State v. Jones
| Decision Date | 05 July 1994 |
| Parties | 94-0459 La |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
Numa V. Bertel, Dwight M. Doskey, Orleans Indigent Defender Program, for applicant.
Richard Ieyoub, Atty. Gen., Harry F. Connick, Dist. Atty., Mark D. Pethke, Asst. Dist. Atty., for respondent.
Ellis Paul Adams, Jr., amicus curiae for Louisiana Dist. Atty. Assn.
Denise LeBoeuf, Clive Adrian Stafford Smith, amicus curiae for Louisiana Crisis Asst. Center and Louisiana Death Penalty Res. Center.
John Michael Lawrence, Alan Jeffrey Golden, amicus curiae for Raymond Anthony Rawlins.
John Michael Lawrence, Kurt Joseph Goins, Alan Jeffrey Golden, amicus curiae for Brandon Haynes.
The issue in the pretrial phase of this death penalty case is the constitutionality of LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.2(B), added to Louisiana's capital sentencing provisions by Act 436 of 1993. 2 The provision requires the trial court, during the sentencing phase of a capital trial, to instruct the jurors regarding the governor's power to grant a reprieve, pardon or commutation of sentence following conviction of a crime. Finding LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.2(B) in direct contravention to defendant's due process right to a fundamentally fair trial and to defendant's right to humane treatment, we declare it is unconstitutional.
I.
Defendant, Lester Jones, was indicted by an Orleans Parish Grand Jury on June 18, 1992 for the first degree murder of a British tourist, Julie Stott. The murder allegedly occurred in [94-0459 La. 2] the French Quarter on the 1100 block of Rue Chartres during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of an armed robbery on April 14, 1992. 3
Defendant filed a motion in limine on December 7, 1993. The motion moved to restrain the prosecution from mentioning in voir dire, opening statement or argument that the governor retains the power to pardon or commute a life sentence, and to have the trial court declare in advance of trial that it will not charge the jury regarding to the power of the governor or executive branch to pardon or commute a life sentence. Defendant's motion was denied.
Defendant applied directly to this court for supervisory relief from the denial of his motion. We stayed trial and transferred defendant's application to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal. State v. Jones, No. 94-KK-0459 (La. February 24, 1994). The appellate court granted defendant's application for review, but denied him relief. In Re: Lester Jones, No. 94-K-0310 (La.App. 4th Cir. February 18, 1994). Noting that defendant's pre-trial motion attacked the constitutionality of LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.2(B), as enacted by Act 436 of 1993, the appellate court declined to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction to provide an advisory opinion as to the conduct of the prosecutor during the guilt phase of trial and as to the jury instructions of the trial court during sentencing. Id.
Thereafter, this court vacated its previously issued stay order and remanded the case to the district court. State v. Jones, 634 So.2d 838 (La.1994). The order indicated the case could proceed to trial upon the district attorney's stipulation that he would forego use of LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.2(B). Id. The order further indicated that if the district attorney chose not to forego use of LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.2(B), he should notify this court of his decision, in which case this court would stay trial, grant defendant's application and assign the case for oral argument. Id. When the district attorney decided not to forego use of LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.2(B), we granted defendant's writ application. State v. Jones, 634 So.2d 845 (La.1994).
[94-0459 La. 3] II.
Defendant's writ application does not seek an advisory opinion on the constitutionality of LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.2(B). See generally American Waste & Pollution Control Co. v. St. Martin Parish Police Jury, 627 So.2d 158 (La.1993). Instead, it provokes employment of our supervisory jurisdiction and plenary authority to consider the constitutionality of a capital sentencing provision which the law requires the trial court to implement in all capital sentencing hearings, and which the state declined to forego commenting on in the guilt and/or sentencing phases of trial. LSA-Const. Art. 5, § 5. See State v. Peart, 621 So.2d 780, 790-791 (La.1993). Cf. State v. Jackson, 608 So.2d 949 (La.1992); State v. Bernard, 608 So.2d 966 (La.1992). Thus, since a death sentence is qualitatively different from any other sentence and we have a duty to ensure against arbitrary imposition of the death penalty, we invoke our plenary authority to evaluate the constitutionality of LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.2(B) at this stage, rather than unnecessarily chancing retrial of a capital case. See LSA-Const. Art. 5, § 5; Supreme Court Rule 28, § 1; LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.9.
