State v. Jones

• Citation: 16 A.2d 103
• Parties: STATE v. JONES et al.
• Decision Date: 30 October 1940
• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US)

16 A.2d 103

STATE

v. JONES et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Oct. 30, 1940.

[Copyrighted material omitted.]

Exceptions from Superior Court, Franklin County.

Mildred A. Jones and Dana E. Howland were indicted and tried for lewd and lascivious cohabitation, and they took exceptions to the charge of the presiding justice.

Exceptions overruled, and judgment directed for the state.

Argued before STURGIS, C. J., and THAXTER, HUDSON, MANSER, WORSTER, and MURCHIE, JJ.

Hubert Ryan, Co. Atty., for the State.

Currier C. Holman, of Farmington, for defendants.

MANSER, Justice.

Upon completion of the evidence in the trial of the respondents upon an indictment charging them with lewd and lascivious cohabitation, and the charge of the presiding justice, the following exceptions were taken:

"The respondents object to the whole charge as it is an argument for the State instead of a statement of the law.

"That the charge was prejudicial to the rights of the respondents."

Exceptions such as these have been characterized as serving only as a dragnet with the apparent hope that something might be brought to light and made use of as a valid cause of complaint. State v. Reed, 62 Me. 129. Exceptions to "all matters stated in the charge" are criticised in State v. Pike, 65 Me. 111. In Macintosh v. Bartlett, 67 Me. 130, the Court said:

"Sufficient warning has been given that this court is not disposed to entertain exceptions thus taken."

In Harriman v. Sanger, 67 Me. 442, at page 445, the Court gave notice that:

"This mode of practice, long ago condemned by several of the most respectable courts of the land, and properly characterized by this court in State v. Reed, 62 Me. 129, 135, will be tolerated no longer."

To the same effect, see Bacheller v. Pinkham, 68 Me. 253; Crosby v. Maine Cent. Railroad Co., 69 Me. 418; McKowan v. Powers, 86 Me. 291, at page 296, 29 A. 1079.

In Hamlin v. Treat, 87 Me. 310, at page 315, 32 A. 909, at page 910, in which the defendant presented a general bill of exceptions embracing more than one-half of the entire charge and claiming an expression of opinion by the presiding Justice upon issues of fact, the Court said:

"It is unnecessary to say that this method of spreading out a whole charge, or even to the extent as disclosed in this case, is not countenanced by the court, and were we to consider the exceptions in reference to this mode of practice they would fall within that class of cases which characterize such a bill of exceptions as irregular."

The respondents are not of right entitled to be heard. The exceptions are insufficient. They are within the category concerning which there has been emphatic pronouncement by the court heretofore. A well marked course has been laid down to follow by Statute (R.S. c. 91, Sec. 24), Rule of Court XVIII and decisions.

The Court, however, is conscious that, notwithstanding the failure to present a proper bill of exceptions, yet the Constitution of Maine, Article I, Sec. 6, guarantees to the accused in all criminal prosecutions, the right to an impartial trial. The Legislature has provided, R.S. c. 96, Sec. 104, that the expression of opinion upon questions of fact by the presiding justice is sufficient cause for a new trial upon exceptions. This is undoubtedly an additional safeguard to assure, beyond peradventure, the constitutional guaranty.

Without intending to indicate the course which the Court may see fit to follow in the future in cases not properly presented, but in order that the respondents may be fully protected in their rights, the Court is constrained to proceed in the present case to a consideration of the objections which the respondents have faultily attempted to raise. It would appear that the real intention was to assert a violation on the part of the presiding justice of the provisions of the statute cited supra, through some expression of opinion as to issues of fact in his charge.

This statute reads as follows:

"During a jury trial the presiding justice shall rule and charge the jury, orally or in writing, upon all matters of law arising in the case, but shall not, during the trial, including the charge, express an opinion upon issues of fact arising in the case, and such expression of opinion is sufficient cause for a new trial, if either party aggrieved thereby and interested desires it; and the same shall be ordered accordingly by the law court upon exceptions."

It has been a part of our law since 1874. It has received judicial construction in many cases since.

Without attempting novelty of expression, but summarizing judicial declaration as to fundamental concepts concerning the function, responsibility and duty of a judge presiding over a jury trial, we reiterate and emphasize that.

"When the Legislature, in denning the respective functions of the court and of the jury in the trial of a case, laid down the inhibition that the judge must not express opinion on arising issues of fact, it went no further in its meaning than that he should refrain from speaking of the facts in manner implying his utterance entitled to obedience. * * * He must separate the questions of law from the questions of fact and, thus disunited, send the questions of fact to the province of the jury, free from authoritative verbal invasion by himself. But it never was intended that a judge should sit listlessly by, fulfilling duty as though he were administering the rules in a contest for superiority by chance and skill, utterly powerless to aid in the ascertainment of truth as the underlying essential to a proper verdict. Far from it. The Legislature meant that, in the employment of the experience of his career, he should make the positions and contentions of the litigants clear, by stating, analyzing, comparing, and explaining the evidence, by stripping it of extraneous considerations, pointing out any seeming contradictions, resolving it into...