnson's vehicle while Johnson sat in the patrol car. The search turned up pieces of a white “rock-type substance”—later confirmed to be cocaine—in the front of the vehicle. The trooper also found a cigarette box with crack cocaine smoking paraphernalia—a glass pipe, a broken piece of car antenna covered in cocaine residue, copper mesh that is commonly used as a filter when smoking crack cocaine, and a brown paper sack that contained a soda can with the lid and bottom cut out and rolled into a tube.

Johnson was charged with driving without a valid license, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Before trial, he prepared and submitted a pro se motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the search of his vehicle. His arguments in support of the motion included that the evidence was illegally obtained in an unlawful search and seizure. The motion was overruled after a hearing, and trial counsel renewed the objections to the evidence seized from the vehicle. Again, his objections were overruled, and the trial court allowed the evidence to be presented. After a jury trial, Johnson was convicted of operating a motor vehicle without a valid license and possession of a controlled substance.²

B. Hicks

Andrea Hicks was arrested for driving while her license was suspended. The arresting officer handcuffed her and placed her on the curb. Subsequently, the officer searched her vehicle because he believed he had the authority to do so incident to her arrest. That search produced a syringe containing methamphetamine. Hicks was charged with possession of a controlled substance. She filed a motion to suppress, which the trial court sustained. The court reasoned that Hicks' motion to suppress should be sustained under Gant.

C. Dustin and Heather Kingsley

An officer stopped a vehicle driven by Dustin Kingsley. Heather Kingsley was riding in the in the passenger seat.³ The officer asked Dustin for his driver's license, and he informed the officer that he did not have one because his license had been revoked. The officer observed that Dustin appeared nervous and contacted dispatch to confirm that his license had been revoked. After the officer received confirmation of revocation, he handcuffed Dustin and placed him in the back of his patrol car. Around the time the officer was arresting Dustin, another officer searched the stopped vehicle incident to Dustin's arrest. Heather was instructed to wait by the back of the car. During the search, the officer found a spoon, a syringe, and some small bags of a white powdery substance. After the search, Heather was also arrested.

Dustin and Heather were both charged with possession of a controlled substance. Both filed motions to suppress the evidence obtained during the search. The trial court sustained both motions because it found the search was prohibited by Gant.

II. Standard of Review

A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress must be supported by substantial evidence. State v. Gaw, 285 S.W.3d 318, 319 (Mo. banc 2009). The facts and reasonable inferences from such facts are considered favorably to the trial court's ruling, and contrary evidence and inferences are disregarded. Id. It is a question of law whether the searches in these cases were permissible and whether the exclusionary rule applies to the evidence seized as a result of those searches. Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id. at 320.

While provisions of our state constitution may be interpreted to provide more expansive protections than comparable federal constitutional provisions, analysis of a section of the federal constitution is strongly persuasive in construing the like section of our state constitution. Doe v. Phillips, 194 S.W.3d 833, 841 (Mo. banc 2006). This Court has interpreted the protections of article I, section 15 of the Missouri Constitution to be coextensive with the protections guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution because both provisions provide the same guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures. Oliver, 293 S.W.3d at 442.

III. Analysis

A. Search of the Passenger Compartment of a Vehicle Incident to Arrest

In New York v. Belton, the Supreme Court held that an officer making a lawful custodial arrest of an occupant of a vehicle may, incident to that arrest, conduct a warrantless search of the passenger compartment of the arrestee's vehicle. 453 U.S. 454, 460, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981). Belton instituted a bright-line rule because police officers needed direction to know the scope of their authority in the field. Id. at 459–60, 101 S.Ct. 2860.⁴ Belton was “widely understood to allow a vehicle search incident to the arrest of a recent occupant even if there is no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at the time of the search.” Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1718. This Court adopted this interpretation of Belton in State v. Harvey, 648 S.W.2d 87, 89–90 (Mo. banc 1983). ⁵

Twenty-eight years after Belton, the Supreme Court revisited the vehicle-search incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement in Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1716. Gant rejected the interpretation of Belton that allowed for a search of the arrestee's vehicle incident to arrest based on the justification of officer safety when the arrestee was secured in the back of a police vehicle. Id. at 1720–21. Instead, Gant stated:

Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. When these justifications are absent, a search of an arrestee's vehicle will be unreasonable unless police obtain a warrant or show that another exception to the warrant requirement applies.

Id. at 1723–24. In so stating, Gant invalidated the widely accepted interpretation of Belton endorsed by this Court in Harvey. See Harvey, 648 S.W.2d at 89–90. After Gant, when an arrestee is secured out of reaching distance of the vehicle, officers are no longer constitutionally allowed to search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to an arrest based upon the rationale of officer safety. Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1723–24.

B. The United States Supreme Court Decision in Davis.

1. “Objectively Reasonable Reliance” on Binding Appellate Precedent

Earlier this year,...