III.
In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), the United States Supreme Court recognized that the penalty of death is different in kind from any other punishment imposed under the American criminal justice system. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2932, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976). Because of the uniqueness of the death penalty, Furman holds that it could not be imposed under sentencing procedures which created a substantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Id. Where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, Furman mandates that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action. 428 U.S. at 188-189, 96 S.Ct. at 2932. To minimize the risk that the death penalty will be imposed on a capriciously selected group of offenders, the decision to impose death has to be guided by standards so that the sentencing authority will focus on the particularized circumstances of the crime and the defendant. 428 U.S. at 199, 96 S.Ct. at 2937.
[94-0459 La. 4] In 1974, in the case of Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 96 S.Ct. 3001, 49 L.Ed.2d 974 (1976), the United States Supreme Court held Louisiana's death penalty scheme then in effect failed to provide a constitutionally adequate response to Furman. State v. Sonnier, 379 So.2d 1336, 1370 (La.1979), on re'hrg. However, on the same day Roberts was rendered, the United States Supreme Court approved the bifurcated capital sentencing procedure it reviewed in Gregg v. Georgia, supra, which divided capital trials into a guilt phase and a sentencing phase. Id. Among other procedures, Georgia's bifurcated scheme required the jury in the sentencing phase to consider the circumstances of the crime and the criminal before recommending a sentence of death. In Gregg, the United States Supreme Court expressly commented that such a procedure directed the jury's attention to the specific circumstances of the crime and focussed its attention on the characteristics of the person who committed the crime. It found, as a result, "while jury discretion still exists, 'the discretion to be exercised is controlled by clear objective standards so as to produce non-discriminatory application.' " 428 U.S. at 197-198, 96 S.Ct. at 2936, citing Coley v. State, 231 Ga. 829, 834, 204 S.E.2d 612, 615 (1974).
In 1976, Louisiana amended its capital sentencing scheme, modeling it after the Georgia scheme approved in Gregg. State v. Sonnier, 379 So.2d at 1370. See LSA-C.Cr.P. arts. 905-905.9; Supreme Court Rule 28, § 1. The adopted scheme specifies that a sentence of death may only be imposed after the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one statutory aggravating circumstance exists and after consideration of any mitigating circumstances. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.3. The sentencing hearing is required to focus on the circumstances of the offense and the character and propensities of the offender. LSA-C.Cr.P. art 905.2. Every sentence of death is then reviewed by this court to determine if it is excessive. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.9; Supreme Court Rule 28, § 1.
After these sentencing procedures were in place, this court noted that the possibility of pardon or commutation was quickly becoming a major issue in Louisiana's capital sentencing hearings. State v. Lindsey, 404 So.2d 466, 485 (La.1981), cert. den., 464 U.S. 908, 104 S.Ct. 261, 78 L.Ed.2d 246, re'hg den., 464 U.S. 1004, 104 S.Ct. 515, 78 L.Ed.2d 702 (1983). This generated concern because the injection of such factors into the sentencing phase of a capital trial diverts the jurors from their primary responsibility, charges them to make decisions [94-0459 La. 5] not proper within their duty as jurors (by speculating what a present or future governor may do) and creates a substantial likelihood that the death penalty will be imposed as a product of arbitrary factors. Id.
Since the sentencing scheme then in effect did not expressly provide for the jury's consideration of a pardon and commutation and, more importantly, because the purposeful injection of comments on pardon and commutation provokes the jury to speculate about future actions of governors, induces the jury to consider whether the present or a future governor would improperly pardon or commute a sentence (thereby pre-empting the governor's power and unconstitutionally invoking the death penalty to defeat the constitutional design of the pardon power), and motivates the jury to act out of fear of the unknown possibility that the defendant may be returned to society, we implemented an almost blanket prohibition of discussion of such matters. See 404 So.2d at 486-487. Consequently, based upon the magnitude of the potential for arbitrary jury decision making and the irrelevance of clemency to the jury's duty in a capital sentencing hearing, we held that,
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