State v. Jones
| Decision Date | 29 October 1936 |
| Docket Number | 14363. |
| Parties | STATE v. JONES. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from General Sessions Circuit Court of Marlboro County; S.W G. Shipp, Judge.
Jasper Jones was convicted of manslaughter, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
J. K Owens and J. J. Evans, both of Bennettsville, for appellant.
S. S Tison, Sol., and N.W. Edens, both of Bennettsville, for the State.
On September 26, 1935, the defendant, Jasper Jones, was tried in the court of general sessions for Marlboro county upon an indictment charging him with the murder of one G. W. Cole. He was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to imprisonment for a period of eight years.
The homicide occurred on August 17, 1935, at the defendant's home in the town of McColl. It appears that Jones was a policyholder in the Virginia Life Insurance Company; and that Cole represented this company as an assistant district manager, whose duties were to visit the homes of some of the policyholders every few months "to make inspections" with regard to premiums paid; that is to say, to see if the premium receipt book which the policyholder kept in his possession and the book of the agent of the company who collected the premiums were "marked up correctly." Jones claimed that he had ordered Cole, because of his offensive and insulting conduct on the occasion of at least one of his visits, to stay away from defendant's house, but that he would not do so. In addition to his plea of not guilty, the defendant pleaded self-defense and defense of the home.
Upon call of the case for trial, counsel for Jones moved for a continuance beyond the term, upon the following ground: "That the homicide occurred within the past thirty days, and on the eve of the trial, on yesterday, we received a letter containing information as to certain evidence that might be of benefit to the defendant." This letter, dated September 24, 1935, was exhibited to the court. It indicated that the writer had conferred with some one, and was advised that Cole at one time was connected with the Norfolk & Western Railway as fireman or engineer, but was discharged for infractions of its rules; that he thereafter went to Roanoke and was employed by the Virginia Life Insurance Company, and "they also let him out for some reason not known to my informer"; that later he was reinstated with this company and was sent to Florence, S. C.; but that before going to that city he was with the company at Anderson, where he was shot by his wife and seriously wounded.
The trial Judge refused the motion for the reason, as stated by him, that the letter contained no information which would serve as a basis for the exercise by the court of a "wise, judicial discretion in continuing the case"; that no names of prospective witnesses were given, the writer merely stating that he had heard certain things; that the court had no power to require residents of Virginia to respond to a subp na; and that the testimony at Anderson, which counsel for the defendant already had in their possession, would be merely cumulative. Also, to prove specific acts of violence, such acts must be closely associated in point of time to be admissible at all, which was not shown by the letter.
Appellant argues that the court abused its discretion, which amounted to manifest error of law, in not continuing the case under the circumstances detailed. We are not in agreement with this contention. An inspection of the letter relied upon, without further reference to its contents, satisfies us that Judge Shipp's analysis of it was entirely correct, and that he could not have done otherwise than to refuse the motion. The additional contention that the appellant was entitled to more time in which to prepare his case, is also wholly without merit. While an accused person should not be rushed into trial without full opportunity to meet the accusation made against him (State v. Rabens, 79 S.C. 542, 60 S.E. 442, 1110), five weeks had elapsed in the case at bar between the date of the homicide and the date on which the trial was had, and the appellant made no satisfactory showing that such time was not ample for the preparation of his case. We approve the action of the trial judge in refusing a continuance. See State v. Crosby, 160 S.C. 301, 158 S.E. 685; State v. Kennedy, 177 S.C. 195, 181 S.E. 35.
Error is also assigned to the trial court in not sustaining appellant's objection to certain testimony of the State's witness, H. D. Long, and especially in permitting him to answer the following question: "What were Mr. Cole's duties with reference to this premium receipt book?"
The contention is, and was made the ground of objection below, that the duties of Cole were contractual obligations between him and the insurance company and that the defendant was not bound by them any further than might appear from the terms of the policy itself; that, certainly, the company could have no right to authorize its agents to enter upon the premises of the insured over his objection for any reason whatsoever.
Judge Shipp ruled that the witness might answer the question for the purpose of showing what Cole's duties were, it being purely a question of what his business was; but also at the time made the following statement: And in his charge to the jury he told them that a man "has the right to forbid any one to come into his home, and if he gives notice to some one not to enter his home, a person so entering after notice not to enter becomes a trespasser." He also charged that "if a man is in his own home and has forbidden somebody else to enter in there, he has the right to use such force as is reasonably necessary to prevent that person from entering."
An examination of the record convinces us that the testmiony was merely intended to show what Cole's duties were, and...
To continue reading
Request your trial