State v. Jones

• Decision Date: 04 December 1942
• Docket Number: 15476.
• Citation: 23 S.E.2d 387,201 S.C. 403
• Parties: STATE v. JONES.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

23 S.E.2d 387

201 S.C. 403

STATE v. JONES.

No. 15476.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

December 4, 1942

John C. Lanham, R. B. Paslay, Jr., and Matthew Poliakoff, all of Spartanburg, for appellant.

Samuel R. Watt, Sol., of Spartanburg, for respondent.

L. D LIDE, Acting Associate Justice.

The defendant, Jesse Jones, a negro youth about nineteen years of age, was indicted for the murder of one J. L. Hughes, a white man, who was found dead at his home in Spartanburg County, on or about February 24, 1942. Upon this indictment the defendant was tried at the April, 1942, term of the Court of General Sessions for Spartanburg County before Hon. M. M. Mann, presiding Judge, and a jury. We quote the following from the "Statement" contained in the transcript of record:

"Attorneys were appointed by the presiding Judge on April 20, 1942, to represent the defendant, and they entered a plea of not guilty and also interposed a plea of insanity.

"On April 21, 1942, the defense attorneys made a motion to have the defendant sent to the State Hospital for a period of thirty days for a mental examination and observation, as provided under Section 6239 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1932, and to continue the case until the next succeeding term of Court of General Sessions for Spartanburg County.

"The motion was refused, but an Order was passed by his Honor Judge Mann to have two local physicians examine the defendant and to report their findings, and defendant was ordered to trial on April 23, 1942."

The trial resulted in a verdict of guilty returned on the same day; and thereupon the presiding Judge sentenced the defendant to die by electrocution on June 12, 1942. From the judgment and sentence of the Court this appeal is taken by the defendant upon nine exceptions which his counsel in their printed brief reduced to six main questions.

The first question relates to the motion of the appointed counsel for the defendant, three in number, for an order to have the defendant committed to the State Hospital for a period of thirty days for examination and observation, as provided in and by Section 6239, Code 1932; this motion having been overruled by the presiding Judge. The remarks of counsel thereon appear to have been set forth in full in the transcript of record, from which it will be seen that the attorneys for the defendant made an urgent and earnest plea that the motion be granted, stating in effect that from their investigation of the case, necessarily somewhat hurried, it appeared that the only serious question they were in a position to raise was the mental condition of the defendant, and they felt that they needed the services of experts in mental diseases. They stated that they had communicated with a psychiatrist whose attendance, however could not be had, and the name of a physician was mentioned by them with whom they had consulted, but apparently they were unable to procure his services, and they also said he "would not want to make only a cursory examination." They said further that the local physicians had advised them that they should have the opinion of a psychiatrist. The presiding Judge, after hearing arguments of counsel, including of course that of the Solicitor, stated that the "local doctors deal in both physical and mental diseases," and his ruling was that it was the duty of the Court "not to postpone the trial any further." He did, however, sign an order to have the defendant examined by two local physicians, as appears from the excerpt above quoted.

Section 6239, which provides for commitment by a Circuit Judge to the State Hospital of a defendant for examination and observation as to mental capacity was before the Court in the case of State v. Anderson, 181 S.C. 527, 188 S.E. 186, 190 in which the carefully considered opinion was delivered by Mr. Justice Baker, from which we quote the following: "We are inclined to the opinion, after a careful study of the wording of section 6239, that it was not the intention of the Legislature to make it compulsory that one charged with a crime, who sets up the defense of insanity and irresponsibility, be committed to the hospital for observation, but that it is discretionary with the trial judge. The statute says the judge 'is authorized to commit to the State hospital any person charged with the commission of any criminal offense who shall, upon the trial before him, be adjudged insane, or in whom there is a question as to the relation of mental disease to the alleged crime, whether such question is raised by the prosecution or defense, or it appears to the judge from any evidence brought before him or upon his own recognition."'

We adhere to the judgment thus expressed that the matter is one within the discretion of the trial Judge. And in the case at bar there can be no doubt whatever that the just and learned presiding Judge desired to see that the rights of the defendant were fully protected in every respect, however heinous might be the charge against him. And we find from the record before us that he properly reached the conclusion that a mental examination of the defendant should be had, but he provided that such an examination be made by two reputable local physicians named by him. These doctors, however, did not profess to be experts in mental diseases, and were allowed a very brief time for their examination, while an examination at the State Hospital pursuant to the statute in question would have been made by specialists in mental disorders, and a sufficient time both for examination and continued observation, to wit, thirty days, would have been allowed.

It was suggested by the able and experienced Solicitor in opposition to the motion that this question might be raised in the case of every homicide and hence there might be much resulting delay. But every case really stands on its own bottom, and the proper exercise of discretion depends upon the particular circumstances. We may say, however, that a motion of this kind by a defendant involves a "two-edged sword," for a finding in favor of sanity by the State Hospital authorities would inevitably tend to impair the defense of insanity interposed by such a defendant.

In view of the fact that the examination provided by the trial Judge was, as might well have been apprehended, distinctly inadequate we are constrained to hold that the refusal of the motion for a State Hospital examination was an erroneous exercise of the judicial discretion. This conclusion is strongly confirmed by the testimony of the two physicians who made the examination pursuant to the order of Court and who testified at the trial in behalf of the defendant. One of these was Dr. Oscar B. Wilson, a practicing physician of Spartanburg, who stated that he had joined in the examination of the defendant, but that to make a complete examination "usually requires about thirty (30) days." Hence he testified in substance that since he had merely made one rather superficial examination he could express his opinion "only tentatively," and he repeated this assertion. We quote the following from his testimony:

"Q. From the observation you have been able to make, Doctor, what is your opinion? A. Of course, as I said, I can only make a tentative diagnosis from an immature and limited observation. I would say that my opinion at this time is that he is sane.

"Q. Do you think that opinion might be changed if a psychiatrist after a thorough observation and examination might come to a different conclusion? A. Yes; there is great possibility and even probability of change; general practitioners don't pretend to qualify as psychiatrist." The other doctor was Dr. William T. Hendricks, another practicing physician of Spartanburg, who made the examination with Dr. Wilson. We quote the following from his testimony:

"Q. Tell the jury in your own words what your findings were and what your conclusions are? A. I found it impossible to come to any just and definite conclusion on that one examination. I think certainly he is of low mentality; but I can't help but feel that he knows right from wrong.

"Q. How long do physicians who specialize in mental diseases want or require to come to just and definite conclusions-- much more than a superficial examination like that you have mentioned, at any rate, do they not? A. Yes, sir; I should think so; after such observation and examination, I should think their conclusions would be much more reliable than at one cursory glance.

*****

" Q. From your knowledge and hearing the case such as you have heard, it is your opinion that Jesse Jones does know right from wrong? A. I feel that way, on that short examination; but I also feel that is too short an examination. I do not know enough about mental diseases to honestly express an opinion one way or another. Personally I feel that he knows right from wrong, in fairness all the way around. That is my personal opinion and not my professional opinion. My mind just changes from one way to the other."

It is manifest that each of these physicians was decidedly impressed with the fact that he had not been able to make such an examination as would enable him to speak with reasonable certainty as to the soundness of his opinions, but that a more thorough examination by specialists should be made, with proper opportunity for somewhat continued observation.

Another question raised by the defendant's counsel on this appeal to the effect that the presiding Judge unduly limited the testimony of these physicians does not seem to us to require any discussion, for they appear to have been allowed to testify fully in the light of the well-settled law of this State as to mental capacity in criminal cases.

Upon the examination of the physician who testified as to the cause...