State v. Jones
| Decision Date | 17 May 1911 |
| Citation | 71 S.E. 291,89 S.C. 41 |
| Parties | STATE v. JONES. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from General Sessions Circuit Court of Union County; W. B Gruber, Special Judge.
W. T Jones was convicted of murder, and, from an order denying a new trial, he appeals. Affirmed.
George Johnstone, Townsend & Townsend, James Munro, Jno. K. Hamblin and Stanyarne Wilson, for appellant. Solicitor J. C. Otts, P. D. Barron, J. A. Sawyer, and F. Barron Grier, for the State.
ALDRICH A. A. J.
W. T. Jones, the defendant, appellant herein, was tried at the February term of the court of general sessions for Union county, in 1908, upon an indictment charging him with the murder of his wife, Marion E. Jones, by administering or causing to be administered to her strychnine poison. Upon his trial he was convicted of murder, with recommendation to mercy, and sentenced to imprisonment for life in the penitentiary. A motion for a new trial upon the minutes of the court was made before the trial judge, Hon. R. W. Memminger, and was by him refused.
An appeal from the judgment and sentence of the circuit court was taken to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the judgment of the circuit court (86 S.C. 17, 67 S.E. 160). A petition for a rehearing was made in the Supreme Court, and refused. Thereupon the execution of the judgment of the circuit court was stayed by an order of Hon. R. C. Watts, circuit judge, pending a motion for a new trial upon after-discovered evidence. This motion was heard at the summer term of the court of sessions for Union county, upon the petition set out in the brief, by the Honorable W. B. Gruber, special judge, and after a very full hearing the motion was refused. The defendant appeals from the decision of his honor, Judge Gruber, upon 63 exceptions to the decision of the circuit judge.
The first exception is: ' --and numerous decisions of the highest courts of other states. The question seems never to have been made heretofore in this state.
Exceptions 2, 5, 11, 13, 16, 17, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 31, 33, 34, allege error to the ruling of the circuit judge in receiving affidavits of a "negative nature and incompetent because in reply to nothing contained in appellant's affidavits submitted on the motion." Upon the motion for a new trial, the defendant submitted a great number of affidavits going to prove that the deceased, Marion E. Jones was addicted to the taking of strychnine and other drugs, with the object of allaying nervousness, to produce abortion, or to prevent conception, and of taking of her life. The affidavits objected to in these exceptions are from near neighbors, close friends, and intimate associates of the deceased, and all go to the point that they never heard of such things, and knew of nothing justifying such belief.
It is recognized practice in cases of this sort to relax the rules of evidence as applied to trials in court, leaving it to the discretion of the judge hearing the motion to be governed and influenced in reaching his conclusions only by such evidence as legitimately should have that effect. We have the word of the circuit judge that such was the case in this instance, and we have every reason to believe it was so.
Exceptions 3, 7, 9, 21, 32, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 50, assign error to the rulings of the circuit judge in admitting affidavits which the appellant characterizes as "irrelevant and irresponsive to anything in appellant's affidavits submitted upon this motion."
The alleged irrelevant matter is similar to that passed upon in the preceding exceptions just disposed of, and in our view of the case legitimate matter to be brought to the attention of the judge hearing the motion; we do not understand that upon a motion for a new trial upon after-discovered evidence the judge hearing the motion is restricted to a consideration only of the grounds brought to his attention by the moving party; but he is to ascertain if injustice has been done, and if the ends of justice will be served by granting a new trial and to this end he may and should suffer, yea, invite, all the light possible to be turned upon the case in all its bearings, and exclude nothing which can legitimately have that effect, leaving it at last and always to the wise discretion of the judge to humanely guard the rights of the accused, on the one hand, and the interests of society, on the other. We discover throughout that it was in this spirit that the circuit judge approached the consideration of the tedious and difficult questions brought before him, and adhered to it to the end. What has been said in reference to the exceptions heretofore considered applies equally well to exceptions 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 15, 18, 19, 22, 27, 28, 30, 36.
Exceptions 35, 36, 38, charge error in the admission of affidavits which were intended to refute appellant's ground for new trial, namely, that his wife was addicted to taking strychnine to allay nervousness, and for other purposes named. For this purpose, they were clearly germane to the question in dispute.
Exceptions 50, 51, 52, 53, charge error on the part of the circuit judge in admitting the recognizances of certain witnesses on the part of the defense, which were designed to show that their testimony was in the hands of the defendant at the trial, and consequently was not after-discovered, or that due diligence was not displayed in discovering it. The objection was made upon the ground that the recognizances were irrelevant, and not in response to anything in appellant's showing. We think they were relevant and tended to answer the showing made by appellant; but we do not suppose they exercised any material influence upon the mind of the circuit judge; we cannot say there was any abuse of his discretion in receiving the recognizances.
Exceptions 54, 56, 57, 59, 60, 61, refer to the action of the court below in its ruling and actions upon the allegations touching the bias, and prejudice of certain jurors, as shown by their previously formed and expressed opinions. The reasons of the circuit judge amply justify and sustain his rulings on this point. We will have something further to say about it in the further consideration of the case.
Exception 49 charges error on the part of the circuit judge in admitting an affidavit which contradicts a material witness upon the part of the defendant, and one upon whom he strongly relied. The defendant objects to the introduction of this affidavit, upon the ground that it was irrelevant, and not responsive to anything contained in appellant's affidavit. We think it was entirely competent. One Walker Stroud made an affidavit to the effect that he was in the courthouse at the time of the impaneling of the jury upon the trial of the defendant, and heard one of the jury express himself in a manner so hostile to the defendant as to show himself to be unfit to serve as a juror. The affidavit as to the admissions of which appellant complains in this exception avers that said Walker Stroud was not in the courthouse at the time, but to the knowledge of the deponent was miles away. Nothing could have been more relevant or material.
Exception 55 is as follows: "That his honor erred in excluding the following portion of the affidavit of Mrs. Agnes Thomas, to wit: "And that if they had done so she would have known it;" the error being that the statement so excluded was as to a fact, and not an inference. Upon the reading of the affidavit the following colloquy occurred: The argument passes this over without comment, evidently not regarding it material either way, and we cannot see that the defendant was in any way prejudiced by it.
Exception 58 bears upon what occurred prior to the trial, on the first day of the term, in reference to remarks of counsel, protesting against delay and urging a speedy trial, in no wise affecting the grounds of this motion.
Exception 62 charges error in the circuit judge eliminating from the consideration all references to the use of ergot and copperas. If these drugs bore upon the case in any way, his honor ruled that due diligence had not been displayed in discovering their bearing; and, further, that the charge was as to poisoning with strychnine, and he did not see the propriety of widening the scope of the investigation to bring into the consideration extraneous matters which could have little or no effect upon the inquiry. We cannot see that there was any material error in his treatment of this matter.
Exception 63 imputes error to the circuit judge in the following language: "That his honor erred as matter of law in holding: That if a witness is bound over, or is present at the trial, the defendant is presumed to have then been aware of everything such witness could have testified to, and that his failure to put such witness on the stand on the matters as to which h...
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