State v. Jones

Decision Date17 November 1936
PartiesThe State v. Arthur Jones, alias Will Jackson, alias Johnny Starks, Appellant
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Appeal from Circuit Court of City of St. Louis; Hon. Chas. B Williams, Judge.

Affirmed.

Emanuel Williams for appellant.

Roy McKittrick, Attorney General, and Russell C Stone. Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.

OPINION

Leedy J.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis sentencing appellant to a term of fifteen years in the penitentiary on his conviction, under the Habitual Criminal Statute, for attempted robbery in the first degree by means of a dangerous and deadly weapon. Appellant not having favored us with a brief, we look to the motion for a new trial for his assignments of error, of which there are three. They relate to (1) the manner in which defendant was charged; (2) the propriety of receiving evidence of his prior conviction before appellant took the stand; and (3) an alleged erroneous instruction as to the matter of punishment.

Inasmuch as the sufficiency of the evidence is not challenged, a brief outline of the facts will suffice. The evidence on the part of the State was to the effect that at about eleven-thirty P. M., on August 29, 1932, one James C. Foster, a watchman, was walking south on the west side of Theresa Street in the city of St. Louis. As he proceeded to cross the intersection of that street and Market Street, he observed two colored men near the southwest corner of the intersection. They were standing near, or leaning against a building on that corner, and on the Theresa Street side. There was a street light on the corner. As Foster reached the point where the first colored man was, the second one stepped up, and, as he described it, "throwed a gun in my stomach and told me to stick them up." Whereupon Foster reached for his gun, and "he throwed a gun in my face and shot me, and I fell." He was shot on the right side of the face. Both colored men then left the scene. An ambulance was called, and Foster was removed to a hospital. Appellant was not apprehended on this charge for nearly two years. When arrested he made a written confession in which he admitted being present at the time and place of the shooting, but attributed the attempted robbery and shooting to his companion, Milburn. Foster's identification of appellant as his assailant was unequivocal. Appellant did not take the stand in his own behalf. Other pertinent facts will be stated in the course of the opinion in connection with the point or points to which they relate.

I. The first proposition mentioned above is covered by the following recitals of the motion for a new trial: "That the court erred in overruling the motion on part of defendant for the consolidation of causes for the purpose of permitting this defendant to defend himself as a co-conspirator, rather than to have been placed before the jury as one who had committed the crime alone. That the evidence tended to show that there were two or more persons present, acting in concert with each other; that if any crime was committed at all, it was committed by two or three persons, acting in conspiracy with each other. That to place this defendant on trial, as the sole perpetrator of the crime, was a fatal error, and prevented this defendant from having a fair and impartial trial."

At the close of the opening statement on the part of the State, in which reference was made to the participation of another in the alleged offense, appellant asked that the jury be discharged, and a mistrial declared, on the asserted ground that appellant had a right to be charged with his codefendant. The statute (Sec. 3553, R. S. 1929, Sec. 3553, Mo. Stat. Ann., p. 3152) does provide that all concerned in an offense jointly committed shall be included in one indictment or information, but by the same section it is expressly provided that "the failure to so join them shall not invalidate the pleadings." In State v. Steptoe, 65 Mo. 640, which was decided before the proviso just mentioned was added to the section the court, in reviewing the ruling on a motion to quash for failure to comply with said section, said, "We think it was intended by this section that when two or more persons are charged before the grand jury with the joint commission of a crime, in preferring a bill they shall find it against all who are charged, and not indict one and let the others go free, so that they will be at liberty to appear and testify in the interest of their confederate. The fact that Coen was not included in the indictment with defendant could certainly work no injury to him, and it is difficult to perceive any reasons why the indictment should be held invalid on that ground. If defendant and Coen had been jointly indicted, he could have been subjected to a separate trial as well under it as under an indictment against him alone." We...

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7 cases
  • State v. Kimbrough
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • November 12, 1942
    ... ... cross-examination about the former conviction, on the ground ... that the record was the best evidence." ...          There ... can be no doubt that the italicized statement in this English ... case and one to the same effect in State v. Jones, ... 339 Mo. 893, 896, 98 S.W.2d 586, 588(5), are literally and ... legally correct. But as to whether and when the issue of ... former conviction should be further submitted in the ... alternative, or converse; and on the question whether a ... judicial admission by the defendant of his ... ...
  • State v. Brinkley
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • March 11, 1946
    ... ... be a matter, which, though not fully proved, would be ... sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt; that it must not do ... State v. Strawther, 342 Mo. 618, 116 S.W.2d 133; ... State v. Malone, 327 Mo. 1217, 39 S.W.2d 786; ... State v. Jones, 174 S.W.2d 797; State v ... Hubbard, 351 Mo. 143, 171 S.W.2d 701. (37) It fails to ... include necessary qualification that appellant was not ... required "to nicely gauge" the amount of force ... needed to repel an attack, although such an instruction was ... requested. State v ... ...
  • State v. Hacker
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • November 8, 1948
    ... ...          With ... the charge against appellant invoking the habitual criminal ... act, it stands adjudged that permitting the State to show ... appellant's prior conviction before he took the stand was ... not error. State v. Jones, 339 Mo. 893, 895(II), 98 ... S.W.2d 586, 587[3, 4]. Consult State v. Murphy, 345 ... Mo. 358, 361[3], 133 S.W.2d 398, 400[5] ...          Error ... was not committed in permitting the State, upon ... appellant's cross-examination, to establish that he had ... been previously ... ...
  • State v. Murphy
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • November 22, 1939
    ... ... State v ... Mosier, 102 S.W.2d 620. (4) The court did not err in ... permitting the circuit attorney in his opening statement to ... comment on the previous conviction of the defendant, who was ... charged under the Habitual Criminal Act. State v ... Jones, 98 S.W.2d 586; State v. Walker, 46 ... S.W.2d 569; State v. Hefflin, 89 S.W.2d 940, 338 Mo ... 236, 103 A. L. R. 1301. (5) The assignment of error number XI ... does not set out the questions and answers appellant ... complains of and motions for new trial do not prove ... themselves, and ... ...
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